







# OFFERINGS

TO

# BUONAPARTE.



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1814.



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## C O N T E N T S.

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
1. OF BUONAPARTE AND THE BOURBONS. BY F. A. DE  
• CHATEAUBRIAND.
2. NAPOLEON'S CONDUCT TOWARDS PRUSSIA SINCE THE  
PEACE OF TILSIT.
3. LETTERS OF CALVUS.
4. VIEW OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF EUROPE AFTER THE  
BATTLE OF LEIPSIC.



OF  
BUONAPARTE,  
AND  
'THE BOURBONS,'

AND OF THE NECESSITY  
OF RALLYING ROUND OUR LEGITIMATE PRINCES FOR  
THE HAPPINESS OF FRANCE AND THAT OF EUROPE.

BY  
F. A. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.



LONDON:  
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HANOVER SQUARE.

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1814.



# PREFACE

## . TO THE NEW EDITION.



THE battle was still raging at Montmartre, when the printer, who, as well as myself, was devoted to the cause of the King, came to me for the manuscript of this work. BUONAPARTE was then at Fontainebleau, with 50 or 60 thousand men; nothing was settled respecting the fate of the BOURBONS. In case of a reverse, speedy flight could alone have saved me from death. Ever since the assassination of the Duke D'ENGHIEN, I have, it is true, been accustomed to run all the chances of fortune; though threatened every six months with being shot, cut to pieces, or imprisoned for the remainder of my life, yet I performed what I thought my duty. But circumstanced as I was, when I last

wrote, my mind naturally too much agitated to admit of the strictest observance of propriety. Combattants, on the field of battle, little think of proportioning their blows; I, therefore, considered myself as entitled to indulgence, and writing on a subject of such urgent and general importance, I flattered myself with the hope that all would readily overlook a few inaccuracies unavoidable in a work finished under the roaring of canon, and published, as it were, on the breach.

I shall, however, answer every objection.

Some errors concerning facts, dates, and places, had crept into the first edition; they have been corrected in this.

The Italians are hurt at my having confounded Corsica with Italy, they quote an Italian proverb highly derogatory to BUONAPARTE'S native country.

But I have evidently attacked neither Corsica nor Italy in general; it is, at all

secret friends of the Bourbons, for having dared to introduce in their instructions a few precepts of morality and religion. But those persecutions, so honourable for the members of the university, are at the same time a proof of the truth of my representations: far from having too highly coloured my pictures, I may safely say that they are rather undercharged\*.

Truly happy shall I be to find that this work has done some good; that it has tended to remove the veil with which so odious a tyranny was covered!

My opinion of Buonaparte is sufficiently justified by his *last moments*. I had long foreseen that he would not make an honourable exit: but he has, indeed, exceeded my

\* Several persons have done me the honour to communicate to me some monstrous particulars concerning many branches of his administration; they accuse me of having been *tame* and of not having *spoke out*. I feel much obliged to those well-meaning persons: but the time is not yet come for writing the whole history of BUONAPARTE, and this pamphlet is already too long.



expectation. He retains in his humiliation his character of actor and imitator; he now affects to be cool and indifferent; he passes judgment on himself, he speaks of himself as of another man, of his fall as of an accident that has happened to a neighbour; he reasons about what the BOURBONS have to hope and to fear; he now imitates a Sylla, a Diocletian, as he formerly acted the part of Alexander and Charlemagne. He wishes to appear insensible to every thing, and perhaps he is so in reality. A kind of joy, however, pierces through his apathy; he evidently is happy in having preserved his life. We will not envy him that happiness. He who excites our pity is no longer to be feared.

## PREFACE.

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I HAD begun this Work three or four months ago; events have outrun my wishes; I am too late, and I rejoice at it. Many passages will no longer apply to the political situation of the moment; but if my ideas should only serve to excite a greater detestation of the tyranny from which we have just emerged, and to attach us to the government which is restored to us; its publication would still be of some utility.



## APPENDIX.



*To the Editor of the Journal de Paris.*

SIR,

Several persons have remarked with surprise, that, on alluding in my last work to the generous powers that have just delivered us, I have not mentioned England. I plead guilty, and am extremely concerned for this very involuntary omission: but it finds its excuse in the grandeur of the spectacle which we witnessed, and in the hurry of a composition finished in the midst of a revolution as sudden as incredible. It was but natural, that, during the first moments of our liberty, those august Princes, who first entered our walls, should alone excite the transports of our gratitude: we were justly dazzled with the magnanimity of ALEXANDER, and of the Successor to the GREAT FREDERIC, the recollection of which will live for ever in our hearts. Nor were our eyes fixed with less emotion and admiration on the Austrian Generalissimo, who reminded us of the greatness of the sacrifice of his virtuous and worthy Sovereign.

The other monarchs that entered into this holy league, will for ever be dear to France, for the affection which they bear to our King and the hatred they have vowed to the tyrant. But surely, no Frenchman can forget what he owes to the Prince Regent of England and to the generous nation that has so much contributed to our deliverance. The standards of ELIZABETH waved in the armies of HENRY IV; they again shine conspicuous in the battalions that restore us our LOUIS XVIII.

We are too sensibly alive to glory not to admire that Lord WELLINGTON, who so strikingly recalls the virtues and the talents of our TURENNE. Who is not moved to tears when he recollects that this truly great man promised on our retreat from Portugal two guineas for each French prisoner that should be brought to him alive? On entering our provinces, he by the sole moral force of his character, much more than by the vigour of his military discipline, miraculously checked the resentment of the Portuguese and the vengeance of the Spaniards; in fine, it is under

his banners that the first shouts of **Long live the King!** awakened our unfortunate country ; instead of a captive French monarch, the modern **Black Prince** brings back to **Bordeaux** a free French King. When King **JOHN** was conducted a prisoner to London, he was so affected with the generosity of **EDWARD**, that he conceived a great attachment for his conquerors, and returned to die in the land of his captivity, as if he had foreseen that, at some future time, that land would be the last asylum of the last offspring of his race, and that the descendants of the **TALBOTS** and the **CHANDOS'** would hospitably receive the proscribed posterity of the **LA HIREs** and the **DUGUESCLINS**.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

**DE CAATEAUBRIAND.**

**LIVRES NOUVEAUX,**  
**QUI SE TROUVENT CHEZ COLBURN, LIBRAIRE,**  
**CONDUIT STREET.**

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OF  
BUONAPARTE,  
THE BOURBONS,  
*&c. &c. &c.*

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No, I never shall believe that I am writing over the grave of France: I cannot bring myself to think that when the day of revenge is past the day of mercy is not to dawn upon us. The ancient patrimony of the Most Christian Kings cannot be divided; that kingdom shall not perish which expiring Rome produced from amidst her ruins as the last sample of her grandeur. It is not by the sole efforts of men that the events which we are witnessing have been brought about; the hand of Providence is visible in them all: God himself marches openly at the head of the armies and sits in the coun-



oil of Kings. Unless this divine interference be admitted, how are both, the astonishing rise, and the still more astonishing fall, of him who but lately trampled the world under his feet, to be explained? Fifteen short months have scarcely elapsed since he was at Moscow, and now the Russians are at Paris: from the Pillars of Hercules to the Caucasus all trembled under his sway; and now he is a fugitive, a wanderer without a home: his power overflowed like the coming flood, and disappeared like the ebbing tide.

How are we to account for this madman's faults?—We are not yet speaking of his crimes.

A revolution, which the corruption of our manners and the errors of our minds had prepared, breaks out amongst us. In the name of the laws, religion and morality are subverted; the experience and customs of our fathers are disregarded; the tombs of our ancestors, the only solid basis of all governments, are destroyed;—to form, according to the dictates of a fallible reason, a society equally careless

of the past and of the future. Blundering in our own follies ; having lost all sense of justice and injustice, of good and evil, we ran through all the different forms of a republican government. We called the mob to deliberate in the streets of Paris on the great objects which the Romans discussed in their Forum, after having laid aside their arms and bathed in the waters of the Tiber. Then issued from their dens those half-naked kings, conspicuous for the filth and brutality of indigence, deformed and mutilated by their labours, possessing no virtue but the insolence of wretchedness and the pride of rags. Fallen into such hands, our country was soon covered with wounds. What were the fruits of our phrensy, and of our chimerical experiments? Crimes and chains !

But the watch-word, at least, by which we seemed to be guided at that time was a noble one. Liberty must not be accused of the crimes committed in its name ; true philosophy is not the parent of the envenomed tenets preached by false apostles. Enlightened by experience, we perceived at length that a monarchial go-

vernment was the one which could suit our country.

It would have been natural to recall our legitimate Princes ; but we thought our faults too great to be pardoned. We did not recollect that the heart of a descendant of St.-Louis is an inexhaustible treasure of mercy. Some feared for their lives, some for their wealth. It was, above all, too great a sacrifice for human pride to confess that it had erred. What ! it was said, after so many massacres, devastations and misfortunes, are we to return to the point from which we set out ! The passions that were still in a state of agitation ; the pretensions of all kinds, could not renounce that fancied equality, the principal cause of our calamities. Powerful reasons urged us on ; trifling ones kept us back ; public happiness was sacrificed to personal interest, and justice to vanity.

It therefore became necessary to look for a supreme chief among the children of the revolution ; a chief in whom the law, polluted

at its source, might protect corruption and unite with it. Upright, firm and courageous magistrates, generals renowned for their probity as well as for their talents, had been formed in the midst of our dissensions; but they were not offered a power which their principles would have forbid them to accept. No hope was left of finding among Frenchmen a man bold enough to dare to wear the crown of LOUIS XVI. A foreigner offered himself, and was accepted.

BUONAPARTE did not openly announce his projects. His character displayed itself only gradually. Under the modest title of a Consul he at first accustomed men of an independent spirit not to be alarmed at the power with which he had been intrusted. He reconciled true Frenchmen to his rule by proclaiming himself the Restorer of order, of laws and of religion. The wisest men were imposed upon, and the most clear-sighted deceived. The Republicans looked upon Buonaparte as their work, and as the popular Chief of a free State. The Royalists thought that he was acting the

part of MONK, and were eager to save him. All built hopes upon him. Splendid victories, due to the valour of the French, surrounded him with glory. His successes intoxicated him, and his propensity to evil began to show itself. It will be a matter of doubt in future times, whether Buonaparte has incurred more guilt by the evil which he has done, than by the good which he might have done, and which he has neglected. No Usurper ever had a part more easy and more brilliant to perform. With a small share of moderation he might have settled himself and his posterity on the first throne of the world. No one disputed him this throne. The generations that had been born since the revolution were not acquainted with our ancient rulers, and had witnessed nothing but troubles and misfortunes. France and Europe were tired; repose was the universal wish; it would have been purchased at any price. But Heaven would not permit so dangerous an example to be given to the world: it would not allow that an adventurer should disturb the order of royal inheritances, constitute himself their heir of heroes, and reap in

one day the spoils of genius, glory, and time. Virtues alone can supply the deficiency of birth-right in the claims of an Usurper : but BUONAPARTE had no claim of that kind, except some military talents that have been equalled, if not surpassed, by those of many of our generals. The moment Providence deserted him, and abandoned him to his own folly, his ruin has been complete.

A king of France said, that if good faith were banished from among men, the hearts of kings should be its refuge : it is chiefly in this necessary quality of a royal mind that BUONAPARTE was deficient. The first known victim of the tyrant's perfidy was a chief of the Royalists of Normandy. M. DE FROTTÉ committed the noble imprudence of going to a conference to which he was induced to repair on the faith of a promise ; he was arrested, and shot. Some time after TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE was also carried away by treachery in America, and strangled in the castle where he was confined in Europe.

. Soon after this, a more famous murder threw the civilized world into consternation. It was as if we saw those barbarous times of the middle ages revived, as if we witnessed those scenes which are no longer to be found any where but in romances, those catastrophes which the civil wars of Italy and the policy of MACHIAVEL had rendered familiar beyond the Alps. The foreigner, who was not yet a monarch, wished to use the bloody corse of a Frenchman as a footstool to ascend the throne of France. And what Frenchman, just Heavens! To commit this crime all was trampled upon; law of nations, justice, religion, humanity. The Duke D'ENGHIEN was arrested in the midst of peace in a strange land; he was carried off from the castle of Offenbourg. When he left France he was too young to have a distinct knowledge of his country: it was from his seat in a post-chaise, between two horsemen, that he saw, as it were, for the first time the soil of his native country, and traversed, to meet death, the fields illustrated by the deeds of his forefathers. He arrived at the castle of Vincennes in the middle of the night.

It was by the light of torches, under the vaults of a dungeon, that the grandson of the great CONDÉ was pronounced guilty of having appeared on fields of battle: convicted of this hereditary crime, sentence was immediately passed upon him. In vain he asked to speak to BUONAPARTE (Oh, affecting and heroic simplicity !): the brave young prince was one of the greatest admirers of the military talents of his murderer: he could not imagine it possible for a captain to assassinate a soldier. Although exhausted with hunger and fatigue, he was forced to descend into the *ditches* of the castle; he there saw a grave, newly dug; he was stripped of his coat; a lanthorn was fastened to his breast, that he might be seen in the dark, and that the bullet might be directed with surer aim to his heart. He wished to give his watch to his executioners, and requested them to transmit the last tokens of his remembrance to his friends: but his wishes were rudely and insultingly refused. The command to fire was given; the duke D'ENGHIEN fell without a witness, without a consolation in the midst of his native country, at the distance of a few leagues from Chantilly,



not far from those venerable trees under which the holy King Louis administered justice to his subjects, in the very prison where the Prince DE CONDÉ was confined. The young, handsome, brave, and last offspring of the conqueror of Rocroy met death as the great CONDÉ would have met it and as his assassin will not be able to meet it. His body was secretly buried, and Bossuet will not re-appear eloquently to mourn over his ashes.

To him who has lowered himself beneath the human race by a crime, nothing remains but to affect to place himself above mankind by his plans, to colour his misdeeds by reasons inaccessible to the vulgar, and to make an abyss of iniquity pass for the depth of genius. BUONAPARTE recurred to this miserable assurance, by which no one is deceived, and which is not tantamount to a simple repentance: finding that he could not conceal, he published what he had done.

When the sentence of death was made known in Paris, there prevailed an emotion of

horror which no one dissembled. People asked each other by what right a Corsican had shed the noblest and the purest blood of France? Did he fancy he could replace, by his semi-African family, the French family which he had extinguished? Military men especially trembled with horror. The name of CONDÉ seemed to be their exclusive property, and the representative of the honour of the French army. Our grenadiers had frequently met the three generations of heroes in the heat of battle, the Prince DE CONDÉ, the Duke DE BOURBON, and the Duke D'ENGHIEN; they had even wounded the Duke DE BOURBON: but the sword of a Frenchman could not shed the whole of that noble blood, it belonged only to a foreigner to dry up its source.

Each nation has its peculiar vices. Treachery, malice, ingratitude, are not those of the French. The murder of the Duke D'ENGHIEN, the torture and assassination of PICHEGRU, the war in Spain, and the captivity of the Pope, betray in BUONAPARTE a disposition different from that of the French. Though oppressed

with a heavy load of chains, yet sympathising with misfortunes as much as we are alive to glory, we have wept over the Duke D'ENGHIEN, PICHERU, GEORGES and MOREAU ; we have admired SARAGOSSA, and surrounded with our homage a Pontiff loaded with fetters. He who stripped of his States the venerable Prelate who had placed the crown on his head, he who at Fontainebleau, dared to strike with his own hand the Sovereign Pontiff, and drag by his grey hair the Father of the Faithful, fancied perhaps he was obtaining a new victory: he did not know that the heir of Christ was still retaining that sceptre of reeds and that crown of thorns which soon or late triumph over the power of the wicked.

The time is not distant, I hope, when Frenchmen, restored to liberty, will proclaim, by a solemn Act, that they had no share in those crimes of tyranny ; that the murder of the Duke D'ENGHIEN, the captivity of the Pope, and the Spanish war, are impious, sacrilegious, odious deeds, repugnant above all to French feelings, and the disgrace of which falls exclusively on the head of the foreigner.

**BUONAPARTE** availed himself of the terror which the murder of Vincennes spread among us to venture his last stride and to seat himself on the throne.

Then commenced the grand saturnalia of royalty : crimes, oppression, slavery, marched at equal pace with folly. All liberty expires ; every honourable sentiment, every generous thought, become conspiracies against the State. To speak of virtue renders one an object of suspicion ; to praise a good action, is to abuse the Prince. Words change their meaning : a people fighting for their legitimate sovereigns are a rebellious people ; a traitor is a faithful subject ; all France becomes the empire of falsehood ; journals, pamphlets, discourses, prose and verse, all disguise truth. If it rained, we are assured that the sun shone : does the tyrant appear abroad amidst a silent populace, we are told that wherever he moved, he received the acclamations of the multitude. The sole object is the Prince ; morality consists in devoting one's-self to his caprices, duty in praising him. Above all, it was necessary to

bawl out admiration whenever he committed a fault or perpetrated a crime. Literary men are forced by menaces to celebrate the despot. They composed, they bargained, as to the amount of praise;—happy when, at the expense of some common-places, about the glory of arms, they purchased the right of uttering a few sighs, of denouncing some crimes, of reminding people of some proscribed virtues! No book could appear without being marked with some eulogy of BUONAPARTE, like the stamp of slavery: in new editions of old authors, the censorship caused every thing to be retrenched that spoke against conquerors, tyranny and slavery,—in like manner as the Directory had entertained the design of causing every thing to be struck out of the same authors, that spoke of monarchy and kings. The very almanacks were examined with care, and the conscription formed an article of faith in the catechism. In the arts, the same servitude: BUONAPARTE poisons his soldiers, infected with the plague at Jaffa: a painting is made which represents him, by an excess of courage and humanity, touching the same plague-in-

fected patients. It was not thus that *St. Louis* cured the sick, whom an affecting and religious confidence presented to his royal hands. Not a word, moreover, was to be said of public opinion; the maxim was, that the Sovereign must mould it every morning. To *Buonaparte's* improved police was attached a committee charged with giving a direction to men's minds, and at the head of this committee was the director of public opinion. Imposture and silence were the grand means employed to keep the people in error. If your sons die in battle, believe you that sufficient attention would be paid to you, even to tell you what was become of them? Events the most important to the country, to Europe, to the whole world, were concealed from you. The enemy is at *Meaux*; you only learn it by the flight of the peasants; you are enveloped in darkness; your alarms are made the subject of mockery: your griefs of laughter; whatever you feel or think is despised. For once you raise your voice,—a spy denounces, a *gend'arme* arrests, a military commission tries you; you are shot and forgotten.

It was not enough to enslave fathers, children also must be placed at the entire disposal of the Tyrant. Mothers have been seen hastening from the extremes of the empire, and demanding back with floods of tears the sons whom the government had torn from their arms. These children were placed in schools, where they were taught, by beat of drum, irreligion, debauchery, contempt of the domestic virtues, and blind obedience to the Sovereign. The paternal authority, respected by the most frightful tyrants of antiquity, was treated by BUONAPARTE as an abuse and a prejudice. He wished to convert our sons into a sort of Mamelukes, without God, without family and without country. It appears that this enemy of our race was bent on destroying France to its very foundations. He has more corrupted men, done more mischief to the human race in the short space of ten years, than all the tyrants of Rome put together, from Nero down to the last persecutor of the Christians. The principles which served as the base of his administration passed from his government into the different classes of society ;

for a wicked government introduces vice, as a wise government cherishes virtue among a people. Irreligion, a taste for every enjoyment and expence above their means, contempt of moral ties, the spirit of adventure, of violence, and of domination, descended from the throne into families : a little more of such a reign, and France would have been a den of robbers.

The crimes of our republican revolution were the work of passions which always leave some resources ; there was then disorder, and not destruction in society. Morals were injured, but not annihilated. Conscience still had its remorse ; a destructive independence did not confound the innocent with the guilty : thus the calamities of those times would have been speedily healed. But how cure the wounds inflicted by a government which laid down despotism as a fixed principle ; which, with morality and religion in its mouth, incessantly sapped religion and morals by its institutions and its contempt ; which sought to found public order, not upon



moral duty and law, but upon force, and the spies of the police ; which affected to regard the stupor of slavery, as the peace of a well organized society, faithful to the habits of their ancestors, and silently marching in the path of ancient virtues ? The most terrible revolutions are preferable to such a state of things. If evil wars produce public crimes, they at least call forth hidden virtues, talents, and great men. It is under despotism that empires disappear ; by destroying the minds still more than the bodies of men, it sooner or later superinduces dissolution and conquest. There is no instance of a free people destroyed by a civil war, and every country that has been assailed by storms of its own raising, has always enjoyed a greater prosperity after they were past.

The administration of BUONAPARTE has been boasted of. If administration consist in arithmetic,—if, in order to govern well, it be quite enough to know how much a province produces in corn, wine and oil, to ascertain the last penny that can be raised, the last

man that can be taken from it,—undoubtedly Buonaparte was a great administrator; it would be impossible more completely to organise mischief, to introduce more of order into calamity. But that is the best administration which leaves a people in peace, which cherishes in them the sentiments of justice and of piety, which is sparing of human blood, which respects the rights of the citizen, his property, and family; in this view the government of BUONAPARTE was the worst of governments.

Again, how numerous were the faults and blunders even in his own system? An administration the most expensive engulphed the revenues of the state. Whole armies of douaniers and receivers devoured the taxes they were employed to levy. There was not even a *chef de bureau*, however insignificant, who had not declared war against commerce. If any branch of industry arose in France, he laid hold of it, and took it wholly into his own hands. Tobacco, salt, wool, colonial produce, all was with him the object of an

odious monopoly ; he had become the only merchant in his empire ! By the most absurd combinations, or rather from a total ignorance of, and an absolute aversion from whatever related to the navy, he had completely lost our colonies and destroyed our fleets. He built huge vessels which rotted in the harbour, or which he himself disarmed to supply the wants of his land army. One hundred frigates scattered over the seas might have done great injury to the enemy, have formed sailors and protected the French merchant ships : these first notions of good sense did not even enter the head of BUONAPARTE. Neither ought the improvement of our agriculture to be attributed to his laws. We are indebted for it to the division of large estates, to the abolition of some feudal rights, and to many other causes produced by the Revolution.

This restless and extravagant man was daily harassing a people who wanted only repose, with contradictory and often impracticable decrees ; he violated at night the law which he had made in the morning. In ten

years, he devoured 15000 millions\* of imposts, which exceeds the amount of taxes raised during the seventy years of the reign of Louis XIV. The spoils of the world, 1500 millions of revenue, were not enough for him ; he was solely occupied with swelling his treasure by means the most iniquitous. Every prefect, every sub-prefect, every mayor, had the right of augmenting the customs of cities, of imposing additional centimes on the towns, villages and hamlets, and of demanding from any landholder an arbitrary sum for any pretended want. All France was under pillage. Bodily infirmities, indigence, death, education, the arts, the sciences, all paid tribute to the Prince. You had a son, perhaps, who was lame, a cripple, incapable of service,—a law of the conscription compelled you to pay 1500 francs by way of consolation for his misfortune. Sometimes a sick conscript died before having undergone the examination of the recruiting captain : one might suppose that in such a case the father would be exempt from paying the 1500 francs for a substitute—by no means.

\* Francs.

If the declaration of sickness was made before the event of death, the conscript being alive at the moment of declaration, the father was compelled to pay down the sum on the grave of his son. Was the poor man desirous of giving some education to one of his sons, he must pay 800 francs to the university, without reckoning the expenses of board, &c. given to the master. Did a modern author quote an ancient one, as the works of the latter had fallen into what was called "public domain," he was obliged to pay to the censorship five sous per line of quotation. If, while you quoted, you also translated, you paid only two and a half sous per line, because the quotation then constituted a sort of "mixed domain," one half belonging to the labour of the living translator, and the other half to the dead author. When BUONAPARTE caused food to be distributed among the poor in the winter of 1811, it was believed that he would employ his savings in this charity: but on that occasion, he levied additional centimes, and gained four millions on the soup of paupers. In short, we saw him turn undertaker, and monopolise the administration of funerals: it

was worthy of the destroyer of the French to raise a tax upon dead bodies ; and how could any one appeal to the protection of the laws, when it was he who made them ? The Legislative Body dared once to speak, and it was dissolved. A single article in the new code destroyed property by its very roots. An administrator of domains could say to you—“ Your property is domanial or national. I place it provisionally under sequestration : you may go and try your rights ; if the administration is wrong, your property will be restored to you.” And to whom must you resort in this cause ? To the ordinary tribunals ? No : such causes were reserved for the examination of the Council of State, and tried before the Emperor, who was both judge and party.

If property was uncertain, civil liberty was still less secure. Was there ever any thing more monstrous than that commission appointed to inspect the prisons, and under the report of which, a man might be detained his whole life in a dungeon, without indictment, without

trial, without judgment, put to the torture, shot or strangled between the walls of a prison? Amidst all this BUONAPARTE was nominating every year commissions for the liberty of the press, and for personal liberty. Tiberius himself never made such a mockery of the human species.

But the conscription was, as it were, the crowning of these works of despotism. Scandinavia itself, styled by an historian, the workshop of the human race, would have been unable to furnish men for this homicidal law. The code of the conscription will remain an eternal monument of the reign of BUONAPARTE: there may be found collected all that the most subtle and ingenious tyranny can devise to torment and devour the people: it is truly the code of hell. The generations of France were placed in regular rows for the axe, like the trees of a forest; every year 80,000 young men were cut down. But this was only the regular average of deaths; the conscription was often doubled or reinforced by extraordinary levies; often it devoured before hand its destined vic-

tims, like a dissipated heir who borrows on his future income. At last they were taken even without estimate; the legal age, the qualities requisite for dying on a field of battle, were no longer regarded, and the law displayed, in this respect, a marvellous facility: it went back to infancy, it descended to old age; the discharged soldier, the man who had a substitute were equally taken; the son of a poor artisan, perhaps, ransomed thrice, even at the expense of his father's little property, was compelled to march: maladies, infirmities, bodily defects, were no longer a protection. Moveable columns traversed our provinces like an enemy's country, to tear from the people their last children. Were these ravages complained of, the answer was, that these moveable columns were composed of handsome gens-d'armes who would console the desolated mothers, and restore to them what they had lost. In default of a brother absent, the one present was taken. The father was made to answer for the son, the wife for the husband: responsibility was extended to the most distant relatives, and even to neighbours. A village became bound for



the conscript who was born there. Little garrisons were billeted on the villager, and forced him to sell his bed to maintain them, till he had found the conscript concealed in the woods. Absurdity was even mixed with atrocity ; sons were often demanded from those who were happy enough to have no posterity ; violence was used to discover the bearer of a name which existed only on the lists of the gens-d'armes, or to obtain a conscript who had served five or six years before. Women big with child have been put to the torture, that they might reveal the place where their first-born was concealed ; fathers have brought forth the dead body of their son, to prove that they could no longer produce this son alive. There still remained some families, whose children were ransomed by their wealth, and who looked forward one day to become magistrates, administrators, men of science, landholders, so useful to social order, in a great country : by the decree for the guards of honour, they were swept away in the general massacre. Such a contempt was entertained for the life of man and for France, that it was even customary to call conscripts the

*raw material, and food for cannon.* The following great question was discussed among the purveyors of human flesh, namely, to ascertain the given average time that a conscript might last; some alleged that he lasted thirty-three months, others thirty-six months. BUONAPARTE was wont to say himself, *I have 300,000 men in reserve.* In the eleven years of his reign he caused more than 5 millions of Frenchmen to perish, which exceeds the number of those whom our civil wars swept away during three centuries, under the reigns of JOHN, CHARLES V. CHARLES VI., CHARLES VII., HENRY II., FRANCIS II., CHARLES IX., HENRY III., and HENRY IV. In the twelve months which have just elapsed, BUONAPARTE raised (without reckoning the National Guard) 1,330,000 men, which is more than 100,000 per month; and yet some one had the audacity to tell him he had only expended the superfluous population!

It was easy to foresee what has happened. all intelligent men said that the conscription, by exhausting the country, would expose France to be invaded whenever she should be seriously

attacked. Having been bled almost to death by the executioner, her pale bloodless body could oppose but a feeble resistance.

But the loss of men was not the greatest evil attending the conscription; it tended to replunge us as well as all Europe into barbarism. By the conscription, trades, arts, and letters are infallibly destroyed. A young man who must die at 18, can never apply himself to any study. Neighbouring nations, compelled, in self-defence, to resort to the same means with us, were abandoning in their turn the advantages of civilization; and all nations, precipitated one upon another, as in the age of the Goths and Vandals, would have seen the calamities of those ages revive. By breaking to pieces the ties of general society; the conscription also annihilated those of domestic life. Accustomed from their cradles to regard themselves as victims devoted to death, children no longer obeyed their parents: they become idle, vagabonds, and debauchees, in expectation of the day when they were to march to pillage and slaughter the world. What principle of reli-

gion or morals had time to take root in their hearts? Fathers and mothers, on the other hand, among the lower orders, no longer attached their affections, no longer bestowed their cares on children whom they must prepare to lose, who no longer formed their wealth and their staff of support, and who had become for them only a grief and a burthen. Hence that hardness of heart, that oblivion of every sentiment of nature, which leads to selfishness, to wrecklessness of good or evil, to indifference for country; which obliterate conscience and remorse, and devote a people to servitude by equally stripping it of the horror of vice and the admiration of virtue.

Such was the administration of Buonaparte in regard to the interior of France."

Let us now examine the conduct of his government with regard to foreign affairs, that policy of which he was so proud, and of which he gave this definition: *La politique, c'est jouer aux hommes*. (Politics, is a Game at Men,) Well! he lost every thing at this

abominable game, and it is France that has paid his loss.

Let us begin by his continental system ; that system of a madman or of a child, was not at first the real object of his wars, it merely served as a pretext. He wished to establish the liberty of the seas. But did that mad system atchieve what was necessary to effect his purpose ? In consequence of the two great faults, which caused, as we shall observe hereafter, his designs upon Spain and upon Russia to miscarry, has he not likewise failed in shutting the ports of the Mediterranean and of the Baltic Seas ? Has he not thrown all the colonies of the world into the hands of the English ? Has he not opened in Peru, in Mexico and in the Brasils, a more extensive market for them, than that from which he wished to exclude them in Europe ? It is a striking fact that war has enriched the very nation whom he pretended to ruin. Europe consumes only a few English superfluities ; the generality of the Nations of Europe supply their principal wants from their own manu-

factures. In America, on the contrary, the people stand in need of every thing, from the first to the last article of clothing; and ten millions of Americans consume more English goods than thirty millions of Europeans. I do not advert to the importation of the silver of Mexico, into the East-Indies, to the monopoly of cocoa, of the jesuits bark, of cochineal, and a thousand other objects of speculation which are become a new source of wealth for England. And had BUONAPARTE even succeeded in shutting the ports of Spain and of the Baltic, he would still have been obliged to shut those of Greece, of Constantinople, of Syria, of the Coast of Barbary; this was tantamount to entering into an engagement to conquer the world. Whilst he would have attempted new conquests, the conquered nations, unable to exchange the productions of their soil and industry, would have shaken off the yoke and re-opened their ports. His proceedings in this respect are a tissue of false views, of undertakings that lose all claim to greatness, from being over-gigantic; they be-

tray a want of intellect and of good sense; they are the dreams of an infuriated madman.

With regard to his wars and his conduct towards the Cabinet of Europe, the slightest examination will dissolve the spell. A man is not great for what he undertakes, but for what he performs. Any man may dream he is making the conquest of the world; ALEXANDER alone accomplished. BUONAPARTE was governing Spain as a province; he sucked her blood and her gold. But this would not satisfy him; he wished to reign in person on the throne of CHARLES IV. To accomplish his purpose, to what means did he resort? Actuated by the most infamous policy, he first sowed the seeds of dissention among the royal family, and then he carried that family off in defiance of all laws human and divine; he suddenly invaded the territory of a faithful nation who had just been fighting for him at Trafalgar. He insulted the genius of that nation, slaughtered their priests, offended the Castillian pride, and made the descendants of the Cid and of the GREAT CAPTAIN rise in arms against him. The

inhabitants of Sarragossa immediately celebrated their own funeral rites and buried themselves under the ruins of their city ; the christians of Pelagus descended from the Asturian mountains, and the modern Moor was expelled. This war revived the spirit of the nations of Europe, it gave France an additional boundary to defend, created a land army to the English, brought them back at the end of four centuries to the fields of Poitiers, and enriched them with the treasures of Mexico.

If instead of having recourse to stratagems worthy of a BORGIA, BUONAPARTE following a still criminal but dexterous policy, had under any pretence whatever declared war against the KING OF SPAIN ; if he had proclaimed himself the avenger of the oppression entailed upon the Castillians by the Prince of PEACE, if he had flattered the Spanish pride and spared the religious communities, he probably would have succeeded. “ It is not the Spaniards I want,” he said in his rage, “ it is Spain.” Well ! that country has rejected him. The conflagration



gration of Burgos has produced the conflagration of Moscow, and the conquest of the Alhambra has brought the Russians to the Louvre.—Awful and terrible lesson!

He committed the same blunders with regard to Russia: if, in the month of October 1812, he had stopped on the banks of the Dwina; if he had contented himself with taking Riga, assigning cantonments to his army of six hundred thousand men during the winter, and organizing Poland in his rear,—he might perhaps in the spring have placed the Empire of the Czars in a perilous situation. Instead of this, he marched to Moscow by one single road, without magazines, without any resources. He reached it and the conquerors of Pultawa set fire to their holy city. BUONAPARTE continued inactive for the space of a month in the midst of ruins and ashes. He appeared to forget the periodical return of seasons and the severity of the climate, he suffered himself to be amused by proposals of peace; so complete was his ignorance of the human heart that he supposed a people

who had burnt their metropolis with their own hands to avoid slavery, would capitulate upon the smoking ruins of their dwellings. His generals told him that it was time to retreat. He left Moscow vowing, like an enraged child, that he would soon return with an army, of which *the van guard alone should amount to one hundred thousand soldiers*. God sent a breeze of his wrath ; all perished : one man alone returned to France.

Absurd in his administration, criminal in his policy, what was there then in this foreigner to captivate the French ? His military glory ? Well ! he is stripped of that. He is indeed a great winner of battles : but except this, the least general surpasses him in abilities. He understands nothing of conducting a retreat and disputing the ground ; he is impatient, incapable of waiting a while for the result of a long military combination ; he only knows how to advance, how to rush on, to run, to gain victories, as has been observed, by dint of men (*à coups d'hommes*) to sacrifice every

thing for a success without concerning himself about a reverse, to kill half of his soldiers by marches above the strength of man. What matters it? Has he not the conscription and the *raw material*? He has been supposed to have improved the art of war, and it is certain that he has caused it to retrograde towards the infancy of the art. The acme of the art of war among civilized nations evidently is to defend an extensive country with a small army; to let many hundred thousands of inhabitants continue in a state of tranquillity in the rear of sixty or eighty thousand soldiers, so that the husbandman, who ploughs in peace his furrow, scarcely knows that they are fighting at the distance of a few leagues from his cottage. The whole Roman Empire was protected by one hundred and fifty thousand men, and Cæsar had but a few Legions with him at Pharsale. Let then this Conqueror of the world defend us now in our dwellings? How! Has his genius suddenly left him! By what magic power is that France invaded on all sides, which Louis XIV. had surrounded with

fortresses, which Vauban had enclosed like a beautiful garden? Where are the garrisons of her frontier towns? They have no garrisons. Where are the guns of her ramparts? They are all gone; even the ships at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort are stripped of their cannon. Had BUONAPARTE wished to give us up defenceless to the coalesced powers, had he sold us, had he entered into a secret conspiracy against the French, could he have acted otherwise? In less than sixteen months two thousand millions of livres, fourteen hundred thousand men, all the material of our armies and of our strong places are lost in the woods of Germany and in the frozen fields of Russia. While at Dresden, BUONAPARTE committed blunder upon blunder, forgetting that, if crimes are sometimes punished only in the next world, faults are always punished in this. He shewed the most incomprehensible ignorance of what was passing in the different Cabinets, obstinately persisted in remaining on the line of the Elbe, was defeated at Leipsic and refused an honourable peace that was offered to him. Filled with despair and rage, he left for the last time

the palace of our Kings, from a sense of justice and ingratitude he set fire to the town where the same Monarchs had the misfortune to feed him, opposed nothing to the enemies but an activity without a plan, experienced a last reverse, fled again, and at length freed the metropolis of the civilised world of his odious presence.

The pen of a Frenchman would refuse to draw the horrid picture of his fields of battle: a wounded soldier became a burthen to BUONAPARTE; he was better pleased with his death, it rid him of his burthen. Heaps of mutilated soldiers, thrown promiscuously into a corner, remained sometimes whole days and weeks without having their wounds dressed; there are no longer hospitals sufficiently extensive to contain the sick and wounded of an army of seven or eight hundred thousand men, no sufficiency of surgeons to attend them. There were no precautions taken in their behalf by the Executioner of the French: no pharmacopias, no travelling medicine chest; sometimes even no instruments to amputate the

broken limbs. During the campaign of Moscow the wounded were dressed with hay for want of lint: when hay was no longer to be procured, they died. Six hundred thousand warriors, the conquerors of Europe, the glory of France, were seen lingering, wandering among snows and deserts, resting upon branches of firs, for they had no longer strength to carry their arms, and no other covering than the bloody hides of the horses that had served for their last meal. Old captains, their hair and beards studded with icicles, stooped to caress the soldier who had some remnants of food left, to obtain a trifling share of his provisions, so much were they tormented with the cravings of hunger! Whole squadrons, men and horses, were frozen during the night, and in the morning these phantoms were still seen standing on the icy soil! Troops of ravens and of white half-wild greyhounds, which followed our army to devour its wrecks, were the only witnesses of the sufferings of our soldiers in these solitudes. The Emperor of Russia had the dead bodies counted in the spring; they amounted to more than one hundred and sixty thou-

sand; twenty-four thousand were burnt in one single funeral pile. The military plague, which had disappeared ever since war had been carried on with a comparatively small number of men, that plague re-appeared with the conscription, with armies of a million of soldiers and floods of human blood. And what was the Destroyer of our fathers, of our brethren, of our sons, doing when he thus cut off the flower of France? He was flying! He came to the Thuilleries to say, rubbing his hands at his fire-side: *It is better here than on the Banks of the Beresina*. Not a word of consolation to the wives, to the mothers in tears, by whom he was surrounded; not a single regret, no signs of emotion, no remorse, not a single avowal of his folly. The Tigellinuses said: "What is fortunate in this retreat is, that the Emperor wanted for nothing: he was always well fed, well wrapped up in a comfortable carriage; in short, he has not suffered at all; it is a great consolation." And he, in the midst of his Court, appeared cheerful, triumphant, glorious, decorated with the royal mantle, his head covered with a hat *à la Henri IV*; he

displayed his brilliancy on a throne, repeating the royal attitudes which TALMA the tragedian had taught him : but this magnificence only served to render him more hideous ; and all the diamonds of the crown could not conceal the blood with which he was covered.

Alas ! these horrible scenes of fields of battle have approached us ; they are no longer hidden in deserts ; we witness them within our dwellings in that Paris which the Normans besieged in vain about one thousand years ago, and which was proud of having had no conqueror but that Clovis who became its King. Is not giving a country up to be invaded the greatest, the most unpardonable of crimes ? We have seen the remnants of our generations perish under our own eyes ; we have seen troops of conscripts, of old soldiers, resting themselves on the corner-stones of the streets, dying of all kinds of misery, scarcely able to hold with one hand the weapon with which they had defended their country, and stretching out the other to beg alms ; we have beheld the Seine covered with boats, our highways ob-



structed with waggons filled with wounded warriors, whose wounds had not even the first dressings. One of these waggons, of which a track of blood marked the progress, broke down on the *boulevard*. Conscripts tumbled out of it without arms, without legs, pierced with balls and with pikes, uttering loud screams and intreating those who passed by to give them the finishing stroke. These unfortunate young men who had been carried off from their cottages before they reached manhood, led to the field of battle with their caps and rural clothes, placed like *food for cannon* in the most dangerous situations to exhaust the enemy's fire; these unfortunate youths, I say, began to weep and cried in their fall when struck by a ball: Oh mother! my dear mother! a rending cry which proclaimed the tender age of a child torn but the day before from domestic happiness; of a child fallen at once from the hands of his mother into those of his barbarous sovereign! And for whom were all these massacres, all these sufferings? For an abominable tyrant, for a Corsican, for a foreigner who is so prodigal of the French

blood, merely because he has not a drop of that blood in his veins.

Ah ! when Louis XVI refused to punish a few guilty individuals, whose death would have secured his throne and spared us so many misfortunes ; when he said : “ I will not purchase my safety at the price of the life of even one of my subjects.” When he wrote in his last will : “ I recommend to my son, if he has the misfortune to become a king, to recollect, that he must devote himself entirely to the welfare of his fellow-citizens, and that he ought to forget all hatred and resentment, and particularly whatever relates to the misfortunes and sorrows which I experience ; that he cannot promote the happiness of his people but by reigning according to the laws.” When on the scaffold he uttered these words : “ Frenchmen, I pray God not to avenge on the nation the blood of your monarchs which is on the point of being shed.” That was the true King, the French King, the lawful King, the Father and Chief of the Country.

BUONAPARTE has shewn himself too mean in his misfortunes, to allow us to suppose his prosperity to have been the work of his genius; he is but the creature of our power and we thought him the creature of his works. His grandeur is the mere offspring of the immense military power which we entrusted to his hands at his elevation. He inherited all the armies formed under our ablest generals, so repeatedly led to victory by all those great captains who have perished, and are perhaps destined to perish to the very last, victims of the rage and jealousy of the tyrant. He found a numerous population increased by conquest, exalted by triumphs and by that agitation which is the constant attendant of revolutions; he needed only to stamp the pregnant soil of our country with his foot and it yielded him abundance of treasures and soldiers. The nations which he attacked were wearied and disunited; he vanquished them one after the other by pouring upon each of them singly the shoals of the population of France.

When the Almighty sends the executors

of his divine justice on earth, every obstacle is smoothed before them: they have uncommon successes with moderate talents; born in the midst of civil discords, those exterminators draw their principal strength from the calamities to which they owe their birth, and from the terror which the recollection of those calamities inspires; they thus obtain the submission of the people on account of the very misfortunes from which they sprung. They are endowed with the gift to pervert and to debase, to annihilate honour, to degrade souls, to pollute whatever they touch, to will and to dare any thing, to reign by falsehood, impiety and terror, to utter every kind of language, to fascinate all eyes, to deceive reason itself, to make themselves pass for vast geniuses when they are but ordinary villains: for there is no possible excellence unconnected with virtue; dragging after their car captivated nations, triumphing by numbers, dishonoured by a hundred victories, a firebrand in the hand, the feet steeped in blood, they go to the world's end like drunken men impelled by the Deity whom they forget.

When providence on the contrary is willing to save and not to punish an empire; when the Almighty employs his servants and not his scourges; when he designs for the men of whom he makes use, an honourable glory and not an infamous renown, far from smoothing the way as it was smoothed to BUONAPARTE he opposes to them obstacles worthy of their virtues. It is thus that we always may distinguish the tyrant from the deliverer, the despiser of all nations from the great captain, the man sent to destroy from him who comes to heal. The former is master of every thing and employs immense means in order to succeed; the latter has nothing and possesses but feeble resources: by these traits it is easy to recognize both the character and the mission of the despoiler of France.

BUONAPARTE is not a genuine great man; he wants that magnanimity which constitutes heroes, and true monarchs. Hence it arises that there is not one of those sayings quoted of him which announce ALEXANDER and CÆSAR, HENRI IV and LOUIS XIV. Nature moulded

him without a heart. His rather comprehensive head is the seat of darkness and confusion. All notions, even those of benevolence, may enter it but they leave it instantly. The distinctive feature of his character is an invincible obstinacy, an unconquerable determination, but bent only upon injustice, oppression and extravagant systems; for he easily abandons plans which might be favourable to morality, order and virtue. He is swayed by imagination, not regulated by reason. His designs are not the result of a profound and matured thought but the effect of a sudden movement and of an abrupt revolution. Unsteady like his countrymen, he partakes a little of the buffoon and the actor. He personates every thing, even the passions which he has not; he is always on the stage; at Caïro, he acts the Renegado who boasts of having abolished Popery: at Paris, he is the restorer of the Christian Religion; at one time he is an inspired prophet, at another a philosopher. His scenes are prepared beforehand. A sovereign capable of taking lessons of Talma to appear in a royal attitude may know what sentence

posterity will pass upon him. He wishes to be thought original and he is generally a mere imitator: but his imitations are so clumsy that they instantly recall the object or the action which he wishes to copy. He always attempts to utter what he fancies a great thought, or to do what he imagines a great action. Affecting to be an universal genius, he talks of finances and dramatic exhibitions, of war and fashions, settles the fate of monarchs and that of the toll-gatherer at a turnpike, dates from the Kremlin a regulation of the theatres, and on a day of battle causes some females to be arrested at Paris. The child of our revolution, he bears an astonishing likeness to his parent; he has the same intemperance of language; the same taste for the lower walks of literature, the same passion for writing for news-papers. The man of little worth and of indifferent extraction is discovered under the mask of ALEXANDER and CÆSAR. He has a sovereign contempt for men, because he judges of them by himself. His maxim is that they always act from motives of self-interest, and that probity itself is but a matter of calculation.

Hence that system of heterogeneous combinations (*système de fusion*) which constituted the basis of his government, employing alike the rogue and the honest man, purposely mixing vice and virtue and always taking care to place you in opposition to your principles. His great delight consisted in dishonouring virtue, in blackening reputations. His touch was pollution. When he had debased you, you became *his man*, according to his own vulgar expression; you were his by right of shame; he loved you a little less and despised you a little more for it. In his administration he looked only to the results and never heeded the means of their accomplishment. The grand totals were to be every thing, the individualities which they are composed nothing.

“ These youths will be perverted; but they  
 “ will obey me the better for it; this branch  
 “ of industry will be destroyed: but I shall  
 “ obtain many millions for the moment; sixty  
 “ thousand men will perish in this battle: but  
 “ I shall gain the victory.” These were his arguments, and it is thus that kingdoms are annihilated.



Born to destroy, BUONAPARTE carries wickedness in his bosom as naturally as a mother carries her fruit, with joy and a sort of pride. He detests to see men happy; he once said: "There are still some happy individuals in France; families that do not know me, that live in the country in their castles with an income of 30 or 40,000 livres, but they shall not escape my grasp;" and he has kept his word. One day seeing his son at play, he said to a Bishop who was present: "My Lord Bishop, do you suppose that this little being has a soul?" Whoever derives distinction from any superiority alarms the tyrant; to him the fair reputation of others is vexatious. He is jealous of all talents, intelligence, and virtue; he would even dislike the rumour excited by a great crime, if that crime should happen not to be his work. Being the most ungracious of men, his greatest delight is to insult all who approach him, without remembering that he rules over a people who are extremely nice on the point of honour, a people moulded by the Court of Louis XIV. and justly renowned for the elegance of their manners and

their, exquisite politeness. In fine, BUONAPARTE was but the creature of prosperity; as soon as adversity, the parent of virtues, reached this would-be great man, the prodigy vanished; the monarch appeared a mere adventurer, and the hero a soldier of fortune raised to unmerited glory.

When BUONAPARTE expelled the Directory he addressed them in these words:—

“ What have you done with that France  
 “ which I left you so brilliant? I left you  
 “ peace and I find war; I left you victories  
 “ and I find reverses; I left you the millions  
 “ raised in Italy, and I find every where  
 “ spoliatory laws and wretchedness. What  
 “ have you done with one hundred thousand  
 “ Frenchmen whom I knew, who were the  
 “ companions of my glory? They are con-  
 “ signed to the grave.”

“ This state of affairs cannot last, before  
 “ three years are expired it would lead us to  
 “ despotism, but we want a republican govern-  
 “ ment; a republic seated on the basis of

**"equality, morality, civil liberty and religious  
and political tolerance, &c."**

**"To-day unhappy man, we shall hold the same discourse, we shall interrogate you in your own words. Say, what have you done with that France that was so brilliant? Where are our treasures, the millions raised in Italy, over all Europe? What have you done not with one hundred thousand, but with five millions of Frenchmen whom we knew, our fathers, our friends, our brothers? This state of affairs cannot last; it has plunged us into a horrible despotism. You wanted a republican government, and you have brought us slavery. As for us we want a monarchy seated on the basis of the equality of rights, of morality, of civil liberty, of political and religious tolerance. Did you give us that monarchy? What have you done for us? For what are we indebted to your reign? Who is it that assassinated the Duke d'ENGHIEN, put PICHEGRU to the rack, exiled MOREAU, loaded the Sovereign Pontiff with chains, carried off the Spanish Princes, commenced an impious war. It is you? Who**

is it that lost our colonies, destroyed our commerce, opened America to the English, corrupted our morals, snatched the children from their parents, distressed families, laid the world waste, carried fire and sword over an extent of more than three thousand miles, and caused the name of Frenchmen to be abhorred all over the globe? It is you. Who is it that exposed France to pestilence, invasion, partition and conquest? It is again you. These questions you could not put to the Directory, but to-day we put them to you. How widely does your guilt exceed that of those men whom you did not think worthy to reign? Had a legitimate and hereditary King overwhelmed his people with the smallest part of the evils which you brought upon us, his throne would have tottered under him; and is it possible that you, an usurper and a foreigner, should become sacred to us in proportion to the calamities which you have poured upon us; that you should still reign in the midst of our sufferings! At length we are recovering our rights through our misfortunes; we will no longer worship Moloch; you shall no more

devour our children : we are tired of your conscription, of your police, of your censorship, of your nocturnal assassinations, of your tyranny. It is not we alone, it is the whole human race, that accuse you. They demand to be avenged in the name of religion, morality and liberty. Whither have you not carried desolation ? In what corner of the world has any the most obscure family escaped your ravages ? The Spaniard on his mountains, the Illyrian in his vallies, the Italian under his brilliant sun, the German, the Russian, the Prussian in his towns laid in ashes, demand back from you their sons whom you have slaughtered, the tent, the cottage, the palace, the temple, which you have given up to the flames. You forced them to come to seek among us for what you have stolen from them, and to claim in your palaces the bloody spoils which you took from them. The voice of the universe proclaims you the greatest Culprit that ever appeared on earth ; for it is not upon barbarous people or upon degenerated nations that you have poured so many calamities ; it is in the midst of civilization, in an enlightened age, that you wished to reign

by the sword of **ATTILA** and the maxims of **NEBO**. Abandon, at last, your iron sceptre; descend from that heap of ruins of which you had made a throne! We drive you away as you expelled the Directory. Go! May your only punishment consist in witnessing the joy which your fall causes to France, and in beholding, with tears of rage, the spectacle of public felicity?

Such are the words which we address to the foreigner. But if we reject **BUONAPARTE**, by whom will he be replaced? **THE KING**.

### OF THE BOURBONS.

**THE** functions connected with the title of a King are so well known by the French, that they need not to have them explained; the word King immediately carries to their minds the ideas of legitimate authority, of order, of peace, of legal and monarchical liberty. The recollections of old France, the religion, the ancient usages, the family manners, the habits of our childhood, the cradle and the grave,

every thing is connected with that sacred word King : it terrifies no one ; on the contrary, it affords the strongest comfort. The King, the magistrate, the father ; a Frenchman confounds all these ideas. He knows not what is meant by an Emperor : he is unacquainted with the nature, the form, the limit of the power connected with this foreign title. But he knows that a Monarch descended from St. Louis and HENRI IV. is a Chief whose paternal authority is regulated by public institutions, tempered by morality, mellowed and improved by time, like a generous wine raised on the soil of his country, and ripened by the sun of France. Let us no longer attempt to conceal it from us. There will be no tranquillity, no happiness, no prosperity, no stability in our laws, in our opinions, in our fortunes, till the House of BOURBON shall be replaced on the throne. Surely the ancients, more grateful than ourselves, would not have failed to bestow the appellation of divine upon a race which, beginning by a brave and prudent King and ending by a Martyr, counts, in the space of nine centuries, forty-three Monarchs, of whom only one

was a tyrant; a solitary instance in the history of the world, and an eternal subject of pride for our country. Probity and honour sat on the throne of France as force and politics on that of other countries. The noble and mild blood of the CAPETS, when it did not produce heroes, produced Monarchs that were men of probity. Some were called wise, good, just, well-beloved; others surnamed great, august, fathers of letters and of the country. Some had passions which they expiated by their misfortunes; but none alarmed the world with those vices that burthen the memory of the Cæsars, and which BUONAPARTE has reproduced.

The BOURBONS, who are the last branch of that sacred tree, have by a singular destiny seen the first Monarch of their line fall under the dagger of the fanatic, and the last under the axe of the atheist. Ever since ROBERT the Sixth, son of St. Louis, from whom they are descended, they have for so many centuries wanted no other glory but that of adversity, which they have at length splendidly obtained.



What reproaches have we to make them? The name or HENRI IV. still makes French hearts beat with delight; and moistens our eyes with tears; it is to LOUIS XIV. that we are indebted for the best part of our glory. Have we not surnamed LOUIS XVI. the most honest man of his kingdom? Is it because we murdered him that we reject his blood? Is it because we put to death his sister, his wife and his son, that we repel his family? This family weep in exile, not over their own, but over our misfortunes. That young Princess whom we persecuted, whom we made an orphan, regrets every day the prisons of France in foreign palaces. She might have accepted the hand of a powerful and glorious Prince, but she preferred uniting her destiny with that of her cousin, though poor, an exile and proscribed, because he is a Frenchman and she wished not to separate herself from the misfortunes of her family. The whole world admires her virtues; the people of Europe crowd around her whenever she appears on a public walk, and load her with blessings; and we, we can forget her! When she left her native country, where she had suf-

ferred so much, she cast a look behind and wept. Though the constant object of her prayers and of her love, we scarcely know that she lives. "*I feel,*" said she at times, "*that I shall not be blessed with a progeny any where but in France;*" a moving expression, which alone ought to make us fall at her feet, and draw from us the deepest sighs of the bitterest repentance. Yes, the Duchess of ANGOULEME will give us heirs to the throne on the fruitful soil of her native country. FRANCE spontaneously teems with lillies; irrigated with the blood of so many expiatory victims sacrificed at the foot of the scaffold of LOUIS and ANTOINETTE, they will grow more beautiful than ever!

The brother of our King, LOUIS XVIII., who is to reign the first over us, is a Prince remarkable for his numerous acquirements, inaccessible to prejudice, a stranger to vengeance. Of all Sovereigns that may at present govern France, he perhaps is the best suited to our situation and to the spirit of the age; whereas BUONAPARTE was perhaps of all men that we

might have chosen the least fit to be a King. The institutions of nations are the work of time and experience: reason and uniformity are the first requisites for governing. A Prince whose head should contain only two or three common but useful ideas would be a more suitable Sovereign for a nation than an extraordinary adventurer constantly devising new plans, inventing new laws, fancying he does not reign but when he is disturbing nations, altering or destroying in the evening his creations of the morning. Not only does Louis XVIII. possess those fixed ideas, that moderation, that good sense, so necessary to a Monarch, but this Prince is also fond of literature, well informed, and eloquent like many of our Kings, of a capacious and enlightened understanding, of a firm and philosophical character.

Let us chuse between BUONAPARTE, who comes with the bloody code of the conscription, and Louis XVIII. who comes to heal our wounds, with the will of Louis XVI. in his hand. At his coronation he will repeat those words written by his virtuous brother :—

“ I heartily pardon all those who became my enemies without any provocation on my part, and I pray God to forgive them.”

The Count d'Angois, of a character so frank, so loyal, so truly French, is now as conspicuous for his piety, his mildness, and his goodness, as he was in his younger years for his noble mein and his royal gracefulness. BUCAPARTE was cast down by the hand of the Almighty, but not improved by adversity: in proportion as he loses ground in the country which is escaping from his tyranny, he drags after him unfortunate victims loaded with chains: it is in the most remote prisons of France that he performs the last acts of his power. The Count d'Angois arrives alone, without soldiers, without support, unknown to the French to whom he shews himself. Scarcely has he uttered his name when the people fall prostrate at his feet; they kiss the skirts of his coat, they embrace his knees; they exclaim under floods of tears: “ We bring you nothing but our hearts, the monster has left us nothing else.” In such a

manner to leave France, in such a manner to re-enter it, who does not recognize on one hand the Usurper, on the other the legitimate Prince?

The Duke d'ANGOULEME made his appearance in another of our provinces: Bordeaux, the second city of the kingdom, opened to him her gates, and the native country of HENRI IV. acknowledged with transports of joy the heir of the virtues of that Prince. Our armies never beheld a more valourous knight than the Duke DE BERRY. The Duke of ORLÉANS by his loyal fidelity to the blood of our King, shews that his name is still one of the noblest in France. I have already spoken of the three generations of heroes, the Prince DE CONDÉ, the Duke DE BOURBON: I leave it to BUONAPARTE to name the third.

I know not whether posterity will be able to believe that so many Princes of the House of Bourbon were proscribed by a nation who owed them all their glory, though these Princes were not guilty of any crime, and though their misfortunes did not arise from the tyranny of

the last King of their race; no, it will not be conceived in future times that we should have banished Princes so good, Princes our countrymen, to place at our head a foreigner, the most wicked of men. That France should have wished to become a republic may be conceived to a certain point; a nation, in an access of folly may wish to change the form of government and no longer be willing to acknowledge a Supreme Chief: but if we revert to monarchy, it is the height of disgrace and absurdity to desire it without the legitimate Sovereign, and to suppose that it could exist without him. Let us modify, if we chuse, the constitution of that monarchy, but no one has a right to change the monarch. It may happen that a cruel, tyrannical King who violates all laws, who deprives a whole nation of their liberties, be deposed through a violent revolution; but in that extraordinary case the Crown devolves to his Sons or to his next heir. But was Louis XVI. ever a tyrant? Can we impeach his memory? By what authority do we deprive his race of a throne to which they have so many claims? By what a disgraceful

caprice did we bestow upon the Son of a Law Serjeant at Ajaccio the inheritance of Robert the Strong? This Robert the Strong probably descended from the second race of our Kings, which was allied to the first. He was Earl of Paris. HUGH CAPET, himself a Frenchman brought to the French, besides immense demesnes and wealth, Paris, his paternal estate. France so small under the first Kings of the the family of CAPET, grew rich and received considerable additions under their descendants. To fill the place of this ancient race we selected a King, as has been observed by a Senator, from among a people whom the Romans even disdained to employ as slaves. It is in behalf of an obscure Italian whom we have been obliged to raise from poverty, with the spoils of the whole French nation, that we have discarded the Salic Law, the *palladium* of our empire. How different were the sentiments and maxims of our fathers from ours! At the death of PHILIP DE VALOIS, to the prejudice of EDWARD III of England, rather than submit to be governed by a foreigner they doomed themselves to two centuries of warfare. This

noble determination was the cause of the glory and grandeur of France: the oriflamb, our sacred standard, was rent in the fields of Créci, Poitiers and Agincourt, but its tattered fragments triumphed at last over the banner of EDWARD III. and HENRI V., and the cry of *Montjoie St. Denis* stifled that of all factions. The same question concerning the succession to the Crown occurred again at the death of HENRI III; the parliament then issued the famous decree which gave HENRI IV. and LOUIS XIV. to France. They were, however, not ignoble heads those of EDWARD III., HENRI V., the Duke DE GUISE, and the Infanta of Spain. Just Heavens! what is become of the pride of France! She refused such great sovereigns to preserve her French and royal race, and she selected BUONAPARTE!

Vainly will it be urged that BUONAPARTE is not a foreigner. He is one in the eyes of all Europe, of all unprejudiced Frenchmen; he will be deemed one by posterity, which will perhaps ascribe to him the greatest part of our victories and load us with part of his crimes.



**BUONAPARTE** has nothing of the Frenchman either in his manners or in his character. Even the features of his face betray his origin. The language which he learnt in his cradle is not ours, and his accent as well as his name reveal his country. His father and mother lived more than half their lives subjects to the republic of Genoa. He himself is more sincere than his flatterers: he does not acknowledge himself a Frenchman; he hates and despises us. He has often unguardedly said: "*That is exactly like you Frenchmen.*" In one of his speeches he mentioned Italy as his country and France as his conquest. If **BUONAPARTE** be a Frenchman, **TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE** must necessarily be acknowledged one as much and more than he: for after all, he was born in an ancient French colony and under French laws; the freedom which he had obtained had reinstated him in the rights of a subject and of a citizen. And a foreigner, educated by the charity of our Kings, fills the throne of our monarchs and is anxious to shed their blood! We took care of his youth, and out of gratitude he plunges us into an abyss of misery! Just dispensation of

Providence ! the Gauls sacked Rome, and the Romans oppressed the Gauls ; the French have frequently ravaged Italy and the Medici, the Galigai, the Mazarins, the BUONAPARTES have desolated our country. France and Italy should at length know, and for ever renounce each other.

How sweet it will be to repose at last after so many agitations and calamities under the paternal authority of our legitimate Sovereign ! We have for the moment been vassals of the glory which our arms had shed upon BUONAPARTE ; now that he has stripped himself of this glory, it would be too much to continue the slaves of his crimes. Let us reject this Oppressor as he has been already rejected by all the other nations. Let it not be said of us : they murdered the best and most virtuous of Kings ; they did nothing to save his life, and now they are shedding the last drop of their blood, they are sacrificing the last remains of France to support a foreigner whom they themselves detest. By what motive can that faithless France justify her abominable fidelity ? Or are

we reduced to acknowledge that we take pleasure in foul deeds, that we are delighted with crimes, that tyranny suits us? Ah! if foreign nations tired at last of our obstinacy, should consent to leave us this madman; if we were mean enough to purchase with a part of our territory the disgrace of retaining among us the seed of pestilence, and the scourge of humanity, we must fly to the remotest deserts, change our name and language, endeavour to forget and to make others forget that we have been Frenchmen.

Rather let us consider the happiness of our common country; let us recollect that our fate is in our hands; one word can restore us to glory, peace, and the esteem of the world, or plunge us again into the most frightful and most ignoble slavery. Let us re-establish the monarchy of CLOVIS, the inheritance of ST. LOUIS, the patrimony of HENRI IV. At present the BOURBONS alone suit our unhappy situation, they are the only physicians that can heal our wounds. The moderation, the paternal tenderness of their sentiments, their

own misfortunes suit a kingdom that is exhausted, tired of convulsions and calamities. Every thing will become legitimate, if we recall them ; without them every thing is illegitimate. Their bare presence will re-establish that order which they alone can restore among us. They are brave and illustrious noblemen, and much more French than ourselves. These Lords of the *Fleurs de Lys*, were at all times celebrated for their loyalty ; they are so intimately blended with the principle of our manners, that they even seem to constitute a part of France, and to be as necessary to her at present, as the Air and the Sun.

While tranquillity would return with them ; while they alone would put an end to this too long revolution, the return of BUONAPARTE would plunge us into frightful calamities and interminable troubles. Can the most fertile imagination depicture to itself what that monstrous giant would be, when confined within narrow limits, having no longer the treasures of the world to devour, and the blood of Europe to shed ? Can we fancy him

shut up in a ruined and degraded Court, venting upon the French alone his rage, his vengeance and his turbulent genius? BUONAPARTE is not changed, he never will change. He will always invent projects, laws, decrees, absurd, contradictory or criminal; he will always be our tormentor; under him, our lives, our property, will always be insecure. Until he be enabled to disturb the world a new, he will pour his wrath on our families. The only slaves in the midst of a free world, and the objects of contempt among nations, to be insensible to our degradation, would be to arrive at the last degree of misfortune, to lay down at night like the slaves of the East, indifferent to the *cordon* which the Sultan will send us when we awake.

No, this must not be. We have a legitimate Prince, born of our blood, educated among us, whom we know, who knows us, who has our manners, our inclinations, our habits, for whom we have put up our prayers in our youth, with whose name our children are acquainted, as with that of their neigh-

bours, and whose fathers lived and died with our fathers. Is France to become a forfeited property, because we have reduced our ancient Princes to be wanderers in foreign lands? Is she to remain in the possession of a Corsican, as an Alien Estate? Ah! for Heaven's sake let us not be found so disloyal as to disinherit our natural Lord, to give his bed to the first fellow that asks for it. Should we have no legitimate masters left, the meanest Frenchman would still be preferable to BUONAPARTE as a ruler: we should at least be spared the shame of obeying a foreigner.

It only remains for me to prove that if the Restoration of the House of Bourbon be necessary to France, it is not less so to all Europe.

## OF THE ALLIES.

ADVERTING first to reasons peculiar to BUONAPARTE only, is there an individual in the world who could ever rely on his word? Is it not with him, as much a point of policy,

as a propensity of heart, to make ability consist in deceiving, in regarding good faith as a folly and the mark of a weak understanding, in sporting with the sanctity of oaths? Has he performed a single one of the numerous Treaties which he entered into with the different powers of Europe? It was always by violating some article of these treaties, and in the midst of peace that he made his most solid conquests; he rarely evacuated a town which he was to surrender; and even now when he is cast down, the fruit of his rapine, and the evidence of his falsehoods may still be found in some fortresses of Germany.

If it be said that he is to be tied down so as to be unable to recommence his devastations; I answer that it is to no purpose, that you weaken him by dismembering France, by garrisoning the frontier towns for a certain number of years, by obliging him to pay considerable sums, by forcing him to keep but a small army, and to abolish the conscription; all this will prove fruitless. BUONAPARTE, I repeat, is not changed. Adversity has no power over him, because he

was not above prosperity. He will silently meditate revenge: after one or two years of repose, when the coalition is dissolved, when each Prince has re-entered his dominions, he will suddenly call us to arms, avail himself of the generations that are grown up, take and pass through the strong barriers, and once more overrun Germany. At this very moment he speaks of nothing but of going to set fire to Vienna, Berlin and Munich; he cannot consent to abandon his prey. Will the Russians return speedily enough from the banks of the Boristhenes to save Europe a second time? will it be possible to form again, when all its ties are dissolved that miraculous coalition, the result of five-and-twenty years of sufferings? Will not BUONAPARTE find means of bribing some ministers, of seducing some princes, of reviving ancient jealousies, and perhaps of gaining over to his cause some nations blind enough to fight under his banners? In fine, will those same Princes who are now reigning, be then on their thrones, and may not a change of Kings produce a change in politics? Is it possible for powers that have



been so frequently deceived, to resume at once a security that would be their ruin? Can they ever forget the pride of the adventurer who treated them with so much insolence, who boasted of having Monarchs in his anti-room, who sent his commands to Sovereigns, kept spies in their own courts, and proclaimed aloud, that before ten years had elapsed, his Dynasty would be the oldest in Europe? Can Kings treat with a man who heaped upon them affronts which no private individual would endure? A beautiful Queen was the admiration of Europe for her charms, her courage and her virtues, and he hastened her death by the basest and meanest outrages. The sanctity of Kings as well as common decency forbid me to repeat the calumnies, the insults, and ignoble pleasantries which he lavished by turns upon those Monarchs and Ministers of State who are now dictating laws to him in his palace. Though Princes may personally despise these outrages they cannot and ought not to despise them for the interest and majesty of their thrones; they ought to make themselves respected by their people, to break

at last the sword of the Usurper, and to disgrace for ever that abominable right of the strongest upon which BUONAPARTE grounded his pride and his empire.

Next to these particular considerations there are others of a higher nature, and which alone ought to induce the coalesced powers no longer to acknowledge BUONAPARTE as a sovereign.

It is of material importance to the tranquillity of nations, to the security of Crowns, to the family of sovereigns that an individual, sprung from the inferior ranks of society shall not seat himself with impunity on the throne of his master, take his place among legitimate monarchs, treat them as brothers, and find in the revolutions that caused his elevation sufficient force to counterbalance the rights of legitimacy. If this example be once given to the world, monarchs can no longer reckon upon their Crowns. If in the midst of civilization the throne of CLOVIS may be given to a Corsican, whilst the Sons of ST. LOUIS are wan-

dering on the earth, no King can be certain to-day that he is to reign to-morrow. Let this be well considered: all the monarchies of Europe are the offspring of nearly the same manners, and date nearly from the same period; all Kings really are, as it were brothers, united by the Christian Religion and the antiquity of their families. Should this grand and beautiful system once be destroyed, should new races be seated on our thrones where they would cause other manners, other principles, other ideas to prevail, it would be all over with ancient Europe, and in the course of a few years a general revolution would change the succession of all sovereigns. Kings ought, therefore, to defend the House of Bourbon as they would that of their own family. What is true with regard to the relations of royalty is not less so with regard to the relation of nature. There is not a King in Europe but has Bourbon blood in his veins, and who ought to consider them as illustrious and unfortunate kinsmen. Nations have been but too much apprised already that thrones may be shaken. It behoves Kings to shew them that

although thrones may be shaken, yet they never can be destroyed; that for the happiness of the world Crowns are not obtained by the success of crimes and the sports of fortune.

It is likewise of material importance to civilized Europe that France, which by her genius and situation is as it were the heart and soul of that quarter of the globe, should be happy, prosperous and tranquil; she never can be so but under her ancient Kings. Any other government would prolong among us those convulsions which are felt at the farthest end of the earth. The BOURBONS alone, by the majesty of their race, the legitimacy of their rights, the moderation of their character, will afford a sufficient guarantee for treaties and close the wounds of the world.

Under the reign of tyrants the laws of morality are as it were suspended, in the same manner as in England they suspend in times of trouble the act by which the liberty of the citizens is secured. Every one knows that he is not acting rightly, that he is proceeding in

a wrong course : but every one yields submission and lends himself to oppression. People even create for themselves a sort of false conscience in vice ; they scrupulously execute commands the most contrary to justice. Their apology is, better times will come, when they will recover their rights to liberty and virtue ; that it is a period of iniquity which must be passed over as we pass over times of misfortune. But whilst they are waiting for the return of better times, the tyrant does what he likes, he is obeyed, he may drag a whole population to slaughter, oppress them, demand any thing of them without meeting with a denial. With a legitimate Prince this is impossible ; under a legal sway every one enjoys his natural right and the practice of his virtues. If the king should attempt to exceed the limits of his power, he would encounter obstacles on all sides ; every corporation would make remonstrances, every individual would raise his voice ; the attempt would be opposed in the name of reason, conscience, and liberty. It is on this account that Europe has more to dread from BUONAPARTE,

left in the possession of a single French village, than from the BOURBONS, masters of all France, even to the Rhine.

Besides; can the Allied Monarchs entertain any doubts respecting the opinion of France? Do they suppose that they would so easily have reached the Louvre had not the French considered them as their deliverers? Have they not beheld in all the towns, through which they passed, manifest signs of this hope? For the last six months we scarcely heard any other questions but these, all over France: *Are the Bourbons with them? Where are the Princes? Are they coming? Ah! if we did but see a white banner!* The Usurper, moreover, is abhorred by all. He inspires so much execration that even among a warlike people he counterbalanced the evils apprehended from the presence of hostile armies, and we rather consented to suffer a momentary invasion than endure BUONAPARTE during his life. If our armies have fought, let us admire their valour, and lament their sufferings; they detest the tyrant as much and more than the rest of the

French : but they have taken an oath, and French grenadiers die victims of their word. The sight of military banners inspires fidelity : from the Franks, our forefathers, down to our times, our soldiers have entered into a holy compact and bound themselves, as it were by matrimonial vows, to their swords. Let us not, therefore, mistake the sacrifice of honour for the love of slavery. Our brave warriors only wait to be released from their allegiance. Let the French and their Allies acknowledge their legitimate Princes, and, at the same instant, the army released from its oath, will range themselves under the unsullied banner which often witnessed our triumphs, sometimes our reverses, at all times our valour and never our shame.

If the Allied Monarchs be willing to adopt the only plan that can insure the tranquillity of France and that of Europe, they will encounter no obstacle to their design. They ought to be satisfied with the triumph of their arms. We, as Frenchmen, ought to regard those triumphs as a lesson of Provi-

dence, that chastises without degrading us. We may confidently say to ourselves, that what would have been impossible under our legitimate Princes could only be accomplished under the sway of an adventurer. Henceforward, the Allied Monarchs ought to aspire to a more lasting glory. Let them repair with their guards to the place of our revolution; let them celebrate a funeral service on the very spot where LOUIS and ANTOINETTE bent their heads under the murderous axe; let this council of Sovereigns proclaim on the altar, in the midst of the French people, kneeling, and in tears, LOUIS XVIII, King of France; they will offer, to the world, the greatest spectacle that it ever beheld, and shed upon themselves a glory which ages will not be able to obliterate.

But already are some of these events accomplished. Miracles have produced miracles. Paris, like Athens, has seen foreigners enter within its walls, who have respected it for the sake of its former glory and its great men. Eighty thousand conquering warriors have



rested near our citizens without disturbing their repose, without committing the smallest violence, without indulging in a single shout of triumph. They are deliverers, not conquerors. Honour, immortal honour to the Sovereigns who could give the world such an example of moderation in victory ! How many insults had they not to avenge ? But they have not confounded the French with the tyrant by whom they were oppressed. Hence they have already reaped the fruits of their magnanimity. They have been received by the inhabitants of Paris like our own Monarchs, like French Princes, like the BOURBONS. Soon shall we behold the descendants of HENRI IV ! Alexander has given us his word that we shall see them ; he remembers that the marriage contract of the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême is deposited in the archives of Russia. He has faithfully preserved the last public deed of our legitimate government ; he has delivered it to our archives where we shall, in our turn, preserve the account of his entrance into Paris as one of the greatest and most glorious monuments of history.

However, let us not separate from the two monarchs who are now among us, that other sovereign who is making the greatest sacrifice to the cause of kings and to the tranquillity of nations : may he as a monarch and as a father find the reward of his wishes in the affection, gratitude and admiration of the French !

Countrymen, fellow sufferers, and friends, let us forget our quarrels, our animosities, our errors, that we may save our country. Let us unite in brotherly love. on the ruins of our dear native soil, and call to our aid the heir of Henry IV and Louis XIV. May he soon appear among us to dry the tears of his children, to restore his family to happiness, and charitably to cast over our wounds the mantle of St. Louis half torn by our own hands ! Let us recollect that all the evils we experience, the loss of our wealth, of our armies, the calamities of invasion, the slaughter of our children, the troubles and disorganisation of all France, the infringement of our liberties are the work of one man, and that we shall owe all the oppo-

site blessings to one man. Let us then raise from all quarters the shout which can save us, the shout with which our fathers rent the air in misfortune as in victory, and which to us will be the harbinger of peace and happiness. .

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# NAPOLEON'S CONDUCT

TOWARDS

PRUSSIA,

SINCE

THE PEACE OF TILSIT.

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**I**MPORTANT points of dispute had caused, in the year 1806, the war between Prussia and France. The Peace of Tilsit put a stop, on the 9th of July, 1807, to a contest, as unequal, as it was unfortunate. Prussia bought by immense sacrifices a peace, which was intended to assuage the sufferings of the vanquished, and at the same time to set limits to the rights of the victor.

But this fundamental condition of all treaties of peace among civilized nations, was foreign to the French Government. Its warlike posture against Prussia continued still for a long time, and even with greater asperity. The only difference was, that Napoleon,



*dazzling the eyes with the name of Peace,* did not meet with any further resistance.

Fourteen months after the Peace of Tilsit, the French Government thought proper at last to fulfil its most essential object, and to return to the King the provinces which had been guaranteed to him ; but from this moment, this convention and all the following treaties became to Prussia a source of fresh misfortunes and humiliations. This state remained, by the oppressive superiority of France, under the hard necessity of yielding in points which militated, as well against its interest as its rights, in order to preserve its political existence. The more care and attention it took, in fulfilling the obligations it had taken upon itself, the less could it escape the hatred, the want of confidence, and the more and more increasing pretensions of the French Government, and the less did this government hold itself bound by its own promises.

We need only read the treaties, and compare the facts with them.

The 28th Article of the Treaty of Tilsit, and a separate convention concluded, on the 12th of July, 1807, between Marshal

Count Kalkreuth and the Prince of Neuchatel, stipulated that the *evacuation of all those Prussian provinces* which by the peace were to be restored to the King, should be effected by the 1st of October, 1807. The only condition annexed to this convention was, that the war contributions “imposed on “the country were to be discharged, that is “to say, that they ought to be regarded as discharged, as soon as the securities given “should be recognised by the Intendant-General of the French army as sufficient.” But they took care to recognise so very little as valuable, and so to turn and twist themselves, that this condition could not be fulfilled before fourteen months after the peace, and then in the severest manner for Prussia. The King, after having consented to the cession of the most fertile and most populous moiety of his states, had flattered himself in vain to keep the rest in a tranquil situation, in order to be able effectual'y to work out the alleviation of his subjects, oppressed by the sufferings of an unfortunate war. The French troops, which had only evacuated, in the beginning, East Prussia, as far as the Passarge, and afterwards as far as the Viſtula,

continued their abode in the other provinces, to the number of *one hundred and fifty thousand men, with fifty thousand horse*, at the expense of the inhabitants. In the same manner the commissaries of the Emperor continued to levy all the public revenues in the provinces, and to lay upon them other extraordinary charges, in so much that the state of affairs in general appeared as if peace was still remote. Never will Prussia lose the recollection of this epocha of sufferings!—To keep its close at the greatest possible distance, and to oppress Prussia still more than it had been oppressed by war and by the treaty of peace, Marshal Soult and the other French generals in Prussia invented new sacrifices for that country to make beyond the stipulations of the Treaty of Tilsit, as the necessary conditions of the final evacuation. The following are the most striking :—

The Treaty of Tilsit, Article 16th, had stipulated a *military road* between Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw through the Prussian States; but Marshal Soult demanded, besides, a *commercial road* for the conveyance of the productions of the agricul-

ture and commerce of Saxony and Warsaw, the establishment of Saxon *post-offices* upon this road, and very considerable *privileges*, respecting the transit of the said produce, and of the foreign shipping on the canals and rivers in the interior of Prussia. The King, in order to avoid every thing which could hinder the evacuation of his states, saw himself under the necessity of acceding to all these pretensions, however unfounded they were, and the burthensome Convention of Elbing was signed on the 13th of October, 1807.

The Treaty of Tilsit had further, in Article 2nd and 3rd, fixing the borders between the Duchy of Warsaw and the remaining states of Prussia, neither added to the territory of Warsaw the Circle of Michelaw, in Old Prussia, nor even made the evacuation of Prussia dependent upon the final settlement of the frontiers. Nevertheless Marshal Soult presented the project of a second convention, wherein a new delineation of frontiers, directly to be adopted, was drawn, to the exclusive advantage of the Duchy of Warsaw, and with this Duchy *the Circle of Michelaw* was incorporated. The Marshal in-

sisted upon it ; and, in order not to be behind-hand upon any point, upon which the evacuation of the country might depend, the King, by the Convention of Elbing, of the 10th of November, 1807, gave his consent to this arrangement of the frontiers, and to the cession of an important Circle. Another stipulation was made in this convention, to confirm the donation of certain domains in the Prussian territory, which the Emperor Napoleon, shortly before the peace of Tilsit, had conferred upon the Prince of Neufchatel and upon Marshal Mortier. The King passed equally over this, in spite of the inconvenience which must arise therefrom in the interior administration.

The Treaty of Tilsit, Article 2nd, had expressly mentioned *New Silesia* as remaining to the King of Prussia. Contrary to the convention, Marshal Soult demanded the union of that country with the Duchy of Warsaw. The King, to attain his object, felt himself bound to concede also this point ; and by the same Convention of the 10th of November, 1807, gave up this possession, as important as it was legitimate.

The Treaty of Tilsit, by the 19th Article,

had fixed to the *City of Danzig* a territory of *two leagues (lieues)* in diameter from its extent. But even while the said treaty was pending, General Rapp, French governor of Danzig, had concluded a kind of agreement with the deputies of Danzig, without the knowledge of Prussia; by which the territory of Danzig was enlarged to two *German miles (quatre lieues)* in diameter, not to be reckoned from the real circumference of the city, but from the extreme points of the *out-works*. Marshal Scult insisted upon it, producing the sketch of a separate convention between France, the City of Danzig, and Prussia. At last Prussia was obliged to concede the said frontier line between her states and the territory of Danzig, as it was stipulated by a third convention at Elbing, the 6th of December, 1807.

Nevertheless the evacuation of the Prussian States did not take place, in spite of all these proofs of the compliance of Prussia, which had been considered as necessary for the entire fulfilment of a treaty of peace which had never prescribed them. There was still one principal point to be settled, that in which consisted the only real con-

dition, upon which that treaty of peace had made the *evacuation* to depend.

The Convention of the 12th of July, 1807, had, agreeably to the 28th Article of the Peace of Tilsit, thus defined this condition :  
 “ The *war contributions* imposed upon the  
 “ country were to be discharged, that is to  
 “ say, they were to be looked upon as dis-  
 “ charged, as soon as the securities given  
 “ should be recognised by the Intendant-  
 “ General of the French armies as sufficient ;  
 “ and that it should be equally understood,  
 “ that every contribution, *which was not*  
 “ *publicly made known before the exchanging*  
 “ *of the ratification of the peace*, would be  
 “ regarded as null and void.”

From the beginning the King had ordered a Commission to assemble at Berlin, concerning the fulfilment of the peace, and had charged this Commission to settle, before all other things, with the Intendant-General, this business of the contributions. The difficulties, without end or number, which this Intendant-General \* made, and his always increasing and impracticable pretensions,

\* See Note I. at the end of the work.

obliged the King, in the beginning of November, 1807, to send his brother, Prince William of Prussia, to Paris, and to give him credentials to the French Emperor, in order to get rid there, in person, of all the difficulties, and finally to re-establish a complete understanding between both courts. Unfortunately, however, the Prince did not succeed much better in this; he could not bring it to a conclusion without signing infinitely hard and burthensome conditions. Nothing could have been easier, according to this stipulation of the Peace of Tilsit, than to draw up an account of the sums due from Prussia to France. It was only necessary to know the amount of the war contributions imposed, up to the 12th of July, 1807, and what had been paid of them, and to agree about the supplies in kind made to the French army, and now to be set off against them. According to this basis, the account of the Commission of Peace at Berlin amounted to *nineteen millions of francs*.

But the account of the Intendant-General made the total demand for war contributions, including the arrears of the territorial revenues up to the 12th of July, 1807, amount



to the enormous sum of one hundred and fifty-four millions and a half of francs, and allowed upon this sum only a deduction of thirty-five millions and a half, as already paid ; so that it exhibited a sum-total of *one hundred and nineteen millions*, and therefore a difference of *exactly one hundred millions of francs* from the sum given in by the Commission. Some deductions, that were allowed, made the whole amount to one hundred and twelve millions of francs ; the payment of which sum the Intendant-General demanded before he would evacuate the country. The King, only in order to put an end to it, and to procure the benefit of tranquillity to the unfortunate country, empowered the Commission to recognise this sum ; but there arose new and still more discouraging difficulties concerning the manner of payment, and the securities demanded by the Intendant-General. At last, on the 8th of March, 1808, the Commission agreed with him concerning the sketch of a convention, which was sent immediately to Paris, to be submitted to the Emperor's approbation. Hopes were given to this effect ; yet, notwithstanding the most pressing representations of Prince William, this approbation

never came. The Emperor did not conceal from the Prince, that he *considered the evacuation of Prussia as dependent solely upon his other political combinations* (not then upon the fulfilment of the conditions of treaties!) The unfortunate country, during all these deceptions, and the eternal subterfuges which the Prince experienced in his negociation, sunk, in the midst of peace, under the burthens of war: the sufferings, the miseries, the despair of the nation, rose to their highest pitch.

At last it suited the political combinations of the Emperor to promise the evacuation of Prussia, but at a price which was to exhaust the last strength of the country. His minister for foreign affairs proposed, at the end of the month of August, to Prince William, the sketch of a project, in which, far from ratifying the conclusive account of the Intendant-General, the value of the contribution still to be paid by Prussia was fixed at one hundred and fifty-four millions and a half of francs; therefore forty-two millions more than the Intendant-General himself had asked in his sketch of a convention, at Berlin, without there

being the smallest reason for the enormous rise in the demands to be found, except in the most hostile disposition towards Prussia. It would lead too far to follow the clue of this troublesome negociation, and of all the proposals and requests made by the Prince and by the King's minister, and of all the different *contre-projets*, made by the Imperial ministers. The result was, that the Emperor persisted in not only demanding the arrears of the war contribution, but also those of the revenues of the country, even beyond the period of the 12th of July, 1807, and for the whole time of the French occupation; as if the protracted settlement of this pecuniary transaction did *not* rather originate in the asperity, in the delays, and in the pretensions of France, impossible to be complied with, than in the bad intentions of the Prussian Government, which, most certainly, in the state of oppression under which it laboured, could wish for nothing more anxiously, than at length to bring all to a settlement. These arrears were at length calculated at one hundred and eighty millions of francs; and the Emperor's minister represented it to the

Prince, as a point of generosity in the Emperor, that he had abated to the Prussian State thirty millions of francs. His last word was the payment of *one hundred and forty millions*. An unexpected and disagreeable incident,\* which had not the least relation to this negotiation, served for a pretence to add fresh ill-treatment to that which Prussia had already laboured under. A peremptory term of a few days was given, with the most significant menaces to the Prince, either to accept the proposed sketch of the convention, or to refuse it. There was no doubt that a refusal would have immediately been followed by the ruin of the Prussian monarchy.

The Prince saw himself therefore under the necessity of signing, on the 8th of September, 1808, with the Imperial minister, Count de Champagny, that convention which ought to have restored the Prussians to their King, and have put a period at last to their sufferings, although at the price of new and most oppressive sacrifices.

The lesser sacrifices were,—The reduction of the Prussian army to forty-two thousand

\* The affair of the well-known letter of the Minister Baron Stein.

men, which number was not to be augmented in the first ten years: the cession of the fortresses of *Glogaw*, *Stettin*, and *Custrin* to the French; that is to say, the first, until the payment of the moiety, and the two last, until the payment of the whole of the contributions:

The *maintaining ten thousand men* of the French troops, as garrison, in those places, and the establishment of *necessaries for a siege* of six months in each of these fortresses:

The laying down of *seven military roads and military stages (places d'étappes)* in the country between the three fortresses, the Duchy of Warsaw, Saxony, Danzig, and Magdeburgh: and,

The cession of a *territory of two thousand toises* round the citadel of *Magdeburgh* on the right bank of the Elbe.

But the chief object was the fixing the arrears of the *war contribution and of the revenues of the country*, due to France, at the immense height of one hundred and forty millions of francs, and that in the most burdensome method of payment.

The King saw with pain the impossibility of liquidating, within the prescribed terms, so enormous a sum out of the means of his own

state, which was entirely enervated ; as, during and long after the war, all the revenues of the country were poured into foreign coffers, as the inhabitants were exhausted by demands utterly beyond their means, and by every other kind of extraordinary burthen, and as no national industry, under the complete cessation of commerce, could be expected to recruit the drained resources of the state. The King therefore sent Count Golz, his cabinet minister, to the French Emperor at Erfurth, where he had, in the month of October, 1808, the well-known interview with the Russian Emperor. Count Golz was authorised to represent to him the real state of things, and to propose more moderate conditions ; but the Count was not able to operate any thing, excepting the remission of twenty millions out of one hundred and forty millions of francs, and this only by the earnest intercession of the Emperor Alexander.

The Prussian Government after this, on the 5th of November, 1808, caused to be delivered to the Receiver-General of the contributions the necessary documents, which secured the payment of *the hundred and twenty millions* of francs ; that is to say, bills

of exchange for fifty millions, and for the remaining seventy millions, provincial bonds; which should be exchanged in six months for mortgages upon the crown lands (*domanialpfand briefe*). To record the delivery of these documents, and to approach to the execution of the Convention of Paris, of the 8th of September, a new Convention was signed at Berlin, on the 5th of November, between Count Golz and the Intendant-General Daru.

Now the *evacuation of the Prussian States* took place, with the exception of the three fortresses on the Oder, viz. on the 22nd of November, that of the country between the Vistula and the Oder; and on the 5th of December, that of the country on the left bank of the Oder. The surrender of the coffers, and of the administration of the country to the Prussian authorities, took place on the 18th of November, 1808.\*

Prussia was nevertheless obliged to sign

\* It was not before this period that the Prussian prisoners of war in France were set at liberty, who, according to the 29th Article of the Peace of Tilsit, ought to have been sent back long before. They returned to their country, fifteen thousand in number, at the beginning of January, 1809.

five different conventions on the 12th, 28th, 29th, and 30th November, 1808, and on the 1st February, 1809, in order to secure the supply of provisions for the three fortresses on the Oder, to fix the lines of demarcation around these fortresses, the establishment of French posts between them, and to fix the military roads, the stages, and every thing that could have the least relation with the marching and supplying the French troops in the country.

The King, restored to his states, now only thought of healing the wounds of the nation, and securing, by a good understanding with the French Government, the repose and the blessings which it expected from his paternal care. While the King was fulfilling with the greatest accuracy all the obligations which the Peace of Tilsit, and the many following conventions, had imposed upon him ; he neglected no opportunity, and grudged no new sacrifices, to accommodate the French Court, and to convince it of the sincerity of his endeavours. But the French Emperor did not return measure for measure. In the pride of his power, he thought himself above the obligations he had contracted, and broke



his word to Prussia in many essential instances, and never ceased to ill-treat and persecute a nation that had tried without success to resist the extensive plans of his ambition.

Among the many instances of absolute arbitrariness and violence, which gave Prussia reason for the most just complaints, she will never forget the famous *Convention of Bayonne*, which was concluded between France and the Government of Warsaw, after a negociation studiously concealed, at the very moment when Prince William was sincerely negotiating for the re-establishment of a good understanding between France and Prussia. The object of this Convention of Bayonne was, to deprive Prussia of her property in the Duchy of Warsaw, without her knowledge, and in complete contradiction to every principle of morals, of common justice, and of the Peace of Tilsit.

It was very plainly expressed by the 25th Article of the Peace of Tilsit, “ that, in  
 “ virtue of the stipulated reciprocity, all  
 funds and capitals belonging to individuals,  
 and to public institutions, of any descrip-  
 “ tion, in the Prussian Monarchy (par-

“ ticularly of the Bank and the Maritime  
 “ Company), and out upon security in the  
 “ ceded territories, were neither to be taken,  
 “ nor put under sequestration ; but that their  
 “ proprietors should remain at liberty to dis-  
 “ pose and to continue in the enjoyment of  
 “ them.”

It is true that the Convention of the 8th of September, 1808, forced upon Prince William, in the 3rd Article, had annexed this modification, “ that all demands of the King of  
 “ Prussia, for sums owing to him by indivi-  
 “ duals in the Duchy of Warsaw, should,  
 “ *according to the stipulations of the Peace of*  
 “ *Tilsit*, be cancelled without reserve.” But this modification, insidious as it was, nevertheless, by its reference to the stipulations of the Peace of Tilsit, had left at least untouched the guarantee given by the said Peace to the funds of Prussian individuals, and of the public institutions placed in the Duchy of Warsaw. Therefore this Article could only relate to the sums belonging to the King himself, viz. to the coffers of the state, administering the *property of the Crown*, but not to public institutions, which administer *property of individuals*.

Notwithstanding this guarantee of the treaty of peace, and even before the Convention of the 8th of September, the King of Saxony, Duke of Warsaw, had put under sequestration, as property escheated to his crown, all capitals of Prussian subjects, and of public establishments, placed in the Duchy of Warsaw; viz. not only the capitals belonging to the Bank, the Maritime Company, the General Chest of Widows, the Chest for Soldiers' Widows, the House of Orphans at Potsdam, the Hospitals, Houses of Correction, the Chests of the Fees of Justice (*Justiz Gebühren Kasse*), Churches, pious Establishments, Universities, Schools, &c. but even a great number of capitals belonging to individuals, upon the bare suspicion that these, perhaps, might have been the brokers or middle-men of the Bank of Berlin. However violent and hostile this measure was, it was nevertheless asserted to be founded upon that separate Convention of Bayonne, concluded between the King of Saxony and the French Emperor, on the 10th of May, 1808. This convention was never officially communicated to the Prussian Government; yet it has transpi-

red, that, in virtue of its 4th Article, "all the reserved," as they were called, "or " Prussian claims of money, ~~in~~<sup>in</sup> the Duchy " of Warsaw, making, according to the list " of the Intendant-General of the French " army, 48,466,200 francs, 51 centimes, " as principal, and four millions, arrears " of interest, as well as those which might " still be discovered, should be ceded " by the French Emperor to the King of " Saxony, in his capacity of Duke of War- " saw, for the improvement of the finances " of the Duchy; in exchange for which the " King of Saxony had promised to pay into " the coffers of the Emperor the sum of " twenty millions of francs."

In this manner two monarchs made a bargain of the property of a third neighbouring and friendly nation, and the officers of the Government of Warsaw were ordered to hunt everywhere after this property, as if it were without a proprietor, or as if it belonged to an unfortunate proscribed enemy. These officers fulfilled their commission with an asperity without example. They published at Warsaw, on the 13th of December, 1808, a list of

confiscated Prussian capitals, to the amount  
of

Thalers.*	Gros.
11,314,769	5

and on the 28th of March,

1811, a second list, of	7,509,327	17
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Making a total of	18,824,096	22
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A deduction, according to  
a third list, of the 18th  
of May, 1811, of several  
capitals which had  
been twice reckoned,  
was made of . . .

1,805,143	2
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So that there remained .	17,018,956	20
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of Prussian capitals placed out upon security  
in the Duchy of Warsaw, of which the  
smallest part only was in fact the King's  
real property, but the greatest part incon-  
testably the property of Prussian establish-  
ments and of individuals. All these were  
confiscated or menaced with sequestration.†

\* One thaler is almost four francs.

† The Saxo-Warsovian Government, relying upon the sup-  
port of France, and tempted by the few measures which the  
Prussian Government, in this epocha of misery, could oppose to  
the most horrid injustice, added still greater oppressions. It

A general consternation prevailed among thousands of respectable families, widows, and orphans, who had placed their money in anterior times in South and New East Prussia, at a time when justice and civilisation prevailed there; and one could not foresee such horrid barbarity. In vain were heard the most affecting complaints of so many persons, the most solemn protestations of the Prussian establishments, the voice of general indignation; it was in vain that the Prussian Government made the most pressing representations; at Paris they were referred to Dresden and Warsaw; and there they offered as an excuse the obligations they had entered into with France. At last the Prussian Government offered great sacrifices at Dresden and at Warsaw; at first the sum of ten millions of francs, afterwards of twenty millions declared by a decree of the 6th of January, 1809, all claims of debt, even of Prussian individuals, without exception, as included in the sequestration. This measure extended still to capitals to the amount of 7,370,529 thalers, purely the property of individuals, and which, united to those 17,018,956 thalers, 20 groschen, of the original Bayonne Lists, as they were called, made a total of 24,389,485 thalers, 20 groschen. The Saxo-Warsovian Government, however, afterwards repealed this last decree, on the 10th of September, 1810, by a special convention with Prussia.

lions of francs (the amount of the payment made by Warsaw to France), and at last the cession of all the funds belonging to the Bank of Berlin and to the Maritime Company, to the amount of *circa* eight millions of thalers, in order to obtain at least the removal of the sequestration from the capitals of the other establishments, and of individuals, which were falsely included among the capital of the Bank.

As the humanity of the King of Saxony could not but feel the crying injustice into which he had been drawn, he excepted from the confiscation in the year 1811, besides the funds of the Chest of Invalids (although they had been already excepted by the French Intendant-General), also those of the General Chest of Widows, and of some small establishments; but being afraid to commit himself with France, nothing could ever prevail upon him to pronounce a general removal of the confiscation of the sums put under sequestration, not even those immense sacrifices offered by Prussia. In regard to those Prussian individuals whose demands were put under sequestration, from their being looked upon as the middle-men of the

Bank, the King of Saxony had ordered it to be declared, that he would exonerate those sums which they could formally prove to be their own real property ; but this formal proceeding was too difficult to be executed and too uncertain in its issue, and therefore allowed but very few people to substantiate their rights. The few sums which were really struck off from the lists of the Convention of Bayonne, belonging to the General Fund for Widows, and those of some minor establishments, scarcely amounted to the sum of two millions of thalers. *Fifteen millions of thalers*, therefore, of Prussian property, remained under the sequestration of the Government of Warsaw ; and it is known to every body, that even the General Fund for Widows, and the proprietors of the other liberated capitals, have never been able to dispose of them, or to receive their interest. Thanks to the first impulse which their debtors in Warsaw got by the confiscation, and to the general anarchy which the favours of France had brought upon the Duchy !

These are the wounds which will long bleed, and will long blacken the memory of those who studied to lead astray, by the



Convention of Bayonne, a naturally good and just Prince, to sow between him and Prussia the seeds of eternal discord, and to accomplish the ruin of that kingdom.

Among the new relations between France and Prussia, none had occasioned to the latter so many proofs of humiliating dependence upon the former, or greater cruelty towards innocent individuals, than its accession to the *Continental System*, as it was termed. History will judge the System of the Emperor Napoleon, who, without a naval power of his own, \* thought to combat the commercial power of his enemies by the privations and the impoverishment of his friends. We will speak here only of facts which have reference to the participation of Prussia. The peace of Tilsit, Article 27th, had fixed, “ that until  
 “ the definitive Peace between France and  
 “ England, all States belonging to the King  
 “ of Prussia, without exception, should be  
 “ shut *against the shipping and the commerce*  
 “ *of the English.*”

However just the King's wish would have been, to leave time and the power of returning to the Prussian vessels lying in British harbours, or in the open sea, especially to those

charged with grain, necessary for the maintenance of the French troops themselves, in an exhausted country, and also not to provoke England too soon, to enrich herself with Prussian booty; nevertheless the shutting all Prussian harbours against the English was intimated at Memel, as early as the 1st of September, 1807, by a formal order, and reinforced, on the 9th of September, by a severe instruction to the Maritime Courts. But this shutting the harbours was not deemed sufficient at Paris; for, even in the French *Moniteur*, dissatisfaction and distrust were expressed. The Prussian Government, therefore, saw itself under the necessity of defining, in a more precise order, of the 11th of June, 1808, the principles to be observed concerning the strictest vigilance as to exit, entry, transit, and interior traffic, in order to avoid *any commerce and any communication with England*. It appointed Commissioners of Commerce, in 1808, in all harbours, and in 1810, even in several commercial places in the interior; whose only business it was, to have this inspection, to direct and observe everywhere the execution of the Continental System, and to act everywhere in concert with

the French consuls residing in the harbours. It supported with patience from that time the pretensions and the insolence of most of these consuls, who seemed to think themselves called upon, as independent authorities, only to hinder, and to render more difficult, the little unprohibited trade that could still subsist, and to expose the interest of a country which had received them cordially, and at the expense of which they were enriching themselves. The Prussian Government, in all cases of transgression, did not fail to employ against its own subjects every measure of redress, as confiscations, and punishments by fine and imprisonment; while it submitted to see its commerce, which was formerly so flourishing, completely dying away, and the last life springs of the state drying up, only in order to give satisfaction to the French Government. But this was difficult to be satisfied in points respecting its favourite system, for the extension of which it heaped new and imperative demands one upon another.—In consequence of this summons, the Prussian Government saw itself forced, by the order of the 11th of June, 1808, to turn against Sweden its laws

of prohibition, which at Tilsit were asked for only against England.

Prussia was further obliged, by the order of the 9th of March, 1810, to pronounce the sentence of confiscation against all colonial produce being on board of any vessel, *coming from any European harbour whatever, or from any country, or any colony, in the East and West Indies, with which France was not in relations of friendship and of commerce.*

She was obliged, by the order of the 19th of July, 1810, to shut the Prussian harbours against the vessels of the United States of *North America*; and when she attempted afterwards to restrain, at least in some measure, by a subsequent declaration of the 5th of August, the retro-active power of this so unexpected measure upon her own subjects, she saw herself obliged, by a French summons, to rescind, on the 1st of November, so just a restriction.

At last she was obliged to accede to that famous *continental impost* which was fixed by the Emperor in the tariff of Trianon, on the 5th of August, 1810, and to lay it, by an order of the 10th of October, on all colonial produce that might be brought into the

Prussian States, whether originating from confiscations in the harbours, from prizes made at sea from neighbouring states, or by commerce going on by French licences. On the other hand, all colonial produce coming from the sea was to be looked upon, without further investigation of its origin, as originating from British commerce, and consequently confiscated. The articles of this tariff exceed, at least for the most important goods, the moiety, and even two-thirds of their common price.\* By this extraordinary dearness their consumption, and consequently the commerce with them, was expected to be lessened. France extolled this tariff as a capital mean of attacking Great Britain, on its vulnerable side, with the happiest success; but this tight-stretched tariff would have annihilated commerce at once, if one had not endeavoured to apply to its execution every practicable modification reconcilable with

\* For instance, upon the cwt. of coffee, the common price of which, independent of the old duties, was at Berlin, in the month of August, 1810, 94 thaler, 12 groschen, the continental impost was 52 thaler, 12 gr. Brazil, Surinam, and other cotton, price 158 thaler, imp. 105 th. Raw sugar, price 41 th. imp. 39 th. Cocoa, price 98 th. 13. gr. imp. 130 th. Tea only was favoured, and the impost moderate.

the system and model of impost which France had prescribed. The Prussian Government demanded the impost according to the tariff; but, on the other hand, it remitted the old taxes on consumption; it did not apply the tariff laws to the raw material for the manufactures of the country, nor to the goods of transit; and respecting the manner of payment, essential alleviations were accorded to the merchants.

The Continental System developed itself in all its force during the autumn of 1810. France issued a declaration, "That neutral  
 "vessels no more existed; that the hitherto  
 "neutral flags only covered ships that were  
 "carrying on commerce for England, were  
 "sailing under English licences, and were to  
 "be looked upon as coming from England;  
 "that even, if they had on board certificates  
 "of French consuls, or even French licences,  
 "they were not to be credited; and that all  
 "colonial goods, from whatever place, and in  
 "whatever manner they might arrive, were  
 "nothing but British property, and were there-  
 "fore to be put under sequestration, and con-  
 "fiscated." In the meantime it was rumoured, that French troops were coming to occupy

suddenly the first commercial places in Germany, in order to enforce the execution of the said decrees, and to hunt after colonial produce. This took place in reality at Franckfort on the 22nd of October, 1810, in the Hanse Towns, and in Mecklenburg. There existed many fears respecting the Prussian coasts of the Baltic, where a commerce, formerly permitted and favoured by so many local circumstances, had hitherto escaped total suppression. It was not deemed enough, that the Prussian Government had given to its authorities the most precise orders to observe with the utmost rigour the principles of the Continental System; it was obliged still to exhibit a great example of this severity, in order to anticipate all the measures of France which might accelerate the crisis. The King, therefore, by the ordinance of the 28th of October, commanded all local authorities to put under sequestration immediately, all colonial produce, and all goods looked upon as English, which were in the country, or might still arrive; he ordered lists of them to be made, and their origin investigated with all possible rigour, in order to confiscate them if their entry

were prohibited; on the contrary, if their entry were legal, to charge them with the continental impost, without making any difference relating to their destination for mere transit, or for interior consumption. In fact, on the very 28th of October, on which the King had signed at Potsdam this ordinance, the French Legation at Berlin put in a note, in order, in part, to complain in a very impressive manner of the inefficient measures taken for the suppression of the English commerce in Prussia; partly, to insist upon the severest application of the tariff, as well as, in general, upon the powerful co-operation of Prussia, in all those measures directed against England. "If it were possible," says the note, "in Prussia to have the idea of evading these measures, then the Emperor, forced to consult only the interest of the general cause, would be unwillingly put under the disagreeable necessity of taking care of *their execution himself.*"

A more recent decree of the Emperor, of the 19th of October, 1810, gave orders for the seizure and *burning of all objects of English manufacture*, in the whole extent of the French Empire, that might be found in the



magazines of the excise-offices, and in the store-houses of individuals. In the mean time the Prussian Government was called upon to adopt the same measure. In fact, it saw itself under the necessity of giving orders for the burning of different goods of English manufacture, which had been stopped at Berlin, Königsberg, Elbing, &c. &c. It always indeed executed with unwillingness, and with every possible delicacy, this new harshness against innocent individuals, who, relying upon the precedent orders, had engaged themselves in lawful speculations upon goods originating in prizes made at sea and from confiscations, and who could not foresee the retrospective power of a decree devoid of all justice, and at least unheard-of in the annals of the Prussian legislation.

In order, if possible, to strike the last blow against English commerce, the Emperor demanded of the Prussian Government, at the end of the month of October, 1810, no longer *to shut its harbours against ships laden with colonial produce* (of which a great number was at that time in the Baltic), but, on the contrary, *to favour their entering; then to put them under sequestration, to confiscate them,*

*and to leave the cargoes in kind at the disposal of France*, upon an understanding that their value was to be deducted from the war contribution still owing by Prussia. A long negotiation took place. The end of it was, that Prussia was forced to give her consent to a convention which was signed on the 28th of January by the French chargé-d'affaires. By this convention the cargoes of all ships laden with colonial produce, and confiscated in the Prussian harbours, were declared sold by Prussia to France, according to an annexed estimate, and so, that French commissaries were to proceed in the harbours to a preliminary summary inventory of the cargoes, and Prussia was to transmit them to Magdeburg. There a nearer inspection and a final valuation of what was to be sold, was to take place; and then, after a tariff agreed upon, a receipt for the sum, including the expenses of carriage, was to be delivered to the Prussian Government, to be deducted from the sums due to France. The Emperor ratified this convention, but rejected three Articles proposed by Prussia, and gave her to understand that a valuation so little advantageous to France had left him for some

time in doubt whether he would ratify it or not. Certainly Prussia would have been very happy to be saved the odium of this sale and confiscation. The gradual, but invaluable advantages of a free commerce, and the power of rewarding the confidence of the subjects in the equity of the Government, were of more value to Prussia, than those of a measure of this extent. Besides, the surrender of all the confiscated and sold cargoes at Magdeburg was not finished before the beginning of the year 1812.

The anxiety of the Emperor to protect the Continent against England, only by a total annihilation of its importation of colonial and British produce, fell at last even upon the *exit of continental produce*. Under the pretext of a desire to favour their exit, and merely to guard against England's procuring for herself, without considerable sacrifices, the objects of the first necessity, the French Emperor caused, in July, 1811, the Prussian Government to be called upon, to adopt also the tariff of certain duties which he had just imposed in France upon the exit of corn and timber. Therefore this Government, by an order of the 26th of July, 1811, saw itself obliged to fix

the duties upon the exportation of the said produce at 32 thalers, 12 groschen, per load (*last*), but was authorised, in a second reclamation of the 2nd of August, 1811, to diminish these enormous items to 16 th. 6 gr. for wheat, and to 8 th. 3 gr. for rye and fodder-corn; but those for timber remained. Prussia, whose particular export consists in corn and wood, would have been by these new duties deprived of the advantage of her fertile soil,\* if the Government had not granted to its subjects every possible mitigation respecting the collecting them. But, alas! what a terrible circumstance for this power, to be obliged to follow, even in its own interior system of duties, the peremptory decrees of France!

Sometimes the Emperor granted, as exceptions from his own laws, to his subjects, and even to foreigners (for instance, to the City of Danzig), *licences*, as they were called, or permissions of commerce, for a certain

\* It is a fact, if, for instance, a merchant at Memel sent timber to any other European port, and ordered it to be sold there for the common price, that he, after having paid in Prussia 32 th. 12 gr. per load, instead of deriving any advantage from it, would have been *out of pocket* 2 th. 14 gr. per load.

price,\* in order to be able to sail for England, and to carry on commerce. He even had flattered the Prussian Government with these. No doubt that Prussia must have wished to be allowed the use of them, in order to procure its subjects the profits of this commerce, and to open to itself some beneficial resources, considering the distress in which the state was involved. But in spite of the promise given by the French minister of exterior relations, of from thirty to forty licences, which were to be given to the Prussian Government in the spring of 1812, and in spite of the advantages offered by the latter in return, it never could procure the licences for its subjects, nor indeed see clearly in this whole transaction, in which the Emperor appeared as a legislator for the Continent, and as a violator of the laws for himself.

Here is the moment where the cruelties of

\* The inhabitants of Danzig paid 40 napoleons-d'or for the licence, besides some other impositions; but in the negotiation between Prussia and France respecting these licences, it was proposed to share with this power equally the continental duties, which were to be levied upon the colonial produce coming in upon French licences.

the French Emperor against the commerce of the European Continent had attained their highest pitch. It was impossible any longer to invent new ones. The French Emperor had completely succeeded in annihilating or demoralising the commerce of his friends; whilst the commerce of his enemies, which scarcely felt the measures taken on the Continent, was reigning in all parts of the world.

But Prussia, sharing the lot of several European states, was still obliged by its geographical situation, and by the political ties which bound it to France, individually to suffer other hardships.

The obligations imposed upon the Prussian States by the Convention of Paris, of the 8th of September, 1810, Article 6th et seq. were, that

“ The fortresses of *Stettin*, *Cüstrin*, and  
 “ *Glogaw*, should remain in the power of  
 “ the French army, until the complete pay-  
 “ ment of the war contribution due by  
 “ Prussia to France; but that *Glogaw*, as  
 “ soon as the moiety was paid, should be  
 “ restored.

“ The three garrisons in the said fortresses

“ should consist of ten thousand men, to-  
 “ gether ; these ten thousand men, whether  
 “ in the fortresses, or marching and counter-  
 “ marching in the Prussian territory, with the  
 “ exception of their pay, should be kept at  
 “ the Prussian expense : and that still, by a  
 “ more special convention of the 12th of  
 “ November, 1808, the victualling of the  
 “ three fortresses should be provided for, as  
 “ if the garrisons were in them.

“ During the French possession of those  
 “ places, the administration of the revenues  
 “ and of justice should remain with the  
 “ King, and the direction of the police  
 “ should be handed over to the French com-  
 “ mandant.

“ Seven military roads should be laid  
 “ down for the French troops, viz.

From Glogaw to Custrin,  
 — Custrin to Stettin,  
 — Stettin to Stralsund,  
 — Stettin to Magdeburg,  
 — Stettin to Danzig,  
 — Glogaw to Kalish,  
 — Glogaw to Saxony.

“ And, besides, French posts for letters upon  
 “ these roads should be established.”

Besides these *military roads* there existed already one between Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw, by Crossen and Zullichau (according to the Convention of Elbing, of the 13th of October, 1807); and Prussia was obliged to engage, on the 26th of April, 1811, to establish a new military road between Stettin and Mecklenburgh, as well as, on the 4th of June, 1811, another road between Stettin and Danzig, instead of the former ones; besides two cross roads between these fortresses and Warsaw, by Deutch-Kröne and Konitz. So that there existed at last, for the use of the French troops, *eleven military roads*, running across the Prussian territory in every direction. Prussia, relying faithfully upon the treaties; put forth all her strength to pay, as soon as possible, the war contribution, in order to obtain at last the return of her fortresses, and her independence. Vain hope!—as in the first days of the year 1811, the Prussian Government caused it to be made known at Paris, that, having nearly paid the moiety, it hoped to be able to ask for the restoration of the fortress of Glogaw; the answer was, that still for a good while it could not expect its restoration, as, after



having paid the moiety, it was further bound to pay also the interest, and several other expenses heaped upon it by France :—as, in the course of the same year, the Prussian Government had also satisfied these new pretensions, and had really paid the moiety of all the sums that were owing, according to France's own calculation, and thought itself authorised to repeat its desires ; it saw itself nevertheless disappointed in the restoration of Glogaw, which was now put off on other pretences. At last, when it was to be foreseen, that before the end of the year 1812, the second moiety also of the contribution, including several large issues in kind to be made by the Prussian Government to the French troops, on the contingency of a war with Russia, would have been liquidated, then the Prussian Government was obliged to accede to an agreement, on the 24th of February, 1812, which, among other galling stipulations, left also the three fortresses of the Oder in the hands of the French.

But these three strong places in the midst of Prussia, with eleven military roads, were not sufficient to satisfy the ambitious designs of the Emperor Napoleon.

Although the Peace of Tilsit, in the 19th Article, had assigned to the town of *Danzig* its former independency, even under the protection of Prussia and Saxony, this town was kept nevertheless in the power of the French Empire, which ordered it to be governed always by a French governor, and watched by a garrison of from ten to twenty thousand men of French and confederate troops.

In the constitutional act of the kingdom of Westphalia, the Emperor Napoleon had declared himself, that he wished to keep in the town of *Magdeburg*, for the first few years only, a French garrison of twelve thousand five hundred men ; nevertheless, till this day, the place has been kept as a military possession of France.

The town of *Stralsund*, formerly occupied by the French, had been restored at last, according to an agreement with France, to the Crown of Sweden ; and a profound peace between both powers ensured to the latter all its old possessions in Germany : nevertheless that town, as well as the whole of Swedish Pomerania, was occupied again by the French, who very unexpectedly, in spite of the peace, took

possession of the provinces on the 27th of January, 1812.

Thus, contrary to the faith of treaties, were *six strong places* (four in the centre, and two upon the borders of Prussia, most of them fortresses of the first order) in the power of the French.

Their garrisons composed, in the beginning of the year 1812, an *army of more than fifty thousand men* of French and allied troops ; and this army, which was even stronger than the Prussian one, could be carried at any instant to a far more considerable number, and could at their own pleasure cross, cut through, and divide the Prussian Monarchy, *by eleven different well-established military roads.*

Such an extraordinary and tremendous military position, even in the interior of Prussia, made the Emperor Napoleon almost unlimited master of this monarchy. In spite of all the prudence and care the King caused to be taken to save at least the form, the delusions must at last vanish, when he considered how very humiliating a part was left to him, in comparison with the Emperor ; that this monarch kept Prussia in the most terrible

slavery ; and that his commissaries and soldiers were encroaching continually, as well upon the most sacred rights of sovereignty, as upon those of private property.

We have seen the terrible effects, in the exorbitant measures which the despotism of France ordered to be taken for the Continental System. But let us now take a view of some of those exactions and extraordinary burthens to which the presence of the French troops gave rise.

The continual marching and counter-marching of so many foreign troops, upon eleven different military roads, was sufficient to crush the unhappy inhabitants of the stages at which they halted, who were obliged to quarter and to feed the soldiers, and were exposed to their insupportable caprices . and ill-behaviour. Many of these inhabitants left their houses, which once were tranquil and happy, and now the residence of every disorder and every suffering.

The daily allowances for the garrisons of the three fortresses of the Oder, the providing and the continual renewing of so many different objects necessary for a fortress, for a state of siege of six months, and the repairs

of the works of the fortress, which were sometimes<sup>†</sup> demanded by the French commandant far above obvious necessity—all these things together occasioned to the Prussian Government immense expenses, much greater, especially in latter times, than if Prussian garrisons had occupied these places: for, although the number of the French garrisons had been fixed by treaty at ten thousand men, this number continually exceeded, ever since the month of April, 1811, and amounted, at the end of the year, to more than twenty-three thousand men. The expenses of the Prussian Government for the three fortresses exceeded at this time *the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand thalers monthly*, some extraordinary expenses not taken into the calculation.---The French Government; indeed, had taken upon itself, particularly by the Convention of the 4th of June, 1811, to liquidate a large part of these expenses from the 1st of April, 1811, as well as those that had taken place before this period, subsequent to the 1st of December, 1808, by a separate<sup>†</sup> office of audit and liquidation at Berlin, and to pay it to Prussia. A French *commissaire-ordonnateur* did in fact establish at Berlin, in the summer of 1811,

such an office; the Prussian Government ordered him to be assisted by the necessary functionaries, and granted every mean and facility, that he could wish for, to accomplish the liquidation. But the *commissaire* departed at the end of the same year from Berlin, and has never since returned; the business, postponed by his departure, has never been recommenced, and the repayment stipulated by treaties has never taken place.

Whilst Prussia exhausted herself to satisfy the French Government, the commandants of the three fortresses wearied the authorities of the country with their complaints and demands. Prussia was commonly (according to them, who were so very fond of complaining of the violation of treaties) in arrears, sometimes as to the daily allowances for the three garrisons, sometimes as to the sufficient completion and renewal of those means of providing for a state of siege, respecting the repair of the palisadoes, the keeping up the hospitals, and many other things of smaller consequence: and yet Prussia could prove, upon the greatest part of these complaints, that it had done more than what the treaties called upon to perform. •

Relating to the pretensions and the actions of arbitrariness, which those commandants allowed themselves so very often, in encroaching upon the civil management, one only need to quote some examples, and compare them with the Convention of the 8th of September, 1808, which expressly had reserved it to Prussia, and had only placed the police, properly so called, in the hands of the commandant. At *Custrin*, for example, several transports of effects belonging to his Majesty the King of Prussia himself had been stopped, in the year 1809, by the order of the governor. In the summer of 1811, he even forbade the departure of all posts and expresses without his special permission given on every occasion, until, at the instigation of the Prussian Government, that of France recalled at length his prohibition.

At *Stettin* the French commandant prohibited by his own authority, in July, 1810, the entry and exit of any vessel with colonial produce without a French passport. He even caused, on the 16th of August, 1810, all colonial goods which were in the warehouses of the customs, and in the stores of the inhabitants, to be put under seal, and

kept *en dépôt*, and sent an inventory of them to Paris, where the Prussian legation could not, before the expiration of six months, and without the most industrious solicitations, obtain the taking off the embargo; and then only on condition, that the duties of the continental tariff on these goods should be received by French authorities, and applied to the providing for the three fortresses. He caused these duties (making together 1,028,018 francs, for 8491 cwt. goods) to be paid by the inhabitants with the greatest severity; acting against them even with military execution, and refusing to receive those duties in kind. He caused besides, in November, an examination to be made of the houses and stores of the merchants, and of their books, in order to discover colonial goods. But the governor of *Glogaw* exceeded his two colleagues in the abuse he made of his military power. In the obstinate war which he had declared against all kinds of colonial goods, under whatever character they might have approached the place or neighbourhood, he caused, in the years 1810, 1811, and 1812, several transports of those goods to be stopped, and the conti-



mental impost to be paid into the French coffers ; and as the inhabitants could not be prevailed upon, because they had already paid the duties of the country into the coffers of the revenue, he caused, in the month of November, 1811, a very large quantity of these goods to be carried on French account to Magdeburg. He also caused, more than once, the houses of Glogaw to be visited, and patrols to be sent along the banks of the Oder to a great distance from the town, and to other places, in order to discover objects of that kind. In the month of November, 1810, he caused to be stopped a transport of forty cases full of military effects, which were to be sent from Berlin to Breslaw, on account of the Prussian Government ; and only after the most pressing demands, was it possible to obtain the restoration of its property. Almost at the same time he dismissed, by his own authority, some Prussian police officers at Glogaw, and replaced them by others. At last he declared, on the 11th of May, 1811, the town of Glogaw in a state of siege, and demanded the inspection of all letters arriving or sent away by the Prussian post-office. These measures, quite

inexplicable in the midst of peace, which plunged into the greatest embarrassments the inhabitants, the First Court of Justice, and the other authorities at Glogaw, forced the Prussian Government to ask at Paris for the recal of a general, who, very far from keeping up a good understanding with Prussia, made it only his object to augment the sufferings of the country, and to neglect every form of alleviation. He was in fact recalled, although at Paris they excused him, in alleging, that his zeal for the service had made him commit those faults.\* His successor also continued to meddle with the management of the interior, in continuing the war against colonial produce, and in causing, in the month of August, 1811, three royal civil authorities to be arrested.

The French garrison of *Danzig* and *Stralsund* gave equally occasion to Prussia to experience oppression in her relations of commerce. However insignificant during this time the naval power of the Emperor was, yet French *privateers* did not hesitate, at least when the weather had driven the English fleet out of the Baltic, to lay hold of the ves-

\* See Note II. at the end of the work.

sels of the Prussians, and of the neutrals sailing to Prussian harbours, under the pretext of maintaining the Continental System. These privateers (generally miserable vessels, badly armed, sometimes even without letters of marque) hunted, from their corners of retreat at Danzig, Stralsund, and Rostock, after all merchant vessels, without any distinction; they spared neither friendly flags, nor legitimate cargoes, nor the most legally correct seapapers. They dared even at three times, in December, 1810, in December, 1811, and in February, 1812, to come to the roads of Swinemunde, and to attack, and forcibly to take with them, several Prussian and neutral ships, which were lying there at anchor under the sovereignty and protection of the laws of Prussia, and of which one was even guarded by Prussian sentries. They tried the same again at several times at Swinemunde, Rugenwalde, &c. but not with the same result. These were not enterprises of privateers, but of pirates, whose dens of retreat were in the neighbouring harbours occupied by the French.

Numerous detachments of French troops, which occupied Stralsund and Swedish Po-

merania, unexpectedly entered, on the 26th of February, 1812, the towns of *Swinemunde*, *Anclam*, and *Demmin*; visited there, by their own authority, the houses for colonial goods, and left them the second day. This hostile incursion out of the military roads, in order to execute such arbitrary and violent measures, in contradiction to all treaties, defied with too much levity the rights and dignities of the Sovereign; it made Prussia feel too painfully, even when it was only the ebullition of ill-humour in a French Marshal,\* commanding at that time in Swedish Pomerania, the whole calamity of the slavery into which foreign imperious ambition had forced this state.

The time now approaches, when the plan of the Emperor Napoleon was ripe to subvert by a new war the last remains of an equilibrium on the European Continent, and to become unlimited ruler. The Author reserves to himself to publish, at another time, those diplomatic documents which may serve

\* This Marshal, who was travelling, some weeks later, through Elbing and Marienwerder, found it convenient to lay hold there, also by his own authority, of some transports of colonial goods; although the proprietor of the goods had quite cleared himself with the Prussian Government.

for the general history of that ever-memorable epoch, when France, under untenable pretences, began with immense forces the war by which the Russian Empire was to be subjugated, but which, by its wonderful result, entirely confounded the calculations of that man, who, until then, had vainly imagined himself able to control events. Faithful to his purpose, the Author continues to paint here only the conduct of Napoleon towards Prussia.

As in the beginning of the year 1812, the disputes of the Emperor Napoleon with the Russian Cabinet took a too serious turn to leave a hope of the preservation of peace; and as all the efforts of the King of Prussia to avert the storm were useless: this Monarch saw with pain and certainty, that his states could not escape the fate of being drawn into all the miseries of a new war. However exhausted these states were, yet their geographical position made them necessarily the theatre of the passage and of the operations of the French troops against Russia, without mentioning the means which were offered by the general spirit of cultivation and of industrious attention in its in-

habitants, and of so many public establishments created by a wise and attentive government, and especially useful in a state of war. One could easily see through the firm resolution of the Emperor to take all possible advantage, for his new war, of this intermediate country, of which he was already, by so many military and political means, master. There remained no other choice to the King, in order to keep up the political existence of his monarchy, than to become the ally of him, who, as an enemy, could quite annihilate it, and to sacrifice all other wishes, and his dearest affections, to the superior duty of the Prince. General von Krusemark, Prussian minister at Paris, and Mr. von Beguelin, privy-counsellor of state, and plenipotentiary of the King for the pecuniary transactions, were authorised, each of them in his particular department, to enter into a negociation with the French Government. Different treaties were, in consequence of this, concluded, on the 24th of February, 1812, with the Duke de Bassano, Imperial French minister for foreign affairs, viz.

I. By General von Krusemark, 1st, The main treaty, with some separate Articles for

the establishment of a general and close alliance between both states ; 2nd, A special bye-convention, to define the co-operation of Prussia in the war, in case of a rupture with Russia ; 3rd, Another special convention respecting the continuance of the measures taken in the war against England ;— and,

II. By the privy-counsellor of state, Mr. von Beguelin, 4th, A separate convention, concerning the issues in kind which Prussia should make to the French armies in the war with Russia, in liquidation of the war contributions still owing to France.\*

\* Some time before, a plan had been made at Berlin, conformable to which, Parisian banking houses should raise amongst themselves the sum of twenty-six millions of francs, and pay it to the Emperor Napoleon, on account of the Prussian war contribution ; so that Prussia, by pledging part of her domains, needed not pay more than half a million of francs to her new creditors, instead of the four millions which France had to call for, conformably to the treaties. But as this power prepared to send its troops through Prussia to Russia, it was to be foreseen that the French armies were to be fed in Prussia, under the pretext of reinstating the expenditure after the peace ; and that consequently Prussia independently of feeding the French troops, would be obliged still to pay monthly half a million francs. As there had never been an instance that those troops, in their marching through foreign countries, had fed themselves at their own expense, Mr. von Beguelin proposed to the Duke de

## The desire of the French Government to conclude this alliance at this moment

Bassano an agreement, according to which the Prussian Government should give provisions for the sustenance of the French troops in their passage through Prussia, to the amount of the war contributions still owing, upon condition that those troops, fed in this manner by their commissaries, should not be kept by the inhabitants of the country. The Duke de Bassano made his report upon this to the Emperor, who seemed first to approve the proposition, but demanded a quantity of provisions far beyond the amount of the contribution. As the Prussian plenipotentiary took notice of this, he was answered, that the French troops were kept everywhere by the inhabitants of the country through which they passed; that it was a peculiar favour, if the Emperor Napoleon would concede the deduction of this maintenance from the contribution; that they were willing, after every three months, to employ themselves in the settlement of the accounts; and that, as soon as the amount of the contribution should be attained, France was willing to pay the surplus in ready cash. The Prussian plenipotentiary saw himself obliged to make many observations respecting the quantities asked for, and the impossibility to raise them. Yet the Emperor caused him to be told, that his objections would certainly not hinder him, either from beginning the war against Russia, or from his crossing with his troops the Prussian territory; and that the only question was, whether this passage was to be made with the observation of discipline, or if they would leave it to the troops to provide for themselves? After many entreaties, the Emperor gave way in some points; especially concerning four millions of *scheffel* \* of oats, and of a quantity of rice and hay; he also caused the Duke de Bassano to give the most unqualified promise, that the troops should observe the strictest discipline;

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\* One *scheffel* contains from eighty to ninety pounds in wheat.



was so great, that they were at Berlin still in expectation of the last proposals of France, when they received the treaty formally signed; and this happened on the same day (the 2nd of March) that it was known at Berlin, that a part of the French army, under the Prince of Ekmuhl, had entered, by Mecklenburg, Prussian Pomerania.

Without entering into the whole spirit of

to which he added, that he would not even allow a badly mounted horseman to change forcibly his horse for a better one in the country. On the 24th of February, 1812, in the evening, the Emperor signified that he was weary of all the objections; and that if the convention was not signed on the next day, he would take his passage through Prussia by force. These are facts not to be confuted. The Prussian Court brought them into recollection, especially in the month of June, as Napoleon was at Dresden. In order to lighten the evil, the Duke de Bassano promised there, in the name of his Monarch, to the chancellor of state, Baron von Hardenberg, that they would give French licences to Prussia, in order to introduce English goods into the Prussian harbours. Although France asked for herself the greatest part of the profit arising from this commerce, yet Prussia was willing to be satisfied with it. But there the affairs remained, and the promised licences have never been given, as we have already seen, although they feigned that a courier was about to be sent from Dresden to Paris, for the purpose of their being officially made out.

It appears necessary to quote the facts, in order to put in their real light the whole of the negotiation respecting the said convention.

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See Note III. at the end of the work.

these different treaties, which were intended to fetter the destiny of Prussia by new chains to the triumphal car of Napoleon, the Author is content to represent, by some general outlines, the extent of the efforts, the sacrifices, and the miseries of Prussia in the new war, and how very little credit France gave it for all this.

On the day of the exchange of the ratification (the 5th of March), the King caused all necessary arrangements to be made for the execution of the treaty of alliance and of the bye-convention. His Majesty caused his stipulated auxiliary corps of twenty thousand men, viz. fourteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and two thousand artillery, with sixty cannon, to be put in march, and be always kept up complete; in the beginning, under the command-in-chief of General von Gravert, and then under that of General von Yorck.

Every one knows in what manner this brave corps of Prussians fulfilled its duties.

But in spite of these services for the cause of France, the French authorities left this auxiliary corps in the greatest want of different necessaries. They did not even allow Courland, like other provinces occupied by

the French army, to make arrangements for its supplies, provisions excepted. Besides, the French governors, who had taken their residence at Königsberg and Pillaw, deprived it of the most immediate means of keeping itself in good condition, by exercising a right of laying an embargo upon the guns and ammunition kept at Pillaw for the use of the Prussian corps, and of disposing of the *bataillons* of reserve, drawn together in East Prussia for the purpose of keeping it up complete.

Although the second Convention, of the 24th of February, Article 8th, had provided, "That the French Commandants, who might be appointed on the line of operations, should not meddle with any thing relating to the interior government or the civil administration, but should confine themselves entirely to the requisitions, issues, the maintenance of good order, and so forth, as far as it concerned the army:" yet these governors, and even the civil commissaries of the Emperor in East Prussia, thought to govern this province after their own pleasure, and as supreme authorities; they even looked upon it as a conquered country.

According to the third Convention, of the 24th of February, Article 2nd, "the *trade on the coast* from Lubeck to Memel was "to be *protected* by the most powerful "measures:" and yet the French authorities in Prussia did the direct contrary. They, by their own authority, shut up the ports of Elbing, Pillaw, Königsberg, and Memel; and prohibited there the entry and exit of every ship, without distinction, and the governor of Königsberg even charged the goods with a considerable impost: so that the little trade which remained unprohibited, even by the Continental System, must necessarily be totally annihilated.

Whilst the French authorities in this manner, even contrary to the treaties, paralysed the Prussian administration, and the industry of the nation, the country was still oppressed by the marching and the presence of so many French and allied troops; by their maintenance, thrown upon the inhabitants; and by the regular, but exorbitant issues in kind, which the Prussian Government had to make besides, in order to afford means to the French Government for its war with Russia.

Since the signature of the treaties of the 24th of February, all the Prussian provinces (with the exception of a part of Silesia,\* declared neutral, and the fortresses of Colberg and Graudenz) were obliged to be evacuated by the Prussian garrisons; and even the two capitals of Berlin and Königsberg (although the treaties did not mention them) to be opened to the French soldiers, who now inundated the country in every direction. Three great military roads, beginning from the Vistula, were established in West and East Prussia, by order of the French governor, for the purpose of assembling in the provinces the greatest part of all the troops destined against Russia, and even those that came from Warsaw and Thorn,† and of leading them by Gumbinnen to the Russian frontiers. Sixty-three stages were chosen in the most convenient places, in all provinces, and upon all roads fit for military marching, and put in order for re-

\* *Vis.* Upper Silesia, the County of Glatz, and the Principality of Breslau, Oels, and Brieg.

† In this manner the Duchy of Warsaw was spared at the expense of Prussia.

ceiving the troops and their horses, for lodging and victualling them.

From the beginning of the month of March, 1812, till the next winter, four hundred and eighty-two thousand men, French and Allies, with eighty thousand horse, passed the Prussian States, chiefly in their longest extent,\* in order to make war against Russia; and during the three months preceding the 23rd of June, 1812, on which day the combined armies passed the Niemen, the half of these troops halted and camped in the same states.

The daily allowance of these troops, in their passage and abode in Prussia, was not properly to be laid as a charge upon this state, as the second Convention, of the 24th of February, signed by General von Krusemark, had only stipulated, in the 9th Article, "*That in case of necessity (au besoin), requisitions for the provisions and conveyances*

\* After the passage of the main part of the army in the first months of the spring, from the month of May and during the summer, monthly, from thirty to forty thousand men, with from six to eight thousand horses, were seen to pass between the Elbe and the borders of East Prussia; and besides these, about five thousand men, with one thousand horse, upon the military road of Silesia.

" were allowed to be made by the French  
 " functionaries and commandants to the  
 " local authorities, or Prussian commis-  
 " saries; and that the settlement of accounts  
 " on this score should be made every three  
 " months, in order to be liquidated, either  
 " as a set-off against the war contribution  
 " still due from Prussia, or to be paid at the  
 " end of the campaign."

However indistinct this agreement, re-  
 specting the requisitions was, yet Prussia  
 could not help relying upon the assurances  
 given by the Duke de Bassano to Mr. von  
 Beguelin, relating to the convention, that  
 the provisions for the maintenance of the  
 French troops upon the Prussian territory  
 should be taken from the immense magazines  
 established in Prussia for the army. Yet the  
 Prussian Government, in fact, gave up this  
 principle on the arrival of the troops, and in  
 order not to interrupt their undertaking, but  
 only on the express promise of an exact  
 account of the requisitions, and the payment  
 immediately to follow. But dearly did the  
 Prussian State pay for this demonstration of  
 good-will and confidence, and the more, as  
 the 9th Article of the convention became a

source of so many troublesome extensions, although it only, *in the case of necessity*, gave a right to particular issues in kind, intended to remove difficulties as they might arise, and only originating in accident.

The demands of the French commissaries, especially in East and West Prussia, were very often made without consulting the provincial authorities, consequently without sufficient knowledge of the locality and the strength of the country, without order, and to the utmost charge of the inhabitants. Every day the soldiers committed upon the citizens and peasants, on whom they were billeted, exactions and devastations, that surpassed by far the charge of regular requisitions; and very soon the habit was become a general rule, that those, at whose house a soldier was billeted, had also to provide for his sustenance.

It is no longer possible to make out the number of days on which the French and Allied troops have been fed, in order to ascertain the expenses they have occasioned to the country, as well by the daily allowances, as by the daily supply of waggons, so burthen-



some to the country, and by so many other charges and losses which the inhabitants have sustained. But we may form a general idea of it, according to some authentic data. It is known, for example, according to the account of the authorities of the country, that the corps of the Duke d'Abrantes, which was cantoned, sixty-nine thousand men strong, including fifteen thousand Imperial guards, in the spring of 1812, in Lower Silesia, occasioned to this country every fortnight an expense of four hundred thousand thaler; and in the same way, a by far less considerable corps of the Prince of Ekmuhl, that cantoned in West Prussia, each day *twenty-seven thousand* thaler. Up to the month of September, 1812, the French and Allied troops took with them out of Prussia *seventy-seven thousand nine hundred and twenty horse*, and *thirteen thousand three hundred and ninety-four waggons*, and solely from eight Circles of East Prussia, twenty-two thousand seven hundred and seventy-two oxen.

Relating to the Article of the Convention of the 24th of February, above cited, the French Government should have repaid at

least the expenses of the allowances and the waggon; but we shall see how little it provided for them.

Besides these immense expenses and losses of individuals, the State, in general, experienced similar ones by the exorbitant issues in kind which the Prussian Government gave, beyond its obligations, to the French army.

By the fourth Convention, of the 24th of February, this Government had been obliged to take upon itself the obligation of providing the magazines of the French army from the 1st of March, 1812, by several instalments, with

200,000 cwt. rye,  
 24,000 cwt. rice, or  
 48,000 cwt. pulse,  
 2,000,000 bottles of brandy,  
 2,000,000 bottles of beer,  
 400,000 cwt. wheat,  
 650,000 cwt. hay,  
 350,000 cwt. straw,  
 6,000,000 scheffel of oats,  
 44,000 oxen,

15,000 horses from five to seven years old,

viz.

6,000 for the light cavalry,

3,000 for the heavy cavalry,

6,000 for artillery or military equipages,

600,000 lbs. of powder,

300,000 lbs. of lead, and

3,600 waggons with horses and men, each of them fit for a load of fifteen hundred pounds, making together one hundred and twenty brigades; each of which was composed of thirty waggons, or three main divisions, for conveyance between Magdeburg and the Oder, the Oder and the Vistula, and the Vistula and the Russian frontiers.

At last the Prussian Government was to establish military hospitals for twenty thousand men, and to provide them with physicians and with every necessary article.

According to the same convention, the places of delivery were to be named by the Intendant-General of the French army (but those for the ammunition by the commandant

of artillery), and the estimate of the prices was to be settled by an amicable agreement between the former and a Prussian commissary.

The Prussian Government exerted itself to the utmost in providing for the stipulated issues in kind. The returns, delivered to the French Intendant, Count de Dumas, by the Prussian Intendant, Count von Lottum, prove, that, according to the records and receipts, there had been delivered, up to the 8th of September,

314,981 cwt. wheat,  
 233,688 cwt. rye,  
 28,157 cwt. pease,  
 1,619,579 bottles of brandy,  
 83,165 bottles of brandy, instead of beer,  
 44,845 oxen,  
 72,600 cwt. hay,  
 24,568 cwt. straw,  
 1,251,558 scheffel of oats,  
 7,169 horses, besides 77,920 taken away  
 by the French troops.

These issues in rye and oxen exceeded, therefore, already those fixed by the convention, and every effort was made to continue

the delivery of the remainder of the other articles.

To embrace the whole overwhelming extent of the sacrifices of Prussia, we must add to these immense issues (according to the maintenance before-cited of the troops that were passing, and of those that remained), the expenses of carriage;\* the losses of the inhabitants in waggons, horses, and cattle; the expenditure for the military hospitals;† the fortresses, and so forth; and the impediments which the national industry in general, and especially the agriculture of the country, suffered by the continual use of so many teams for the service of the army. The Prussian Government had resigned itself to so many sacrifices, upon faith, and in full confidence, that France would also fulfill her obligations.

\* The Intendant of the French army had estimated the expenses of the carriage upon the military roads only at four francs for a waggon and horses; but to this must be added, the days of return for the drivers and those conveyances, which, out of the military roads, the troops made use of at their own pleasure, as well as the frequent water carriage for the service of the army.

† Prussia had in these hospitals, from the 1st of March to the 1st of September, at least seven hundred and fifty thousand days' allowance for the sick; each day might be estimated at one thaler.

The fourth Convention, of the 24th of February, signed by Mr. *von Beguelin*, had fixed, in the 10th Article, as follows :—

“ The receipts for the objects issued shall  
 “ be given in proportion to the delivery.  
 “ The audit thereupon is to be held *every*  
 “ *three months* by the Intendant-General of  
 “ the army ; and the single receipts are  
 “ then to be converted into one general  
 “ receipt, in order to shew the terms of  
 “ *reimbursement on account of the contribution*,  
 “ as well as the portion of the interest, which  
 “ is then to cease.”

And in the 13th Article,

“ As soon as the issues in kind, to be  
 “ delivered in consequence of this conven-  
 “ tion shall have taken place, and their  
 “ value, as well as the final amount of the  
 “ contribution, principal as well as interest,  
 “ owing by his Majesty the King of Prussia,  
 “ shall be ascertained ; new measures con-  
 “ cerning the *payment of the balance* of these  
 “ accounts, by the one or the other party,  
 “ are to be taken between the high contract-  
 “ ing powers.”

We have seen above the entirely similar arrangement of the second Convention, of

the 24th of February, Article 9th, relating to the provisions and the conveyances to be found by the inhabitants.

The accounts respecting all the issues were therefore to be regulated every three months ! and as soon as they should have reached the residue of the contribution, the surplus was to be paid to Prussia.

But the King's minister at Paris, and his Intendant-General of the French army, vainly applied for the inspection and passing of the accounts. The prices for the different objects of issue were not yet fixed, and the accounts for the two quarters past were not yet in order, and even not yet begun by the French authorities, when the third quarter commenced and Prussia saw herself entitled to demand *the payment of a very considerable balance*. In vain had the Prussian Intendant proposed to the French Intendant, about the end of the month of October, an agreement as to the manner in which, in future, the issues for the sustenance of the troops passing, and in cantonments, should be exchanged for regular acknowledgments, entitled to immediate payment, for the preservation of the inhabitants, who were sinking under the weight of these

demands, and to revive their confidence, courage, and exertions, even for the advantage of the troops themselves. Prussia still experienced, respecting her fortresses on the Oder, a similar treatment. The second Convention, of the 24th of February, Article 14th, had fixed;

“ In respect to the fortresses of Glogaw,  
 “ Custrin, and Stettin, now occupied by the  
 “ French troops, the expenses of the main-  
 “ tenance of their garrisons, and of provisions  
 “ for a state of siege, shall be *at the charge*  
 “ *of his Majesty the Emperor*; that is to say,  
 “ for the fortress of *Glogaw*, from the day of  
 “ the signature of the present convention, and  
 “ for *Stettin* and *Custrin*, from the day when  
 “ his Majesty the King of Prussia shall have  
 “ fulfilled the obligations taken upon himself  
 “ by the convention signed at the same time.  
 “ A particular agreement between both  
 “ Monarchs shall take place respecting the  
 “ duration of the occupation of these for-  
 “ tresses by the French troops.”

Whilst this Article suspended again the surrender of the three fortresses,\* it put at

\* France then had, since the peace of Tilsit, concluded eighteen conventions with Prussia, without the surrender of the



least, on account of France, the maintenance of the fortress of Glogaw *from the 24th of February, 1812*, and that of the fortress of Stettin and Custrin from another term, which arrived *at the end of the month of May, 1812*, when the contribution owing by Prussia to France was liquidated by the issues made according to the convention: but it was equally in vain that Prussia applied for the fulfilment of the agreement. This power was therefore obliged to continue, on its own account, the maintenance of all three fortresses, and of their French garrisons: and France has never compensated, either for this great augmentation of its advances, or its embarrassments, although a positive agreement to this effect had previously taken place.


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This is a faithful Narrative of the injuries which France heaped upon Prussia. The turn which the war just commenced took, liberated it at length from all further oppressions of France. The still remaining energies of the State, united with the exertions of the

three fortresses; which should have been the immediate result of that peace, or at least of a subsequent convention.

Nation, enabled Prussia to begin the honourable fight, which, under the protection of God, has had a prosperous progress, and to which we have every reason soon to expect a glorious conclusion.

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# APPENDIX

## BY THE EDITOR.

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### NOTE I.—PAGE 8.

THE members of a former Committee, making remonstrances one day to the same Intendant-General, Count Daru, concerning the inability of the country to furnish every thing demanded by him, were insultingly answered by him : “ *Messieurs, vous n’avez pas d’idée de ce qu’un pays est en état de souffrir.*” ---“ Gentlemen, you have no idea what a “ country is able to bear.”

### NOTE II.—PAGE 51.

To give a proof of Bonaparte’s sanction to a similar behaviour, we quote the following anecdote : General Vandamme, who is at this moment expiating his crimes at Moscow, was second in command in Silesia, under Marshal Mortier. He behaved in such a shocking manner, that Mortier saw himself under the necessity of denouncing him to Napoleon. The answer was, “ *Faites bien des complimens à*

“ *mon ami Vandamme.*”—“ Make my compliments to my friend Vandamme.”

NOTE III.—PAGE 58.

NAPOLEON was nowhere more affable towards every one than at this last interview at Dresden. It is curious to observe this last spontaneous affability ; it looked like the precursor of a gentleness he would have been constrained to adopt. We have no specimen of any real impertinence, in which formerly even his most trifling conversations abounded, and that especially towards ladies. To say to a lady that she was ugly, or that he had thought her younger than he found her, used to be nothing to him. At Dresden he even seemed sometimes to be in very good humour. Seeing the hoop-petticoats abolished at the Court of Dresden, he complimented the King upon this *revolution* in his country ; but the old King, not exactly understanding what he alluded to, assured him, in the most anxious and earnest manner, that there was no fear of a revolution in his country, as his subjects were all quiet and obedient.

## POSTSCRIPT,



IT is interesting enough to consider the conduct of the different French governors who have entered Berlin. Although every new one gave assurances of his desire not to be a burthen to the town, yet each of them made new and unusual pretensions. The first, General Clarke and General Hulin, were the best ; although during the continuance of the war, they behaved, if not always with mildness, yet generally with justice. For one act of cruelty General Clarke committed, in causing the burgo-master of Kyritz, to be executed, for having favoured Prussian partisans, he excused himself by saying, that he had been reprimanded for his too great mildness. Perhaps it is true he was real'y, with the exception of this act, a good-tempered man. These were followed by Marshal Victor and General St. Hilaire. The former brought his lady with him : in this he was imitated by several other *employés* ; and dinners, suppers, balls, and French plays, succeeded each other, as a sort of carnival ; to which only those few

families went, who, partly from the circumstance of having estates both in the French and Prussian territory, or from the head of the family being in an office which rendered his attendance necessary, were in continual intercourse with the French. The Prussian ladies particularly behaved with great firmness towards them. In spite of their engaging manners, and of their residence of twenty-six months in the country, the instances of marriage or other connection are very few. They were polite towards those French who were billeted in their houses, and nothing more. To the small private parties which were arranged in that time of misery, no Frenchman had admission; those who were not asked to the French parties, were obliged to spend their evenings either at home or in public places.

The entertainments of the French carnival, above alluded to, were, with very few exceptions, at the expense of the town. The Marshal at length, not satisfied with his town-house, the beautiful palace of Prince Radzivil, desired that of Baron Eckartstein at Charlottenburg for his country-house, which, of course, could not be refused him; but he was

so parsimonious, that, to quote an instance, he gave the gardener for all the fine flowers he brought him every morning, for the space of six weeks, only ten thalers in bad groschen, which at the highest rate might be valued at one pound sterling. Marshal Victor and General St. Hilaire did not care in what manner their inferiors behaved. The Marshal's corps, about thirty thousand men, in Berlin and its neighbourhood, gave rise to many complaints, which were generally disregarded.

After him came Marshal Soult. He assured the town of the discipline he would observe with his troops, and that he would give occasion to the least possible expense. But, alas! he brought so many horses, and such quantities of hounds, that he caused the same expense as the former Marshals with their sumptuous dinners. He left Berlin however very soon, and was succeeded by Marshal Davoust.

This Marshal's entrance appeared at first to be the return of good, or at least of tolerable times. The good character for discipline which his soldiers had acquired in Poland, prepared the way for him. He assured the magistrates of his attachment to

the King and the royal family, made his visits to those Princes and Princesses who had remained, and seemed all softness and good humour ; but this good humour one day suddenly changed. He caused from twenty to thirty people, mostly public'functionaries or literary men, to be brought before him, and' harangued them in a most violent manner for their jacobinism, their hatred to the French, &c. They knew not what to answer ; some of them did not even understand French ; some, by a mistake of names, had been sent for, instead of others, and were dismissed'quite confounded by this violent address. Marshal Davoust, from that moment, saw nothing but jacobinism at Berlin ; his spies were sent in every direction ; several arrestations took place ; and' he left Berlin, full of apprehension of revolutionary proceedings, for Hamburgh, where he began to act in the same manner.

This Marshal sometimes exhibited the most sudden and extraordinary transitions from mildness to the utmost violence. In Silesia he one day assembled several noblemen of the first rank ; he gave them assurances of his perfect good-will for the welfare of the



country, and of his regret at being obliged to be burthensome to it, and so forth; then suddenly addressing himself to Count M——, an old dignified nobleman, he assured him that he would blow his brains out as a traitor, laying something at the same time to his charge, either untrue or insignificant. The Count turned slowly round, looking first at him, then at all his colleagues, and asking, “*Ai-je donc l’air d’un traître ?*”—“Do I look like a traitor?”—“*Vous êtes, Mons. le Marshal, le premier qui ose me dire chose pareille — faites ce que vous voulez, mais épargnez moi vos injures, pour lesquels vous seriez obligé de me répondre d’une autre manière.*”—You are the first person, Mr. Marshal, who has dared to address me thus—do what you please, but spare your abuse, for which you would be obliged to answer me in another manner.” Marshal Davoust was quiet, and there was no question about shooting the Count.

Among so many useless oppressions during the time of the occupation of Prussia, the citizens of Berlin will never forget, that, although in profound peace with France, they were not allowed to shew publicly their joy on the birth-days of their beloved sovereigns.

Forced by the French to illuminate their houses for the unhappy peace of Tilsit, they were forbidden to do the same on the birthday of their King. Many arrestations took place for infringing this ordinance, and the Director of the Theatre was confined several days for having arranged an indistinct allusion, in a ballet, to the happy day.

These were insolences committed by French officers in their *public* character: the insolence of many, as *individuals*, was equally disgusting. It would lead too far to mention every instance of insolence, public and domestic; but two ludicrous instances of the latter will give an adequate idea of them; although truth obliges us to say, that there were many who behaved in a creditable manner, and were sensible of the unpleasant office they had to perform.

General Dorsenne, who died some time ago at Paris, whilst at Berlin, desired from the lady of the house, every day, amongst other things, six bottles of *eau de Cologne*, to be used after his bath. He demanded also a large sheet to wrap himself in; and as none in the house were large enough, two were sewed together. But this did not please

the general ; the seam, he said, injured his skin, and he complained that no French general had ever been so ill-treated as he was.

General Verges, who was billeted at the house of a gentleman of the first distinction, was often upon the point of fighting his host, upon the subject of some dish or another at table. He one day asked to this gentleman's table several Swedish officers, who were returning from their captivity in France ; and he took an opportunity of assuring them, in the presence of the master of the house and of his lady, that they did not dine with *them*, but with *him*, as he was now master of the house by right of conquest.

Finding better wine in some other gentlemen's houses, where he was asked to dinner with his host, he told the latter, in his Gascon dialect, before the whole company, that this was to be called *wine*, “ *mais que le sien* “ *était aigre, trouble*”—“ that his was sour and “ cloudy”—and that he ought to take example from his friends.

FINIS.

# LETTERS

ADDRESSED TO

LORD LIVERPOOL,

AND

THE PARLIAMENT,

ON THE

PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

---

BY

*CALVUS.*

---

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1814.



## P R E F A C E.



THE epistolary style is chosen, to avoid the necessity of following a continued train of argument. Few people can be brought to close reasoning by any device ; and attention is excited more easily than kept up. If I am tedious, it is not because I am prolix, but because the natural ardour of my reader carries him before me. May I be tedious to a thousand such ! There are events enough in life, without these that are passing, on which we may be cold and indifferent, formal and systematic.



# LETTERS

ADDRESSED TO

LORD LIVERPOOL,

AND

*THE PARLIAMENT.*

---

Clementior certe est pastor qui lupum necat quam qui servat: rex, qui sontem carnifici tradit quam qui eripit. Si necas, unius nece innocentis multos morti eripis: sin parcis, qui et istum suâ impunitate et alios, parâ impunitatis spe, ad quodvis scelus patrandum audaciores facis, innocuos postea innumeros illorum manibus interficis. Nempe quosdam necare clementia est; quosdam servare, crudelitas.

Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos, Quæstio. III.

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## LETTER I.

I KNOW not whether your Lordship will read these letters; but I have the confidence to assert that, if you do, you may gain as much in wisdom as you expend in time. Precious and irretrievable as time is, it is better that it should be deducted, or lost, from any occupation, how-



ever active, however momentous, than that systems should be hastily adopted, or treaties signed, which may entail wars, calamities, and disgraces, both on our children and our remotest posterity.'

I am conscious that the weight and value of opinions depend less on *what* is delivered than on *where*; that many things have appeared in pamphlets, and have been forgotten in a week, which, had they been uttered by a successful minister, or a clamorous leader of opposition, would have been quoted as most profound and eloquent. I wish to be estimated by no other standard than the truth of my observations, and shall be contented if it is acknowledged by honest and wise men, that I express English sentiments in English language. Nothing seems more easy, yet nothing is more rare. I never wrote a pamphlet: I belong to no party, no faction, no club, no coterie; I possess no seat in Parliament, by brevet or by purchase. I can afford to live without it: but I cannot afford that

vast accumulation of taxes which will arise from another war, if, after our experience, we conclude another probationary peace, and enter on a new course of experiments, with all our instruments unscrewed, and all our phials evaporated.

If your Lordship should not have the leisure or the inclination to peruse these letters, it may perhaps be sufficient to fulfil my hopes, if you will ask yourself the following short questions. I think you will answer them as I have done ; that we shall differ only in the process of their operation on our minds, and not at all in the result.

1. Cannot we, at the present time, reduce the power of France within such limits, as may secure us from future wars against that country, and as may secure both that country and ours from perpetual privations and animosities ?

2. Unless we do it now, is there the slightest probability that so favorable an opportunity will recur at any future period.

3. Is not the death, or perpetual imprisonment, of Bonaparte requisite for this end? Is it not desirable both to France and England? Has he any claim or any hold on the affections of the French or of the English?

4. If France was powerful enough, at the *accession* of Louis XIV. to conquer, in different campaigns, so many provinces, as at last, with their united strength, enabled her to menace the existence of every State in Europe, to influence every Government, and indeed, unless the *elements* had conspired against her, to subvert every one; is it not requisite, for the independence and safety of all nations, that the extent of France shall not exceed, *at farthest*, her limits at his accession?

5. If an effeminate Prince, with a churchman for a minister, could alarm and disquiet all Europe, and could seize several of her richest provinces, with hardly two-thirds of what, according to the propositions of some statesmen, is in

future to be considered as France, will not Bonaparte,

“ Inured to blood, and nursed in scenes of woe,”

a defeated, it is true, but more often a fortunate General, be equally able to extend his territory, and to renew the calamities he has brought so repeatedly on Europe?

6. Has he not reduced to misery and desolation the greater part of the Continent? Has he not destroyed more than *one million of her inhabitants*? Has he not declared that the conquest of Holland is necessary to his possession of Belgium? Has he not also had the impudence to threaten, that, if he could not possess, and keep possession of, England, he would, however, *make it intolerable to live in.*

7. If we forgive him the death of so many, and of our bravest men; the ruin of so many, and of our most industrious; if we make him a free present of all our contributions for the last twenty years, and of all the effects we can mortgage for the next century; if we permit him to

hold a festival of blood at our expence, whenever it pleases him to proclaim it, is it not enough ? Must we add to our liberality from the ruin and extinction of our neighbours ? Have we any *right* to be parties in the surrender of the Netherlands ? Is it because they have always been distinguished for their Bravery, their Freedom, and their Religion, that we should deliver them up, bound hand and foot, to a Deserter, an Usurper, and an Atheist ?

8. Was not France as happy in 1783 as in 1813 ? Was she not as happy with a *family* of twenty-four millions as with an *establishment* of forty ? If she was not, whether is the pride of France or the security of England the proper object for our present consideration ?

9. Can we, with wisdom or with safety, leave a more numerous population on a more extended territory to France, than is possessed by any of the *adjacent* states ?

My lord, I conceive these nine main questions,

and those which spring immediately from under them, to admit no other than one and the same answer from all mankind. I sent the letters, which follow this, in which they are discussed more at large, to the Editor of the Courier, on the twentieth of October. The succession of great events, or perhaps a diversity of opinion in the Editor and his party, have prevented their publication. All the arguments occurred to me long before ; but, whether to me or to others first, I cannot tell : I wish it had been to your Lordship. They have passed into the hands of some few politicians, and some few literary men, without any anxiety of mine for the praise of eloquence, of energy, or even of originality. On the contrary ; I could wish nothing I have written to be considered as more than a simple, or less than a momentous truth ; and I would rather that all the nation thought as I do, *before* me, and expressed its sentiments with much more vigour and animation.

Some, who have read these letters, declare that they certainly were written by an Irishman :

others fix the stigma on an inhabitant of Wales. Your Lordship will attend to neither of these judges, and will regard not the Author, but the arguments. These, I presume, bear no characteristic of the nations to which they are attributed.

A worthy man has wounded my pride a little, by ascribing my arguments to a combination of those gentlemen, whom the goodnature, the discernment, and the perseverance of Lady Holland, has at last instructed to make a distinction, in the right place, between *will* and *shall*; and who, under her tuition, have also made no inconsiderable progress in the management of a silver fork. I am informed by a servant of mine, a correspondent with one in that family, that they have not broken a plate nor overturned a tureen these last three months; and that he does not mention this from any desire to boast of his kinsmen, but to show that a good table is sure to produce good manners, and even where you would least expect them.

I say nothing of their principles, for I know

not what they are; but their voice is at once so feeble and so elevated, their language so sordid, and yet so ostentatious, that they remind me of whatever is most incongruous to any of the senses: of bulky animals with birds' heads, (the only remains of antiquity to which indeed they bear any resemblance) and of attar of roses from some cheap shop, refreshed and renovated by the fumes of sulphur. They are purgent; but it is the purgence that arises from the very last stage of putridity.

These are your enemies: I am not. These would be your followers: I would not. I was the first to abjure the party of the whigs, and shall be the last to abjure the principles. When the leaders had broken all their promises to the nation, had shewn their utter incapacity to manage its affairs, and their inclination to crouch before the enemy, I permitted my heart, after some struggles, to subside, and repose in the cool of this reflection. Let them escape: it is only the French nation that ever dragged such feebleness to the scaffold.



## LETTER II.

WRITERS have often made a distinction, in the very midst of party zeal, between *the events of the day*, and those which, in their opinion, were more likely to interest future generations. Our age, which has abolished so many distinctions of less moment, has at last abolished this; and the events of the day, and the advantages which our statesmen may derive from them, will perhaps be of more importance to posterity, than any that have occurred in this country since the establishment of christianity.

To speculate on the future, is common to the minds of all: some confine their speculations to their own advantages, some to the prosperity or glory of their country, and others extend them to the remotest interests of mankind. Of the first it is expedient to say nothing: the latter two parties are to be commended, according to the means they adopt for the propagation of

their tenets. But some events are so stupendous, that the wise and simple, the active and indolent, men of pleasure and religious men, make the same inquiry, and almost with the same solicitude, “ *What will be the result?*” Something we must have to direct us, and something to rest upon in the progress of our pursuits. Fond as every man is of indulging in conjectures, and particularly in those which he himself has raised up from the foundation, I think it safer to be guided in my opinion of what is likely to occur, by the indications of those who touch the very springs, and who regulate, as far as human power can do so, the machinery of politics. On this principle I shall examine the declaration of Lord Castlereagh ; freely, as becomes an Englishman ; decorously, as becomes a gentleman ; and, to the best of my judgment, narrowly and intimately, as becomes a politician and a scholar. I presume then to form no opinion of my own, on the plans and intentions of our government : I mount no hippogrif, and contend with no chimera.

In the speech of Lord Castlereagh, on the

augmentation of the army from the militia, the principal expression is liable to serious misunderstanding, and not at all the less so for being *several times* repeated. I shall transcribe it as it *first* appears, from the *London Packet* of the twelfth of November; a paper, in my opinion, written with more purity, and conducted with more impartiality than any other.

“It had followed *that*, because our exertions were *limited, progressive*, and according to the natural powers of man, *that* we have gone on *progressively*, to successes and victories. He was satisfied that in so doing we had done well, and that the resources of the country had grown instead of being diminished; because the energies of the country had not been sacrificed by any unnatural extension of our power whatsoever.”

*Progression* was never the result of *limitation*; but it is true enough that we have gone on *progressively*, because our exertions were *progressive*. I should rather have attributed this con-

fused and turbid sentence to a certain countryman of his, who so constantly announces in the public prints that he is coming again into office, had I not read it in a paper where the debates are given correctly, and where his Lordship's party and principles are never misrepresented. It is not, however, my intention to pry for petty faults in the language of an eloquent and able man; but I must remark that, where a man's aims or reasonings are clear and definite, his language is rarely otherwise... The *natural powers* of man form a distant link of connexion with the subject. The first and simple meaning of the words, is the physical power of the creature man; the next is—by dropping a little our attention from the word *natural*,—the general powers which he possesses, both by the principles of his growth, and by the moral energies which he has acquired, from his situation and his exertions in society.

Instead of “the *natural* powers of *man*,” his Lordship evidently means the *military* power of the *nation*.

Politicians can seldom talk like philosophers with any safety, or act like them with any success. There is a certain species, or rather a certain stage, of refinement, that rejects plain language: but the perfection of true refinement is to appreciate it justly. Upon this foundation, and upon this only, rests sovereign and consummate eloquence. The thunderbolts of Demosthenes and Pascal, men without any third in vigour and purity of expression, were not forged in the caverns of Etna, nor anvilled out by giants. Common minds, and among these are some very *learned*, wonder what there is about these writers, to strike so forcibly. The secret is this: they throw aside everything that obstructs their force, and look steadily before they strike.

I wish to see a little more precision both in the style and in the counsels of our Parliament. There is a wide difference between the *extension* of powers and the *exertion* of them. An idler may *extend* his arms when he yawns, wider than a pugilist when he fights. It appears to me that our

power, if not too much extended, has been often *extended* in a wrong direction, and that it has not been *exerted* so constantly and regularly, as was requisite for its health and vigour. In estimating our successes, I must confess I attribute more to the climate of Russia, than to the counsels of all the cabinets in Europe. For twenty years, every one was equally swayed by blind passions and lame counsels. In all governments, and at all times, the passions both mislead and debilitate; but energy is true wisdom. It never varies in its essence; it varies in its application incessantly. It has, however, one great channel, and runs into no other until this be full. Our enemy is France. What portion of France? Her army. What raises this army; what supports it; what puts it in motion; what gives it its direction? Bonaparte. Against him, then, should all our efforts be made incessantly; even if he had committed no cruelties against our countrymen: if he had imprisoned, if he had assassinated, none of them; if Captain Wright were still living, the glory of his glorious profession; if he had

never been extended on the rack; if he had never called on his beloved country to think, amidst her victories, on his captivity, and to avenge his unmerited and cruel death. We fight against Bonaparte, and have been fighting against him, until more than one generation of warriors has passed away. Yes, we are permitted to fight, but we must not attempt to dethrone him. He calls himself sacred; we hold him so. We must not even interfere in his government, because it might irritate the French! Is this the language of the eloquent and ardent Burke? Are these the maxims of him who is fantastically called "the great statesman now no more," "the heaven-born minister?" Prove that you believe in the divinity of his descent, by believing in the inspiration, or at least in the wisdom, of his counsels. He could not do what the elements have done. He contended with the torrent of lava; you trample on the scattered cinders. The population of France is exhausted. This is the great arithmetic of politicians. Three hundred

thousand extinct, three hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, in the space of twelve months. Neither exchequer nor conscription can repair these losses. The wildernesses of a vast nation wail aloud with them: her neighbours fly from her, as under the ban of God. Yet we are to treat with *delicacy*, and approach with caution, a most insolent and ferocious band of robbers. If we really feel, or ought to feel, any respect for the French character, a character which the manly English held ever in sovereign contempt, long before its rottenness lost the varnish that covered it, if we really do however feel respect or tenderness for a people so prostituted to all the most hideous forms of tyranny, one after another, let us assist them to reassert the common dignity of our nature, and to pour their vengeance on our common enemy. If we leave him *any* of his conquests, if we leave him as large a territory as that with which Louis XIV conquered Alsace and a part of the Netherlands, will not he reconquer whatever he has lost? Shall we again be contented with an experi-



mental peace? Shall we ever be able to make one of another kind, with a wretch so perfidious and remorseless? The million of human lives which he has sacrificed to his ambition, demand *his* life: eternal justice demands it. What! shall we fight only until he consents to exchange some stone walls for some sugar-plantations, and throws down the bag of horse-beans that he holds up against our coffee? What scoffs, what bitter scorn would Lord Chatham (no one can mistake *the* Lord Chatham I mean) pour forth against England, crouching from an elevation to which she never rose before, down to a degradation to which the united world could not reduce her! We never have compromised with crime: we never warred before against so foul and pusillanimous a criminal. Shall that contemptible faction, which could neither conduct a war, nor preserve a peace, presume to set limits to our exertions and our enthusiasm? Shall those who felt their superiority to it, in the midst of their reverses, both in abilities and in probity, contract a torpor, as they would do,

by joining hands with it? Shall they not rather pursue that policy to which they ascribe the renovation of our prosperity, and demand, as their powerful leader would have dictated, "indemnity for the past and security for the future?" If the power of France within its ancient limits, and under its most dissolute and effeminate kings, was enough to threaten and disturb the whole continent of Europe, and ultimately (as we have seen) to subjugate it, will you permit such a nation to retain an accession of strength, torn by perfidy and violence from our confederates and allies, and residing in the hands of a tyrant, who hath incessantly stalked forward from usurpation to usurpation! You shew alacrity enough in enterprises in which the people second you reluctantly. Will you shew none where the quarrel is as much theirs as yours? Is this a sufficient reason for what you are pleased to call your moderation? "We are not to meddle," my Lord Castlereagh says, "with that great and powerful country itself." Why not? Has not that great and powerful

country meddled with every other? Is she not great and powerful, because she has done so? Is it not lawful in all warfare, is it not expedient, and in our own power at present, to chastise aggressions, to avenge injuries; and is not a severe and signal retribution the surest guard against their recurrence? I am astonished at so pacific and soft a declaration; I am in consternation at such a dereliction of duty, as indeed it appears to me, from a man so brave and honourable as Lord Castlereagh. I am certain he would encounter the danger of instant death, to rescue any utter stranger, if he beheld him exposed to such cruelties and indignities, as Bonaparte hath inflicted on many hundred thousands of the bravest and best among mankind. It is not the language of his heart; it is not the counsel of his understanding; it is not the system he will follow. If he should, the cries of millions unredressed, will sound for ever in his ears, amidst the sarcasms of that profligate and degraded crew, which no one in the gaming-house is now desperate enough to lead, and no one in

the tavern is shameless enough to follow. Would it not, without all this, be enough to recollect, and receive no pleasure from, the unrivalled eloquence of his departed friend? He has long been without a competitor in the House of Commons: he is now without an opponent. The tide of popular opinion never rose higher, and never rose less tumultuously. Until the present hour, indeed, the nation was never unanimous; nor was there ever a time when the enemy hath suffered such sudden and terrible and reiterated reverses. Unless we follow him up while we can, the spirit of England will be more broken than the spirit of France. We are driven no longer to expedients or experiments. The season for diversions is over. We fight with surer weapons than finances. Refinements in policy seldom have succeeded with any people, and with us would be just as foolish as to substitute the rapier for the bayonet. Alacrity, and steadiness, and force, must do the business; a force, active, incessant, undiminished, and undivided. The further we advance, the further do we keep

the enemy from the resources of our allies, and the more is his recruiting-ground contracted. I see no reason to believe that the English of the present day would be averse from occupying the same cities and fortresses that were conquered by the Duke of Marlborough, or would think it less glorious or less just to conquer them from Bonaparte than from Louis. The reign of Queen Anne will not be looked back upon as the reign of inferiority or defeat. Even those who ultimately brought about a premature and ignoble peace, never talked of consulting "the feelings and the delicacy" of the French. Yet honorable sentiments then prevailed in France, and human society had acquired a polish and a grace, the traces of which are now to be found in only a few families. Certainly, since that epoch, civilization has been retrograde. "The vallies have been exalted, and the high places laid low," equally to the detriment of both. But only one man, in modern times, hath founded a system of government on the abolition of polished letters for the education of youth, and on

a mental no less than a bodily dependence, of all classes, on the chieftain. The young men of England are not yet instructed in these rudiments: the grammar of Attila is not taught in our schools. We remember what we were with satisfaction, and feel with exultation what we are. But the tide that carries us onward may overthrow us if we stop. We must fulfil the will of Heaven, so clearly manifested. We must restore to Holland the liberty we received from her. We must fix on an eternal basis the peace and independence of every power in Europe. He who believes in the possibility of this, without the extinction of Bonaparte, has lost his intellects, as many have done, by the sudden and overwhelming influx of good fortune. He will turn his eyes upon Experience, and drop them without hearing her voice, or recognizing her features. Such unhappy men are to be found, unquestionably; but there is not an officer of regulars, militia, or volunteers, who would not gladly fall into the rear of Prince Eugene: there is not a statesman, unless your Howicks

and Ponsonbys are called so, who would not carefully and zealously correct the blunders that crept into the Treaty of Utrecht. Shall we a second time tear the laurels from the brow of Victory, and substitute a crown of thorns? Shall we toil as heartily to raise up again the Colossus we have thrown down, as ever we toiled to demolish and subvert it? Should we not, instead of soldering it up, efface the effigy, erase the superscription, break it in pieces, throw it into the furnace, and restore it to the nations from whose tribute-money it was cast, and amidst whose curses it strided over a "*sea of troubles*?"

It is curious, that we should always put into the form of questions the things that are the least questionable. The nation is unanimous: every man cries aloud, "Let this war be the last with Bonaparte." Our manifesto ought to be simply this: *Deliver up the usurper and his usurpations; we restore to you the blessings of peace, your ancient laws and rights, and three hundred thousand of your brethren. Are they not*

*worth one tyrant? the most insatiable, and the most sordid of his species!*

### LETTER III.

By the Roman laws, in a country where slavery was tolerated, where indeed it was a custom and an institution, and no family was without the uses of it, citizens were commanded to rescue and protect a slave from the chastisement of an enraged master. According to the laws of Egypt, if any one saw a man attacked or robbed, and gave no succour, he was condemned to death.

If such attentions were considered due to slaves and strangers; if they were commanded by one nation not very humane, and by another not celebrated for its freedom, how infinitely more imperative, at the present hour, are the dictates of reason, of honour, and of policy, on



the allied sovereigns, to maintain the common rights of nations, and to assert the common dignity of man. Some monarchs have sought glory from war, some from the administration of justice, and some from the preservation of peace. But nothing that is vain can be glorious. If a war, however successful, shall have brought no accession of power or freedom, the blood expended in it will have flowed in vain. To engage in it with so futile a design, as merely to bind at last an Atheist with an oath, and an assassin with a piece of red tape, is just as foolish and as wicked, as it would be to discharge a cannon into a crowded market-place, for a jubilee, or to burn down part of a city for an illumination. No military despot, not even the one we are fighting, hath ever destroyed the commerce, or ever squandered away the lives of his subjects, so wantonly.

In this our war, for every man who is not a Frenchman may call it *his*, all the great objects for which wars should be undertaken, must be

attained at once, or all must be abandoned for ever. If the plunderer, the perjurer, the poisoner, should, through weakness or baseness, be permitted to abscond, new wars will certainly follow, and certainly not successful ones. For people will exert no zeal in defence of those patrons who have suffered their patrimony to fall into dilapidation. The rulers of the Continent, amidst their perpetual wars, have never waged any, *in union*, for the interests of their people. Sweden, who has produced more great kings than all the nations of Europe, has called to the succession of her throne a new Gustavus Adolphus. This illustrious man will hold together the confederacy, and, together with the Emperor of Russia, will visit, with signal chastisement, the first defection. Let us see whether the people, or whether their governors, are inconstant. All the successes that have been gained in Germany arise from the profound hatred in which the French character is holden, whenever time has been allowed for its development. Cruelties and persecutions may be for-

given ; bodily wants and sufferings may be assuaged ; but fraud and fallacy, once detected, are followed with incessant and unrelenting hatred ; not because they argue the depravity, but because they prove the insufficiency of those who have employed them ; because they force us to acknowledge that we have been weaker than the weak, and because they have committed the most flagrant outrages on our dormant and unsuspecting self-love.

The domestic who robs a house is punished more severely than the thief who steals into it from without. Murder itself is viewed by the laws as more atrocious, and is prosecuted with a vengeance and a fury at which even war would shudder and shrink, when it is committed by that person whose affection (if institutions the most universal are founded upon reason, or if love springs from the bosom of nature) should be the most ardent and the most faithful.

Such is the delinquency of Napoleon Bonaparte ;

I will not say first against Spain, but certainly there the most conspicuously ; both from the manifold and vast advantages he had derived from her alliance, and from the tremendous vicissitudes of the conflict, to which that glorious nation, as became her renown and dignity, rose up against her oppressor. Such are his repeated crimes in the various states of northern Italy ; to which, in the language of their poet, he made it appear that liberty, after too long an absence, had at last returned. Let it be remembered by our own country, as well as by all others, that the *independence* of the Italian states received the solemn recognition of France ; and that the violation of this independence was the principal and determining motive of the war. There is a set of politicians, who talk of moderation, not only as good and laudable in itself, but as peculiarly due to the feelings of the French : and this moderation is to be exercised, it seems, by abstaining from all claims whatsoever on the restitution of their rapine and spoliations. On this principle, it was very delicate in the conventionists of Cintra, to load their ships for them

with whatever they had plundered from the Spaniards and Portuguese. Saints and coaches, and candlesticks, and crucifixes, and ear-rings, and shoe-buckles, and the miniatures that won the hearts, and the padlocks that preserved the treasury of the ladies, were boxed and nailed down, and directed, as the property of his Serene Highness the Duke of Abrantes. Private and public, and consecrated property, was not held inviolable until it was sanctified by French confiscation. Respect was not due to alliances, reverence was not due to religion ; delicacy to the French superseded and suspended all other obligations. Is there not also a sort of delicacy due to the tender and the wounded conscience ? Perhaps not : I may be mistaken : but here I stand firmly, and adjure the regenerators and improvers of our old English maxims, that they will not allow their susceptibility to relax the *state-morals* of their forefathers, nor hold any thing more delicate than justice.

French feelings indeed ! what are they ? the feelings of wolves in winter. Have not the

wretches outstripped the halloo of every tatterdemallion who has cracked his whip to the pack ? You would as wisely consult the tender appetite, and as safely stroke down the soft skins, of a menagerie of tigers. They are dejected, discomfited, subdued, and scattered : for the nations have risen up against them. Let them recover their former power and posture, as they will do, if the spirit of those nations be not seconded, and if their sufferings be not redressed ; let them, and you will never afterwards come forward with the prowess and the terrors which are now at your command. Your well-dressed ambassadors, and your ingenious state-papers, in which I must observe that the weakest governments and the worst causes have generally shone most, may be very much admired in the drawing-room, and at the breakfast-table ; and you will have glorious opportunities of breeding up your children (I mean you who have seats in parliament) to the study of diplomacy ; but you will have lost for ever that bright pre-eminence on which you stand at present, and you must prepare the means

of taxation for the support of indefinite and hopeless wars.

To abolish the power of Bonaparte, you must abolish the genius which erected that power: and how can it be done but by the extinction of the individual? We know the exhaustion of France when he assumed the reins of government. Was it ever, or can we reduce it, lower? If we can, are we certain we can reduce it to that pitch from which he cannot raise it again? No, nothing is certain but that his extinction is necessary for the repose and independence of Europe: and nothing comes nearer to certainty, than that France, the country which now suffers the most from him, will be among the most anxious and the most energetic, *if called on, and assured of help*, to dash him headlong from his elevation. Should it be otherwise, let her learn, that the Franks were not the first colony that settled on her soil, nor the most powerful, nor the most worthy.

## LETTER IV.

THE Whigs, I understand, like lovers too passionate, are in a cruel dilemma between their tenderness and their ardour. Sometimes they would not press too far such a high-minded and generous people as the French: next minute they tell us that ministers are wasting our strength and money most deplorably, by their languor and delays. Will neither story do? Will nobody listen? Was ever beneficence so abused! were ever poor creatures, in the last cries and struggles of debility, so unpitied and neglected?

Honest men, I confess, have generally in the present times an aversion to the Whig faction; not because it is suitable, either to honesty or understanding, to prefer the narrow principles of the opposite party, but because in every country lax morals wish to be, and are, identified with public freedom, and because in our own a few of the very best have been found in an associa-



tion with all the very worst. This raises their indignation. They ill endure to see the liberal and ingenuous, those whose warm hearts court society, and are anxious that the world should be governed by the wisest and the most virtuous, bound by a factitious honour, in subordination to a league of six or seven families, tugging at a galley which is never to leave the shore, further than conduces to the petty traffic, or the pusillanimous recreation, of these masters.

Whenever the Tories have deviated from their tenets, they have enlarged their views, and exceeded their promises. The Whigs have always taken an inverse course. Whenever they have come into power, they have previously been obliged to shift those maxims, and to temporize with those duties, which they had not the courage either to follow or to renounce. The character of Lord Rockingham gave them a respectability, and the genius of Burke added a splendour, which have long since utterly passed away : and the nation sees at last, that nothing

is more unsound and perishable than what is founded on an oligarchy of gamesters and adventurers. Those who constituted themselves the guardians of the people's rights, have been driven from the charge of them for malversation: and, what shews how utterly they were detested and abjured, the property of Englishmen is thrown down at the mercy of people whose responsibility, they tell us plainly, lies entirely and solely among themselves; and who are watched only by a race made active from the hunger that keeps them out of doors. The leader of these, if ever they acknowledge one, is usually some young person whom good fortune alone has rendered discontented. He countenances and supports his uncourtly sycophants, with little satisfaction, and less gratitude. They discover by degrees, that he becomes the more restive the more he is patted and pampered, and that to curry him is as dangerous as to catch and halter him. He also finds, that although there is something animating in the bustle and shouts of throwing off, there is more to vex and

harass, in the spurring, and the thorns, and the mire, of the pursuit. The gentleman soon retires from public dinners ; indignant that similar professions should give a similar and truly a joint claim, to some haranguing shopkeeper, on the bursts of applause, the clinking of glasses, and other regalia of equal value, which he fancied his own in perpetuity, as sovereign of the shambles. To complete his disgust, he retires at last under an unjust suspicion of altered or wavering principles. Little know the licentious crowd that never was he more out of humour with his adversaries, than for thrusting him among such friends.

These brightening and bracing days, these breezes of health and renovation, blow away all foppery, and bring the most active and certain remedy against all fastidiousness. In the perpetual effervescence of society, sometimes the crimes are uppermost, and sometimes the follies. The latter of these seasons is neither the harvest-time nor the harrowing-time of the poli-

tician, but the vintage of the moralist. He sits by himself in the chequered arbour of life: the light and luxuriant foliage flaps around him : he looks down complacently on the basin of froth beneath him : he chooses the most prominent bubble : he blows it into the air, and watches its course and colours as it rolls and rises. Some burst sooner, some later ; all, however, burst ; yet all afford, in their frail generations, a little pastime to the idle, a little derision to the stupid, and perhaps more than a little reflection to the considerate and wise. Every man is amused by the offspring of vanity, although no man ever acknowledged his own children by that mother. We must not indulge at present in the comedy of life, in the leisure of speculation, or even in the tranquillity of contempt. Whoever is not with us, is against us ; and it is equally criminal to desert from the rear guard as from the advanced.

It would be pleasant, at any other time, to observe here the spirit and energy, there the sa-

gacity and deliberation, of those, who, ashamed as they justly might be, to bear the name of Whig, renounced it for that of Foxite. If we had not witnessed the achievements of these heroes at Constantinople and Alexandria, we might form some conception of them from their speeches and their writings. Self-sufficiency hath always been insufficiency.

The last of our factions is now humbled to the dust: yet, unhappily, those who have been censured by it for doing too little, seem ready to sit down and enjoy their triumph over this charge, and resolved, at all events, not to be reviled for doing at last too much. The hand of government never was so powerful as at present; not in breaking down our laws and liberties, not in gusts of eloquence, but in the spirit of all ranks and conditions of men, against the inveterate enemy of our country. A minister in these times requires no more abilities than a market-woman. We have collected, we have disciplined, and we pay a mighty force: to render it

*all* efficient, and to direct it against one point, until there is nothing to resist it, or until it is driven back, is our only policy. To treat, to temporize, would be infatuation. Say only to the French, "abandon Bonaparte, restore your conquests, and peace is concluded. You proposed that the conqueror should cede nothing: we accepted the challenge, and will keep the conditions."

I see no danger in exertion: I see much, even yet, in relaxation. We must demand Bonaparte as the Romans demanded Hannibal. Indeed we must follow in more than one instance the system of that wise republic. What it was we know thoroughly: those who do not, may refer to a clear exposition of it in the commentary on the first books of Livy. We seem to reject it with as much jealousy, as we rejected the civil code of the later empire. The word system is mentioned with contempt by us: it is confounded with theory, but in fact it is the very contradistinction. In politics that is a system which *hath stood*, that is a theory which is *proposed to stand*.

Now is the time to act effectively. By the violent disruption of society, and by the levelling pressure of universal subjugation, a solidity is given to the nations of the continent : as the sands of the sea are compacted and hardened by the recent wave.

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## LETTER V.

LORD LIVERPOOL, in declaring that he “would not *ask* any thing from our enemies, which we ourselves in similar circumstances would refuse,” at once places England in the same situation as Bonaparte hath placed France. Let us examine, by what necessity or on what principle of justice. We never have been in similar circumstances, and never can be. We never have occupied with our troops the capitals of the continent ; we never have confiscated their money ; we never have burned their merchandize ; we never have driven the horses and oxen from their towns

and villages ; we never have forced away their artisans and labourers from the loom and from the plough ; we never have marched off in handcuffs their students from the universities ; we never have condemned to a cruel death those writers who gave intelligence to our disadvantage ; we never have violated our treaties with their governors, nor overturned the governments at our pleasure. The conduct, mind, and temper of the two nations, are altogether so dissimilar, that it is not only puerile and trifling, but base and wicked, to imagine ourselves “ in similar circumstances.” Whence can such imaginations proceed, but from some latent disposition to act as France hath done ; or from some admission at least that we might have acted so, or may so act hereafter ?

We have the clearest right, a right unquestionable even by our enemy himself, to demand from the French people such terms as Bonaparte would have demanded from us. What they are, we know to a certainty ; both from his conduct to-



ward every other nation, and from his menaces to ourselves. We know that he, like the Romans, makes every people pay the expences of his war against it : and indeed to act otherwise is folly. We know also that his wars have been unjust. If he hath extorted from others the sums necessary to subjugate them, when hostility was manifestly most iniquitous, what can be more indisputable than that we, who insist that we have both policy and equity on our side, should demand at least as much from our adversary. If we forgive the French the horrible cruelties they have both committed and excited against our neighbours and allies ; if we forgive them the prohibition of our commerce and the accumulation of our taxes ; if we forgive them the slaughter of two or three hundred thousand men ; the ruin of triple that number, the poverty of millions, the misery and broken hearts which are equally out of sight and out of calculation ; do we not forgive a great deal more than ever yet was forgiven by the victorious ? a great deal more than ever was alleged as a legitimate cause of war ? a

great deal more than first aroused in us such enthusiasm and unanimity against them ? a great deal more than would arm us afresh for the conflict, even in the bosom of peace, even in the hour of affliction and calamity ? yes, infinitely more than is sufficient to urge into resistance and rebellion, even the humblest, the meekest, the most hopeless, of the oppressed. Has Lord Liverpool ever made, or attempted to make, a calculation of the losses we alone have sustained by the war ? In taxes, in debt, in privation and diminution of trade, does it not exceed one thousand millions ? What profits ought one hundred thousand sailors alone to have brought to their employers in the space of twenty years ? In recompence for all these, if we must forswear the practice of the Romans, and of every other great and powerful nation, and are determined to carry on our own shoulders, and to throw afterwards on the shoulders of our children, the burdens imposed on us by the vanquished, we shall require that they deliver up the rapacious and insatiable plunderer, for whose sole benefit these

wrongs and robberies were committed ; and that they institute such a system of national police as will render a repetition of them impossible. Instead of rendering France a country not desirable or fit to live in, a condition to which Bonaparte declared he would reduce Great Britain, let each party keep at a peace what neither could recover by war. This is the calm proposal of our enemy, suggested as the basis of pacification. He acknowledged it fair and equitable. What was justice then, cannot be injustice now. We accept the new French measure, which he has forced into our hands, and we will fill it up even to a kiliogram.

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## LETTER VI.

THOSE princes who help to remove, or countenance the removal of, the landmarks to international polity, and bring their subjects into the

field under the pretext of restoring and fixing them, teach a lesson of injustice on the broad tablet of instruction now adopted so generally in this country. It is impressed by the stronger on the weaker, and is quickly taken up by all ages and conditions. Whatever king punishes a crime after pardoning those of Bonaparte, and possessing the power of avenging them, is guilty of gross injustice. He pretends to seek indemnity and security : on this pretence he calls a portion of his people from their families and occupations, and demands a contribution from the rest. All accede to his proposal, because they consider that he will lay out their money to their advantage. Those who take the field, believe that the days deducted from their labour will be compensated in the additional value of their possessions, by the stability which will have accrued to these from such exertions. If, for any accession of territory, or any other personal convenience, he shall forego the interests of his own people, and shall squander their substance and their lives, he must sacrifice by this blind ambi-

tion not only the physical but the moral power of his empire, and will probably see his new allies on a visit not of ceremony at his capital. It is easier to lose a friend than a rival: those whom he has driven to a compromise, will never be much more delicate with him, than those whom he has betrayed.

“Not only are they tyrants,” says Thucydides, “who reduce others to slavery, but they also who can repress the violence and will not.”

The Emperor of Germany is bound by oath to preserve the established laws under the *representative system*. “*Leges latas custoditurum, publica publico consilio curaturum.*” He neither is anointed nor receives the sword of state, before he answers the archbishop in the affirmative to these questions. “Whether he will not defend the church? whether he will not administer justice? whether he will not protect the widow, the orphan, and all who shall deserve commiseration.” (Sleidan. lib. 1. 11.) The princes

and *other* representatives of the empire make the same promise. By breaking it, they abdicate their authority. The Emperor of Germany cannot assume that dignity on the same terms as he chose to entitle himself the Emperor of Austria. Unless he both swears to do and does, what the ancient constitutions of Germany require from him, he may be and ought to be dethroned as an usurper. Europe has not shed her blood for any half dozen of her families. She hath shed it, that all her thrones may be founded on laws, and all her laws on equity : she hath shed it, that revolutions may never more be deemed glorious or desirable. What hath been forcibly taken by Bonaparte from the states and free cities of Germany, must be restored, to the value of the last farthing, else justice is not administered, else the widow, the orphan, and many thousands more who deserve commiseration, from the rapacity and ferocity of the French, will not have been avenged nor redressed. Unless this is done completely, there is no Emperor of Germany : for only on these

conditions can that eminent functionary be elected. Let those who, in the beginning of the French revolution, shewed such zeal against all innovation, shew it now, where innovation is most dangerous; let those who know the value of old customs, insist on the return of them to the palace, where old customs are most venerable. Thrones can be secure only while kingdoms are independent; for who will defend that by which he never was protected? A country is not much the dearer to me because I moisten it with the sweat of my brow, nor a sovereign because I have the honour of paying into his treasury a quarter of my possessions. I want something more and better, to excite my enthusiasm and to retain my affections. I must be certain that neither I, nor any one of my family or friends, shall be murdered, or robbed, or imprisoned, or even insulted, with impunity. Such are the oaths of sovereigns, in the presence of the Almighty, before they can officiate. He who violates his oath, breaks also the oath of allegiance to all his subjects; and he who takes not

the one, has no claim upon the other. The Emperor of Germany is restored when he has restored the constitution of Germany, and redressed her grievances. Until he hath done so, his imperial robes are a *fancy-dress*, fit only for one gala night.

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## LETTER VII.

EVERY man is looking over his map, and tracing with his pencil the boundaries of France. Some give less, and some allow more, but all are fond of *bounding*. The prettiest of these boundaries, and the most delightful to the indulgence of generosity, are the Alps, the Pyrenees, the sea, and the Rhine. Such are precisely what wise French politicians would desire for France, and what, for the same reason, a wise English politician would most strenuously contend that she never should obtain. Those who would



willingly make France so charmingly compact, bear as much hatred to the French character as any other men. To inflict a just and deadly punishment, for her manifold and most atrocious crimes, they are willing enough that such a monster as Bonaparte should be permitted to roam at large over her territories. We, however, whose eyes are unblinded by passion, must perceive that the power over *them* would extend, and, in no moderate degree, over *us*: that, by opening to Bonaparte an insurance-office against all losses in war, we leave him the option, and present to him the encouragement, to diminish our means, and to increase the pressure of our taxation. Depend upon it, he requires no *bonus* to keep us in perpetual disquiet and warfare. This system, if he retains one rood of empire, will be of equal duration with his existence. Is it possible (I appeal to every man in his senses) that Europe can enjoy security, or rest at peace one year, if three hundred thousand soldiers, now prisoners in foreign countries, are placed again under his standard? It is not wise

to say, " We have conquered them, and should conquer them again." We vanquished them, as it were, in detachments : they are the produce of successive conscriptions. Brave as are the armies of our allies, indignant as they are at injuries, and elated with success, if all these French soldiers joined their regiments at once, the united armies would be annihilated. Yet can we ever hope to see again (or, alas ! much longer) such unanimity, such enthusiasm ? Remember there is a Power among the rest, which will too certainly, when it has gratified its ambition, check the spirit of insurrection against France ; a Power under which both liberty and genius have always languished. Her jealousy of Russia is equal to her dread of France : and with Russia she has no affinity.— For these reasons, we must instantly cease to do what we have always done hitherto. We must throw away the paddle, and hoist the sails ; for we are no longer in calm water. The comfortable talk of " husbanding our resources," must be interrupted. In a little time, by the nature

of things, there must be disaffection and diffidence. Let us do every thing we propose to do, while the force is whole and together, while the spirit is one and the same. Six months of active warfare, with all our heart and all our strength, will complete the task. If we manage and modify, we may fight another twenty years, and leave off where we begun: but we must not be surprised to find at our return, as Ulysses did, that our wealth is consumed, and that our houses are occupied by the swineherd and the beggar.

## LETTER VIII.

ROMANTIC minds are now become the most reasonable. A little while ago, what sensible man cared a straw for the family of Bourbon. At present, what sensible man is there who does not cordially wish their restora-

tion ? If Louis XVIII. will erect his standard in the South of France, and the Emperor of Russia will authorize him to declare that the French prisoners shall return to their country on his accession to the throne, a bloodless revolution will instantly terminate a most sanguinary war. It is only in this way that the captives can be restored to their native land with safety to the neighbouring states. Those who differ from my opinion, must allow that their release and delivery to the present Ruler, will require, at all events, an immense and ruinous armed force, to be constantly kept up, both on the frontier and in this kingdom. The Bourbons, if re-established, must conciliate the affections and obedience of their people, by taking and continuing a line of policy far different. Whether the French are likely to be more or less happy by a change, is a question, I think, easily solved, but, reasoning as politicians, quite indifferent to us. Hatred and love have no place at the signature of treaties. One only object is held worthy of consideration : the durability of advantage. Bona-

parte will exercise, and perhaps is now exercising, his usual arts of corruption. To imagine, that in such a variety of characters, there are none whom he can intimidate or seduce, would be to form such a magnificent image of human nature, as we never shall find a basis to support. What *he* can do, *we* cannot. He would not drown himself for the dominion of the ocean.— We cannot offer more than empire. There was indeed a time when the Directory was accessible to bribery, as was proved in the notorious case of the American Commissioners. But the Directors had foisted the attacks of our Minister! He would not gratify the individuals; else he might easily have negotiated the evacuation of Holland, without any expenditure of human lives, and probably with less money than supported our war-establishment one single week. The alleged and legitimate object of the war would have been attained, to the satisfaction and joy, no less of the French themselves, than of the English and of the Dutch. An event so desirable would have invested the Directory with

popularity, power, and confidence; and our minister would have kept his word, both to the nation and to the allies. But these Directors had ridiculed his financial speculations; and, what is worse, experience had shewn the justice of their ridicule: they had first held him at *arms' length*; they had afterwards thrown him into the mire; and he struck the most furiously when he had no longer an object to strike at.

We now discover that a fall of snow may do more mischief to an enemy than a fall of the funds. But this would not have done alone.—It was by pressing on every calamity, by seizing on every advantage, by allowing no respite, no parley, that aggression was turned into flight, and denunciations were lost in dismay.

## LETTER IX.

BONAPARTE has declared, and published in the *Moniteur*, to all nations, that “*the union of Holland to France is the necessary consequence of the union of Belgium.*” And again, that “*the association of the Batavians with their brothers in Belgium, ought to be the first of their wishes, the most pressing of their wants.*”

Like the hero described by Voltaire, contrary to his intention, more ludicrously than truly :

*Il “força” les Français à devenir heureux.*

He has also forced on other people a great number of “pressing wants.” But now, “the first of their wishes” have been amply gratified, and something from the “pressure of their wants” hath been removed, they begin to look around for what is missing, and to inquire whether this eclectic philosopher has not taken too much for his lessons. They would willingly

give him his cloak and his tablets again, for some of those trifles he has picked up in their houses. He must restore all. England has a right to retain what she won by war. But having now acknowledged Holland as her ally, she must assist her to recover what has been seized by France, and appropriated under false pretences. War, it has often been said, is a game of chance, in which the governors are the players, and the things governed are the stake. Bonaparte, with the consent and applause of all classes in France, played for the whole continent against his empire; and every Frenchman took a share in the bank. After all sorts of packing, and shuffling, and tricking, to say nothing of mixing drugs of a soporific quality in the cakes and wine, he has lost all he played for. Yet we have such respect for his dexterity, such confidence in his honour, and such veneration for his goodness of heart, that we not only think of giving him back whatever he laid down, but also a great part of what he failed to win, and what, as, belonging to others, we



have no right to dispose of in any manner, without first obtaining their consent. Yet, besides all this, we sweep the board for him, lift the candlesticks, and make him a present of the card-money.

The English are the only people in the universe that ever played, voluntarily, this losing game. They sit down to it quietly, night after night, to the astonishment of their observers, the despair of their friends, and the derision of their adversaries.

## LETTER X.

IN giving so violent a shock to France, Europe herself must receive no gentle one. There will, probably, be yet a long vibration before there is an equilibrium. Denmark and Saxony are forfeited. These are sufficient to indemnify

the minor belligerents; and the two more powerful will be amply rewarded, by humbling the only nation, and subverting the only potentate, formidable to their greatness. The terms of peace proposed by Lord Liverpool are merely speculative, and leave him all desirable latitude of explanation. The confederates on the continent shew none of that sickly and imbecile delicacy, which is more suitable to lovers than to enemies. They will demand, in some shape or other, an equivalent for all the spoliations authorized by the French government, and all the wanton mischief committed by its armies. Unless they fulfil this duty, they will have become more criminal than Bonaparte. They will have acted against an express and formal compact with their people. He has entered into no compact with Frenchmen. His power, relative to France, is commensurate with his will: his constitution was planned by himself, without any concurrence or consultation, and presented to them under fixed bayonets. He observed to Ferdinand, the captive King of

Spain, how naturally men would avenge themselves for the homage that was exacted.'

We must remember, and bear constantly in mind, that other rights and interests, besides our own, are equally to be defended. The balance of Europe must be restored and fixed. There must be an efficient counterpoise to France. If she retains a population of twenty millions, which it would be against all political precedent for conquerors to permit, the confederate States of Germany should amount to thirty millions. Twenty in one government are equal to thirty in several. He knows little of the Germans, who knows not the antipathy of every principality to its neighbour. We ought not to imagine that the House of Austria will always be friendly to their liberties. On the contrary, we must recollect that she has diminished, if not destroyed, the privileges of every nation she has governed. It required the most wanton and outrageous wrongs to incline the people of the Netherlands to the side of France;

a moral and religious race, and in all respects the opposite of the French. If Belgium, and Venice, and the Milanese, and Tuscany, and Parma, are recovered, they should be strengthened by such an accession of territory, and such confederacies, as may defend them from the collusions and compromises of Austria and France. But the power most to be strengthened is Sardinia. We are not only to provide an indemnity for the loss of dominion so many years; we are not only to give a narrow line of coast, bordering Piedmont, and an island so poor as Corsica. No; the dominions of this potentate must be made strong enough to form an eternal barrier for the defence of Italy.

Italy, who invented the balance of power, should receive the benefit of her invention. Something of this kind existed in the States of Greece. But to recover and institute it anew, is as glorious as to devise, and merits the name of invention, as much as the preserver of a state merits the title of founder or father. Ma-

chiavel, in speaking of the Italian league, says, "These potentates had two principal views: one, that no foreigner should enter Italy in arms; the other, that none of the princes, or states, should attempt an increase of territory." In reading the Italian authors, from the time of Dante to the present, one eternal tone of sorrow, mixed with indignation, murmurs in our ears, against the commotions raised, and the barbarism spread around, by foreigners. Petrarch and Michael Angelo stand only in the middle of the mournful train, and men of tempers and pursuits the most dissimilar, but united by genius and virtue, fill up the whole interval between these and Alfieri. Not only the charters of cities, but the academies of the learned, have been invaded by the "*boreal scettro*."

The last piece of insolence a foolish tyrant can commit, is to meddle with literary associations. To alter or modify their forms, to appoint or recommend their members, is, of all presumption and usurpation, the most arrogant and intolerable.

If our statesmen had ever seen the magnificent cities of northern Italy, they could not but reflect on the causes both of their splendour and their decline. Bonaparte, the cause of more mischief and misery than any one European that ever lived, was not, however, the cause of their ruin. They lost the keystone of their greatness when they lost their independence. While they retained it, every pressure strengthened them; every shock, without it, threatens their dissolution. Among the many great blessings, which we have reason to expect at the conclusion of the war, is a confederacy of the Italian States: but unless the republicans raise up their heads again, unless the people drive all intruders from amongst them, unless Italians govern Italy, peace will return without happiness, and the arts without glory.

## LETTER XI.

THE friends and supporters of every administration have constantly been charged with the propagation and patronage of arbitrary principles. A love of order, and a respect for the government of our country, are inconsistent, one would imagine, with liberal sentiments and enlightened views. At last, however, we seem to have arrived at the period, when every faction hath been convicted of unsteadiness and inconstancy, and is heartily glad of some fair excuse for ceasing to look its opponent in the face. All eyes are now turned towards a spectacle sublime and new : a spectacle in which Victory, although incessant and encreasing splendours are thrown upon her from every quarter of the horizon, claims only a subordinate station. The conjunction of all the great powers that govern the world, brought about by moral necessity, and their regular procession to the same point in the

same period, is an event which, a little while ago, no experience and no signs would have encouraged us to calculate. On seeing it before us, the first and most obvious question is, what will be the effect of this combination on the polity of Europe? This is far more important than whether an old or a new dynasty shall be established in France. Although I am of opinion that the honour of the French nation, if any honour is yet left in it, is concerned most intimately and vitally, in bringing to justice an usurper who hath subverted her laws, a murderer who hath slaughtered her citizens, and a deserter who hath abandoned her armies, *in every great defeat*, yet, as an Englishman, I am perfectly indifferent whether this military Marat die by the dagger of a Charlotte Corday, or by the axe of a Fonquier Tinville. He who places himself beyond the laws, is outlawed by his own subscription. So self-evident is this, it is rather a truism than an axiom. But it well becomes those great sovereigns, who have so often laboured in vain to establish the peace of Europe, to



consider well and maturely, whether peace *can* be lasting while France is governed by Napoleon Bonaparte: whether, in signing *any* fresh treaty for that purpose, they can receive stronger assurances of its permanency and inviolability, than they received on the signature of the first, or last, or intermediate one. The Holy Ghost has never descended in the form of a dove to the adjurations of Napoleon. It is no less impiety than folly, to call God to witness what you believe will be futile: it is, both in letter and spirit, to take his name in vain.

With us, indeed, the fruits of victory have usually been perishable in proportion to their sweetness. Our pleasure seems to have been in making the sacrifice we ought to have exacted; in laying the olive-branch under our pillows, as servant girls would do, to prolong our slumbers, or to embellish and diversify our dreams. If generosity is due to our enemies, is it due to our enemies *only*? If Napoleon hath given us the greatest latitude for it, by detaining

our friends and relatives in France, after the most solemn assurances of their liberty and safety; if he hath courted our forbearance, or conciliated our good offices, by murdering and torturing the captains of our navy, yet something is also due towards their families. I am ashamed to acknowledge, that I know not whether Captain Wright hath left, to bemoan his captivity and cruel death, a son of brother; but what shame, what grief, what indignation should I suffer, if in another war, after the peace of another year, one of these, by the chances of battle, should fall into the hands of the tyrant, and be doomed, as he would be, to fill up that measure of solitary woes which agony shook down for his kinsman, amidst the guards we re-equipped, and upon the rack we restored, as a heir-loom of the monarchy. Is it true, or is it false, that Bonaparte has committed against every one of the allied powers, actions which, according to the laws of their country, are punishable by death? Is there any thing in his previous good conduct which could plead for favour from the most

lenient judge? Would not every one of these sovereigns condemn *capitally*, even the highest and most favoured subject, who should have committed a thousandth part of the crimes which this tyrant hath perpetrated, and threatens still to perpetrate? Are his motives irresistibly urgent? Is his authority unquestionably legitimate? Do they pardon him because he assumes their rank and station, and uses their forms and phraseology? They would unquestionably then forgive the piracies and murders, if such were committed on their subjects, of Pétion or Christophe, or of any corsair on the coast of Malabar: they would excuse a villain who should have set fire to a town, because he had acted the part of Mahomet or Julius Cæsar in a barn. Cannot a man be a scoundrel in a crown as well as in a red cap? Are the manners, the morals, the principles, of this fellow changed, is there even any difference in his stature or his complexion, from his assumption of power to the death of Pichegru, or from that period to the dissolution of Moreau? Do princes then tremble because his

shadow is like theirs? or, what is weaker still, do they love and cherish him, because in all his shifts and changes, from among the bundles of the stage-waggon at Marseilles to the embraces of Cambacers at the Thuilleries, he has constantly, to the utmost of his power, rendered the names of king and emperor hateful or contemptible? He never forgives, nor, conscious of his atrocities, believes that he can ever be forgiven. In this temper of mind and posture of circumstances, he flies to the oracles of Machiavel, of all oracles the least fallible, and will compromise with his enemies until he can disunite and destroy them. He has not had leisure to read much; but he has had sagacity to read and study what is most conducive to his purposes. An attentive perusal and a right understanding of two excellent books, have enabled a petty officer of artillery to confound all the wisdom and baffle all the energies of the world. The *Prince* of Machiavel and the Polybius of Folard, are the cup and wand of this Comus. A just comprehension of them will guard prudent men

'against most of the errors which have been committed by the great politicians and great soldiers of our days. But arguments are not necessary to shew them in what manner this insolent and sanguinary outlaw should be treated; or in what manner he will treat those who at present *can* crush him, if they weakly or treacherously permit him to escape. Kings and statesmen will rather endure any insult, than listen to those who entreat and implore them to look into history for guides. They consider it as a relaxation to their studies; and not as a rule to their conduct. Yet every thing that *can* occur, *has* occurred. Events may receive, from the ages and countries that produce them, some slight shades of colour, some few modifications of form; but the seeds of them are imperishable, and exist throughout the world; a thousand and a thousand times have they germinated and died down again, wherever there are rival nations, wherever there are discordant interests, in short, wherever there are infirmities and wants. The wise and contemplative man, active and energetic, will find as much as is

requisite to direct him in all political emergencies. If those have failed the most remarkably, who have left upon the memory of their countrymen the most profound impressions of their eloquence, which even the calmest sagacity cannot always distinguish from true wisdom, it was by following the passion of the moment rather than the precepts of experience; rather by attending to some whisper from an imaginary and illusory genius of their own, than observing those recorded and plain dictates, which stand eminent above the flight of time, and have been erected and emblazoned at distant intervals, by a succession of nations roused to activity by wars, and lighted to policy by calamities.

## LETTER XII.

ACCORDING to my view of the subject, the future state of Europe seems to depend entirely

on the resolutions of the allied princes, concerning the punishment of Bonaparte. If these are manly and just; if they treat him only as they would treat their own subjects, for crimes infinitely less and fewer; if they act as the servants of God and the guardians of their people; they will then, and then only will they, have secured to themselves and their posterity the peace and independence of their kingdoms. Never more will the drunkenness of an upstart and street-walking power raise itself over their courts, and throw their innermost household into confusion: never more will the dreams of overgorged democracy be interpreted as the dictates of heaven, or issued as the decrees of fate. Then will this Bonaparte, great only in the enormity of his crimes, and in the littleness of his surroundings, find one only of all his speeches in the memory of man :

“ The finger of Providence was there.”

Lamented and most beloved Moreau! such, such was the triumphant exclamation of this

perjurer and atheist, at the moment when Europe was deprived of thy genius and thy virtues. Thy exile, too soon followed up by death, was occasioned by thy strenuous but ill-accorded efforts to purify the earth from his pollutions. Shall thy undeviating aims be overlooked? shall thy glorious example be forgotten? shall the hand that pressed thine in death, press with equal fervor thy exulting murderer's? Do not Heaven and earth call aloud for vengeance? do not weakness and wisdom raise the same cry to God? From the humblest toil of industry to the highest efforts of genius, the blasting hand of this incarnate pestilence hath left its visible and appalling track.

Men of literature have seldom been remiss in offering their intense to the elevated and the fortunate. A small portion of light from the object above is enough for them. But something like virtue there must be; let it be constancy, let it be fortitude, let it be generosity, let it be clemency, let it be encouragement to the pur-



suits of abstruse learning, of polished letters, of eloquence, in the cabinet, in the pulpit, in the parliament, or at the bar. Since Bonaparte hath assumed the functions of government, the very time when any thing worthy of the slightest praise would be extolled above the highest, not a notion, not a sentiment of his, appears to have been commended by the most partial of his slaves, in a manner to be remembered by the rest. The world expects with great curiosity the publication of the *erotics* of his Mameluke : I, who read little of the modern literature, and indeed too little of any, shall be contented to admire his epitaph.

### LETTER XIII.

IN my last letter I expressed more anxiety than hope, that the governors of the world

would consult the history of mankind, in order to judge correctly how the nations of Europe would be treated, if Bonaparte were to retain the sovereignty of France. Yet I should have been both more urgent and more explicit, if he had not several times given such illustrations and proofs, to all the powers now arranged against him, as would render any question on the subject too nugatory for even the most childish declamation. History would lead them into that chilly and awful chamber, in which, under the suspended armour, they might read their own destinies. It appears to me the extreme of folly, to think of giving up the chase, at the moment we have driven the tiger back into his lair. A curious sort of courage and generosity! admirably timed and placed! Perhaps it is thought proper to inquire first, whether he has done any harm in the country: if he has, whether he is likely to do any more, after such magnanimous shouts and sallies. It is wise, then, and considerate, to ask a sailor with a wooden leg, whether he knows what it is to be wounded; a citizen

whose house is in flames, whether he has heard of any fire in the neighbourhood : if we are circumspect and delicate, we shall certainly say to both of them—Have you lost any thing ? Yes, it would be just as reasonable, as to appeal to the sovereigns of Europe on the tremendous cause of their former degradation. Look at Smolensko; look at Moscow; look at Hamburgh ! Hear the threats of the impudent fugitive, in the midst of his army, against all Germans, who would rather not be Frenchmen ! If this general incendiary and universal murderer is permitted to escape with impunity, the sovereigns will have little merit in preserving the minor laws, which protect one subject from another. Will they ever be able to preserve them ? Will they *be* the sovereigns of the country ? the protectors and avengers (for both characters are requisite to constitute a sovereign) of their people ? Certainly not long : they will fall to ruin amidst the groans and execrations of kingdoms, whose noble efforts they had blasted, whose best and dearest interests they had compromised

and betrayed. It is madness to assert that the conditions of a stable peace would be accepted with more difficulty by the French senate than by the French despot, or that an unprincipled set of men, who have tossed up their caps for the leaders of every faction, would remain more constant to their master than to their principles. Their principles have given them no anxieties, and offered them no affronts: their master has shewn them, repeatedly, both his displeasure and his contempt. Secure to them their stipends, and they will gladly throw off those cumberous trappings, which they cannot so conveniently trail with them into the haunts of vulgar vice. The surrender of Napoleon will be as easily attained as the surrender of a province, or even of a fortress. Without it, many provinces, and many fortresses will afford but an inadequate compensation for the expenditure and devastations of only the Russian campaign. The ruin of a yielding force is certain, if the pressure against it be undiminished and unremitted. Cæsar Borgia far excelled Bonaparte, both in military and politi-

cal science, and never betrayed in any enterprise a deficiency of that personal courage, which is punished in soldiers with death, in others with contempt. He had the advantage of high connexions, and passed every stage of his life among men who respected both his abilities and his rank. He had also taken the precaution to remove by violence those heads of parties, which might else have intercepted him in his ascent to sovereignty. Yet his fall was even more rapid than his rise.

Agathocles of Sicily seems to have been the idol of Bonaparte; but he never deserted his army in any extremity: on the contrary, he retained, by prudence and valour, the dominion he had acquired by violence and fraud; yet his power died with him.

Oliverotto Firmani was also an usurper, of more consistency, and more resources, than this Corsican; equally dexterous in treachery, and equally resolute in assassinations. He added

personal courage to military science, and never was convicted of desertion, or accused of any pusillanimity : yet he was taken prisoner, together with Vitelloccio his accomplice, and suffered death upon the gallows.

What is there, I repeat it again and again, in the character or conduct of this insolent and audacious man, that ought to exempt him from a similar punishment ? Is there any crime, in public or private life, with which he has not been deeply and thoroughly contaminated ? Is there a family on the Continent of Europe which has not to bemoan the effects of his rapacity ? Ambition I will not call it, little as I respect what is usually and more justly termed so, and aware as I am what bitterness, dust and ashes, lie at the core of its hollow but fair-seeming fruit.

If the French people were once assured that the life of Bonaparte would be accepted as the price of peace, that price would be paid down

instantly. It is only then that they could resign, with the appearance of doing it unconstrained, the territories they have wrested from their neighbours. They would attribute to his cupidity all the losses they had sustained; and the sacrifices they should be obliged to make, they would celebrate aloud as a voluntary peace-offering to justice. Every nation has a right to demand that so atrocious a criminal should be delivered up: every nation has made such demands, both in ancient and modern times. France is neither able nor willing to refuse the summons. Insensible as she is to the value of liberty, and forgetful and unworthy of her ancient constitution, she requires a cessation from her labour, and a recovery from her disgrace. Never can she enjoy them without the death, judicial or extra-judicial, of her traiterous and turbulent usurper. The present French condemn, or pretend to condemn, the cruelties of Marat and Robespierre: yet the one excelled Bonaparte in knowledge, the other in eloquence; both of them excelled him in consistency, in honesty, and in

courage. Is there, however, a single man in the territory of France who does not cordially rejoice in the extinction of these wretches? And why? Because of their restless suspicion and insatiable cruelty. And, to say nothing of exactions and extortions for the support of individual and solitary pride, is there less suspicion in the breast of this Corsican, who despises and detests the whole nation? Is there less cruelty in this Moloch, who selects his annual victims by the myriad; who consumes their youth in the vices and miseries of a prowling and felonious warfare; who has calmly delivered to the jaws of death, or broke their limbs and sinews, three hundred thousand Frenchmen within one year, and calls for another such oblation to crown it? Take the average of the last ten months, and make your calculation on the authentic reports of the allied armies, what is the result? How many fellow-creatures, how many fellow-countrymen, and fellow-soldiers, born to happiness, and torn from it at the first opening of its enjoyments, hath he deprived of life, or of all its



comforts and uses, *every minute of his waking hours*? What a scene, then, of woe and desolation is renewed by every day of his existence! How many hopes, how many virtues, are extinguished at every sun-set! How many families are made miserable, desolate, and helpless!

Sovereigns of the earth, if you prolong the existence of this miscreant, this accursed of God and man, declare at once that you have drawn the sword only to divide dominion with him; that you have brought nations to fight one against another, only that you might at last be admitted to peace and amity with him: and the blood of extinguished and of unborn generations be upon your heads! the scorn of your contemporaries, the reproaches of your posterity, and the vengeance of your A'nighty Judge.

CALVUS.

## LETTER XIV.

Monday, Dec. 20, 1813.

A MONTH has now elapsed since the preceding letters were written, and sent to be inserted in the *Courier*. The freedom with which I have treated all subjects and all persons, within the range of my observations, made them perhaps undesirable and unwelcome to the acute and judicious Editor. Heartily glad should I be, to have closed them with any thing rather than the *Manifesto*, which, at a distance of more than two hundred miles from the capital, came into my hands but yesterday. It appears as a declaration of the Allied Powers. It states that “*The Powers*” confirm to the French Empire an extent of territory which France, under her kings, never knew; because a valiant nation does not fall from its rank by having, in its turn, experienced reverses, in an obstinate and sanguinary contest, in which it has fought with its accustomed bravery.

*But the Allied Powers wish to be free, tranquil, and happy, themselves, &c.*

Reasonings may be very weak and inconsequent, which are founded on truth and justice. But was ever reasoning more weak and more inconsequent, or founded less on truth and justice, than that France should have an *increase* of power for not having *fallen*? That she should be endowed with an accession of territory, *such as her kings never knew*, because she has experienced *reverses*; because she has been able to maintain an obstinate and *sanguinary contest*? Because the Allies *wish to be free, tranquil, and happy*? When this sanguinary contest, maintained against them by Bonaparte, as they themselves have urged repeatedly, that they might *not* be “happy, nor tranquil, nor free.”

Unfortunate nations ! the play-things of creatures so destitute of intellect, so destitute of recollection. Even their own eyes and ears are not their senses. They have waded through

blood, and never felt it ; they have been surrounded by conflagrations, and seem to imagine it was the natural light, the wholesome fresh air of day ! Surely they think, that whatever has happened, must have happened in another state of existence. Alas ! it is not *their* wrongs and sufferings ; it is only the wrongs and sufferings of their people. They live ; they are happy ; they exult in unexpected deliverance. Those whose sturdy arms delivered them, are permitted the honour of following them home, but under no assurance that their cottages, if they rebuild them, shall not be levelled to the earth again, by the same inhuman and merciless invader.

No ; “ a valiant nation does not fall from its rank by having, in its turn, experienced reverses.” But it justly falls from it, when those reverses are occasioned by incessant breaches of faith, by a prostitution of military honour to the purposes of confiscation and rapine, by a mockery of all religion, by a disdain of all equity, by a prohibition of all the best energies, which en-

noble and exalt our nature, and, by an assumption of right, to lower and demolish the *rank* both of the allied <sup>use/yes,</sup> and of the hostile. What France threatened against Russia and England, what she carried into execution against Austria, and Prussia, and Spain, not to mention some dozens of the smaller *powers*, ought now, both in justice and in prudence, to be carried into execution against France.

If we demand a just debt, contracted peaceably, shall we not demand one equally just, because it was extorted, and because it was exorbitant? If you catch a thief who has fallen down your staircase, and has broken his bones under your plate and jewels; if you find also in his pocket the fruit of former plunder, will you humbly request him to restore one pretty pair of ear-rings? will you console him with the idea that he has not *fallen from his rank*? will you beg permission to order a hackney-coach, that he may carry off the little matter he has taken from your children and domestics? Are you

not bound by every duty of a citizen and honest man, to seize him, to deliver him up to justice, *to distribute to each individual the property of each?* Such also is the duty, the sworn duty, of all these allied powers: the subjects of those who act otherwise are absolved from their allegiance. I know not who the persons are that assume to themselves the title of allied powers. Certain I am, that the Spanish Government breathes no such sentiments. I know personally and well some of the best and bravest of that nation: I know that even the worst and most cowardly of it, would never whine their adulation in these abject strains. Their fathers, sons, and brothers, have bled, both in the field of battle and in their houses; their sisters and daughters have been bowed to the abominations of the French. There is not a village in this country, the cradle of heroism and of glory, that has not suffered such miseries and pollutions as it would be impiety to pardon.

And who can believe that the Emperor of

Russia hath sanctioned, with his august name, this most pusillanimous and iniquitous manifesto? Equitable, humane, and enlightened; calm in the midst of danger, but alive to the sufferings of his people, he will demand a full indemnity for all their losses, a memorable, solemn, and piacular atonement for the most wanton and unprovoked aggression. Let the French carry on their heads the ashes of Smolensko and Moscow. Let him who ordered to execution the peaceable and loyal citizens of the Muscovite metropolis be conducted to the same scaffold. Robespierre, who, in comparison with this monster, was but as a kitten to a tiger, was carted and brought to justice. Let Bonaparte be, as he called himself, the God of Thunder to the Mamelukes and the Foxites; but let the sovereigns, whose dominions he hath laid waste, and whose subjects he hath slaughtered, punish his crimes, or assist in punishing them. Has he not boasted that they exist as sovereigns by his clemency and forbearance? Will he forgive any kind of humiliation? Will he forgive his de-

feats, his flight, the exposure of his perfidy, the  
 ridicule of his weakness, both in politics and in  
 tactics. Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, will en-  
 joy no future opportunity of stripping him bare  
 of power. Their armies will even again come in  
 contact amicably ; they may now break the  
 threads of all future combinations that are likely  
 to disturb their union. Holland, and the re-  
 maining Netherlands, that abhor *every* foreign  
 yoke, will join their confederation. 'Too surely  
 is Bonaparte now, at this instant, cementing his  
 old alliances : too surely will the gold and the  
 intrigues of France sow dissention in the family  
 of European States, and nothing can keep under  
 and consume the shoots of it but the ardour and  
 activity of offensive war. ' Shall every land have  
 endured its cruel scourge, except that, which,  
 with inhuman delight, hath nursed her children  
 in blood ? Except that in which the beggar and  
 the cripple talk of universal empire, and high-  
 way robbers think of retiring from the too great  
 exertion of their public life, as professors of  
 some college, or prefects of some department in



Germany. Some Vandamme, a compost of filth, and roguery, and impudence, may again call to his carriage Dukes and Emperors, and may chastise, with the whip, a refusal to obey. Can it be questioned? Were not even ladies menaced by *this gallant people*, as our silly declaration terms them, with such a punishment? A punishment so degrading, that neither those who receive nor those who inflict it can ever lift up their heads among the reputable.

Who, in the name of Heaven, could have composed this flimsy tissue of folly, cowardice, and falsehood? Who could have presumed to publish it first as a declaration of the allied powers? We have authentic declarations in which every sentiment is contradicted. What officious creature, half minister, half journalist, has broken the joints of logic to compose this precious amulet? Let him wear it for his pains.

*Limus ut hic durescit,*

He will only be looked at to be laughed at.

Other fabulists have given to birds the feelings and language of men: he has attributed to men the natural sentiments of birds—"Do not try to catch me; I know you cannot; but attempting it frightens me." Thus irresolute and timid does he represent the rulers of the world, before a vanquished and flying enemy! For what purpose then were issued those animating proclamations of the Russians? Men who unite like Athenians; fight like Romans; and feel like Englishmen. Have the Germans risen in arms for the parade? Is no vengeance to be taken for the cruelties they have suffered? Shall not even their contributions and confiscations be restored? No: on the contrary, the enemy is promised power enough (and who can question his inclination?) to extort them tenfold at his leisure. Bonaparte, it seems, is no longer an insatiable plunderer, a shameless liar, a scoffing Atheist, a merciless assassin. His faults are venial: at present they have cost humanity only one million of human lives: some say more: add then eighty or a hundred thousand. When

only half the number had been sacrificed to his rage and avarice, the nations rose against him : pusillanimous princes, reduced to the condition of recruiting sergeants, declared his cane intolerable, and broke the drum. In shaking off his yoke, the other half million has fallen. It is only within these few days that his perfidy is turned into passable good faith : it is only when he *can* be punished, that he must not. Surely it was unnecessary for his expiation, that so much blood should have been demanded from their subjects. What streams, and from what distant sources, have flowed for the cleansing of that scurvy leper ! If impunity were the extinction of wickedness, even then, so awful a diminution of the human race, such a loss of civilization, of social comfort, of mere competency, such a concourse of mourners, day after day, for years together, in every town and hamlet, such expressions of woe in all languages and all places, wherever man's voice hath been heard, would loudly demand the life of Bonaparte : but impunity is the certain and swift forerunner of fresh

calamity and aggravated revenge. At every tribunal, whether the appeal be to the gown or to the sword, every crime should receive its punishment. If you punish all, you will punish the fewer. Pardon one in twenty, and you will be under the necessity of punishing twice the number that you would if no offences were remitted.

Bently, a man hardly more remarkable as a profound scholar, than for the acuteness of his mind, to whatever he applied it, argues that men distinguished for assiduity, birth, and fortune, frequently enter on such a course of studies as befits them for the church, from considering the great prizes, of bishoprics and archbishoprics, in our ecclesiastical establishment. Although few can attain them, no man imagines them above his reach. In most temptations we overlook the chances against us, and calculate on those in our favour. Bonaparte is justified in renewing the war when he can, if he is permitted to declare it with impunity when he chuses.

The allied powers assure him that, whatever he does, he never shall be a loser : that the utmost they require from him is the territory he has *conquered* ; not the surrender of those means which have *enabled* him to conquer. They will *treat* with him about the recovery of what he hath stolen : they will perhaps go so far as to insist on blowing out the dark lantern : but they leave him his phosphoric match, his whole bunch of pick-lock keys, his iron crow, his pistol and his dagger : they release all his gang. It is easy to foresee what will be the consequence, to them and the community.

A loss of territory is not the greatest loss, even to the prince. The writer of the pretended *manifesto*, which I have taken the trouble to quote, argues, or talks rather, as if the sacrifice of the brave, the massacre of the inoffensive, the conflagration of farms and villages, and cities, and provinces, the misery of nations, the despair of mankind, were nothing in the estimation of these *allied powers*. Whoever wrote such a silly

and worthless paper, is unfit not only for the exercise of any political function, but for the discussion of the least important question, that ever occupied the reasoning faculties of man. Let him teach children their catechism, for he has patience enough who can bear what this creature bears, and, if he believes that Bonaparte will not profit by such simplicity, nobody can doubt his capacity for a creed. But let not his apathy be attributed to sovereigns: let them not, by the suggestion or representation of such weak wretches, be accused of utter indifference to the welfare of their subjects, nor be left exposed to the vengeance of the enemy they have pardoned, by the armies whose honour they have insulted, and by the nations whose safety they have betrayed. I detest and abhor an insurrection: but it would be sacred against men so unworthy of their trust.

The allied powers must disclaim this paper, or must cancel all their former manifestos. The English can never sanction it. We fight for security—put indemnity and glory out of sight,—

Our security will not allow us to give *the French empire an extent of territory which her kings never knew*. We have been fighting seven hundred years, with few and narrow intervals of peace. For what? To diminish this territory. It was the policy of all tempers and all times. The French were constantly held too powerful. Her kings possessed a kingdom too large and populous for the safety of England: yet sometimes the neighbouring states, and sometimes provinces almost independent, in the very heart of the kingdom, rendered their power infinitely less injurious than it would be, if reduced within the same limits as at the *accession* of Louis XIV. The population of France would even then be greater than that of Great Britain and Ireland, and more united in locality, in manners, and in religion. A turbulent and ferocious people will for many generations require much vigilance, will often thwart our policy, and not seldom divide our attention with our enemy.

I would not undervalue the abilities of Lord

Castlereagh and Lord Liverpool: I believe them to be great, and what is more, of the kind best suited to the present times. But I do not see any reason to think these ministers wiser than Sunderland, Somers, Godolphin, and Marlborough; the opinion of which illustrious men was, that, when we laboured under the pressure of debt, when America was ours, and could not act against us, when France was deprived of many strong places, when her power was less *than her king had known it*, she still was too powerful for the prosperity and peace of England.

If it be possible that, corruption at the foot and infatuation at the head of the confederated thrones, the princes of the continent should seriously think of leaving France more powerful than at the accession of Louis XIV, enjoying strength enough to make progressively those stupendous conquests, which have eternally menaced, and at last have almost overthrown them, the Allied Powers, as they are called, will pre-



sently be separated, scattered, and extinguished. The liberties of Europe, such as they are, will sink into the same abyss. But she will look down contemptuously on her base deserters, her unworthy lords, and beholding the servile condition to which they will have reduced themselves, she, like the heroic Scald, will laugh at her dissolution.

THE END.

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AN Usurper had for fourteen years employed two means of subjugating the world. He deceived it by his policy—he astonished it by the prowess of his arms. More fortunate than skilful, he drew from his successes that weight of opinion which gave credit to his falsehoods, and found in these same falsehoods the means of assuring his success.

From the day of the eighteenth of Brumaire, when France was reduced under submission to his



will, as Lombardy afterwards was at Marengo, and Prussia at Jena, Bonaparte, scattering terror before him, only plucked the laurels of victory because his adversaries were defeated before they came into the field. Emboldened by every new enterprise, his confidence increased in proportion with their timidity, and thus stifling the truth, he traversed Europe upholding his real with his imaginary strength.

This enchantment must naturally continue as long as the magician could drive before him nations habituated to found their resistance upon the chances of probability. But if he happened to meet with a nation whose habits were less estranged from nature, who approached nearer to that state in which man is more the creature of feeling and less of his calculations, the enchantment must necessarily be dissipated.

The two powerful auxiliaries to which Napoleon owed his successes in his former campaigns, falsehood and terror, failed him in his invasion of Russia. The people of Russia understood less than the more central nations of Europe, a tissue of falsehoods established upon customs, upon things,

upon names to which they were absolute strangers, and terror could make little impression upon simple-minded people who, inflamed with an ardent zeal for their religion, with love for their country, with attachment to their sovereign, had their hearts too full of these generous sentiments for any villainy to find a place in them.

The power of man is limited as soon as he begins to reason; it becomes undefinable from the moment that he resigns himself to all the faculties of his soul. The people on the shores of the Elbe and the Danube had calculated, those on the borders of the Tagus and the Moskwa felt; and two nations inspired by the most noble delirium that ever exalted the courage of a people could overstep the common boundaries of their power, as easily as our imaginations can pass the boundaries of that horizon to which our sight is confined.

Nations, for at present it is of nations we must speak, not merely of armies, since every war brings the existence of a whole people and the sovereignty of their kings into question,—the nations which since the beginning of this century

have been bowed to the yoke, have found in their annals examples, and, consequently, excuses. Before the peace of Westphalia, Germany had changed masters; she has since been often obliged to bend to all the chances of war. What happened to Prussia and to Saxony after the battle of Jena, had been experienced by these same countries in the Seven Years' War. Every government had yielded by turns to the storm; policy had by dint of patience redressed the wrongs of fortune; thus the sons might be involved in the measures which had seduced the fathers; but the Russian nation happily had not before it any of those recent examples with which memory arms weakness. Invaded five centuries ago by the Tartars, she preferred recalling the vigorous manner in which they had been driven back into Asia, and if she had not forgotten that two hundred years had scarcely elapsed since the Poles insulted her capital, she knew that this was only under favour of an interregnum and the civil dissensions to which it had given occasion.— Since no recollection then could familiarise the Russians with the idea of enduring a conqueror in

the midst of their country, falsehood was blunted against arms, the temper of which was preserved by the rust of time.

The Russians have furnished a great example ; for it is from being ignorant of the imaginary power of Napoleon, that they have crushed his real power. It is by this that his battalions have been dispersed, that his falsehoods have been repelled. For the first time his bulletins could not find reasoners to weigh the circumstances, to admit the possibility of them ; the road to success has been refound, the way to victory has been reopened. Prussia was the first who thought she could re-enter with confidence a career not unknown to her, and the insolent proclamations, the false reports, the enigmatical bulletins excited indignation even in those cold calculators whose indecisions had done more mischief to Europe than could have been effected by the most exaggerated principles.

The campaign of 1812 has a character which assigns it a place in history as a thing single in its kind. It only began, as it were, on the part of the Russians when it seemed to be terminated.

on that of the French. Twenty pretended victories and the conquest of several provinces were reduced to a military progress through a country ceded for a moment in consequence of a combined and regular plan ;—a plan the boldest, the most successful that ever was practised in the art of war. Napoleon could only be conquered by a plan still more gigantic than his own, by a mode of defence more monstrous, if I may use the expression, than his mode of attack. It was necessary to have recourse to incalculable means, and to resources so much the better concealed, as the country by which they were furnished could not foresee all the importance attached to them. A moment's calculation, and every calculation that could be made, would have been false under such circumstances, and all Russia would have been devastated ; every thing would have been lost if they had thought of preserving any thing ; a complete sacrifice has saved every thing ; the flames devoured some edifices, but the Nation and the Sovereign learnt to know themselves, and they are admired by all Europe. It is because that for fourteen years all other na-

tions had modelled their mode of defence after each other, that the same causes produced the same effects, and consequently the same reverses. In every campaign the oppressed had felt themselves discouraged in proportion as the confidence of the oppressor was augmented. Austria defended herself still worse under the walls of Ulm than at Marengo under the walls of Pavia. The campaign of 1805 evinced a diminution of means in the armies of the powers opposed to Napoleon, and the rout at Jena served to carry his glory, as well as the depression of his enemies, to the highest pinnacle.

But Pultusk was the first rock against which this ocean in fury broke. The French were beaten there, and the Russian troops had the immortal honour of being the first to contest fifteen years of glory. Reckoning from this day, Bonaparte has made war with the usual chances of successes and reverses. Successfully resisted at Prussian Eylau, beaten at Heilsberg, but conqueror at Friedland; fortunate at Ratisbon and at Eckmühl, but crushed under the ramparts of Vienna, and nearly beaten at Wagram, policy

has since served him better than his military talents. The perfidious negociator has borne away the palm from the experienced general ; the reverses in the war of Spain have effaced the victory at Tudela and the occupation of Madrid ; fortune has become an every-day being, and the former magic power is converted into a power wholly human. In vain, to uphold an enthusiasm of command, does he seek to blazon forth a ridiculous prosperity, facts speak, truth marches unveiled, she is protected by glory. The incendiaries of Moscow are returned to Mayence, the ashes of three hundred thousand victims consumed on piles attest the first loss, the bones of twenty nations confounded together attest the second ; history will only follow this track of blood, Europe traversed by a long line of devastation, as under the ferocious Attila, will speak louder than a single man ; the mask of glory once fallen, the hero will soon vanish.

Did the Russians chase the French from their territory ?—Was it the rigour of the climate that did all ?—Did Napoleon fight only against the elements ?—Did two hundred thousand brave

men remain idle spectators of so many disasters, and was it only the exterminating angel who destroyed in one night the army of Sennacherib, that marched before them?—History would perhaps have had some difficulty in answering these questions, if the Russians alone had conquered; jealousy might have disputed them the victories of Tarantino and Krasnoy, but this sentiment is no longer to be feared. The fire of patriotism, kindled upon the altars of victory, has purified all; Culm has recalled to Europe the devotion of the three hundred Spartans at Thermopylæ, and all doubts have disappeared from the moment when those nations, who had not yet conquered, rose in their turns to that degree of glory, when we become just towards those who share it.

Bonaparte was believed, and consequently admired, in his other campaigns; not that his falsehoods were combined with more art, but that more fortunate results gave them an appearance of truth. As these results had always been in his favour, as policy had always conquered in the last instance, of what importance was it to contest with him the truth of facts, which, if



they had not existed, were rendered at least probable? The Cabinets, or those who led them, found it perhaps for their interest to let him exaggerate his victories, since that served as an excuse for the treaties they afterwards made; they chose rather to pass for having been conquered in the field than in the closet, and the falsehood of the impostor vanished before the fortune of the conqueror.

Such was the cause of the credence given to the bulletins of former campaigns; the date of the places, the change of head-quarters, the occupation of the capitals, armistices concluded at the most favourable moment, extorted conventions, concessions wrung from them, all united to fascinate the eyes of the world in general;—time, and a success wholly unhopèd-for, could alone recall them to the truth. Bonaparte always misused his fortune, but it was necessary that he should experience disgraces before any one would dare own that to himself. At M. rengo, at Austerlitz, at Friedland, he had endangered his armies as he did at Moscow and at Dresden; he sacrificed his military knowledge to his diplomatic experience;

if success had drawn upon him the contempt of mankind, it is that contempt which has brought on his present reverses. ' The discomfiture of his enemies, having augmented the excess of his confidence, the certainty of compelling his adversaries to conclude a peace produced negligence in making war, and want of foresight in prolonging it. Successes and defeats, all must be with him in excess, and perhaps ten unfortunate campaigns were requisite to produce the most brilliant series of victories ever consecrated in the annals of history. It is in vain that some skilful military men always sought to establish certain facts, fortune stifled their voices; every thing that is at this moment covered with glory, was then ridiculous; all that now excites admiration, was then contemplated with scorn; time had not then turned his hour-glass to commence a new æra. Europe, humiliated for so many years, could no longer listen to reason, she could be convinced only by incontestable facts; it was necessary that Bonaparte himself should confess more shame than he had ever assumed glory, and that the taking of Moscow should terminate in the

twenty-ninth bulletin, which burst forth upon Europe, and began to open its eyes.

The whole campaign of 1812 is comprised in this political ledger stuck up at the gates of the temple of history. Napoleon in publishing it thought that he had compiled a chef-d'œuvre in exaggerating, as he supposed the picture; he did not know till afterwards that he had with a lamentable failure in dexterity fallen upon the truth. More prudent at his return to the army, he had perhaps regained his ascendancy and profited by the too great confidence of the Allies, if this war had had the same character as the others in which he was engaged. But the revolution was accomplished, and Europe was resolved to be independent. Whether he conquered or not at Lutzen and at Bautzen, he gained only the soil on which he fought, he did not astonish and confound a single being. The armies fought to save the people, and the people were at hand to support the armies; the shock of independence against tyranny must have been tremendous, its success could not be doubtful. Sovereigns, cabinets, generals, soldiers, inhabitants, all had but

one sentiment, one idea. A reunion of all the patriotic virtues fought against him who had neither virtue nor country; the athletæ came to close quarters, the strife was painful, the sacrifice was bloody, but guilt was at length constrained to yield. Napoleon and his shame are now fully exposed, the torrent of success, armistices, negociations, truces, do not come as formerly to smooth the soil covered with falsehoods; the romances of fortune are at an end, the pages of history are re-opened.

The French repass the Rhine, the dream of universal monarchy is at an end, Europe is revenged. But how far ought her vengeance to be carried?—what shall be the price of her victory?—what fruit shall she draw from so many calamities?—shall she demand of a nation exhausted with the loss of her own blood an account of all the blood she has occasioned to be shed?—Have the Greeks sworn the destruction of Ilium?—will sovereigns whose noble characters are attested by so many recollections make a whole nation expiate the crimes of a single individual?—No! it is much rather the

fanaticism of generosity than that of vengeance that it is wise to foresee and to fear.

But if France has nothing to fear from the ambition of the conquerors, the continent of Europe must not be placed in such a situation as that it may have cause hereafter to regret its disinterestedness. Her soil is ravaged, her wealth is exhausted, her fields are laid waste, her commerce is destroyed, her population is drained, and it is to her that the sovereigns owe satisfaction. Europe has endured twenty years of war in the hope of enjoying a long tranquillity, the generation which has passed through so many sorrows, demands repose as its recompense, and that which rises in the midst of so many ruins has occasion for a long calm to restore them.

Ah! for whom should the Allies shew themselves more than magnanimous upon the banks of the Rhine, and France more than a submissive slave?—For whom should three hundred thousand men lay down their arms on one side and ask for peace, and two hundred thousand conscripts on the other, the last resource of an

exhausted population, advance to purchase it?—Is it for a hero, a great man, the father of a happy people?—Is it for a prince surrounded with glory, or under the affecting safeguard due to honourable misfortunes?—What are the rights of Bonaparte to the clemency of Europe, to the gratitude of the French, to the compassion of all?—Led astray by ambition he might be culpable in the eyes of other powers, yet merit from the people he governs the most affecting sacrifices;—but what has he done for this people?—When he seized on the sovereign power, when he wrested it from the impotent hands in which it was then placed, what did he promise to France?—Repose!—What has he procured her?—all the scourges which can at the same time overwhelm a people, all the plagues which he seems to have brought from Egypt. In spite of anarchy France still preserved some powerful colonies, she still traded with some nations which were not wholly exasperated against her; her vessels escaped occasionally from her ports; war was carried on with something like equal chances, political mea-

asures with a well-weighed distrust, and a new generation was rising up unsuspecting that it was about to be sacrificed by him in whom it had placed its hopes. Bonaparte might have repaired every thing; he has destroyed every thing; a conqueror for himself, a dilapidator for the French, every step he has taken over Europe has dissipated the resources of the nation, has exhausted the means confided to his care. Not feeling himself great enough to reign, because this word in all its extent is only applicable to legitimate sovereigns, he has sought to transpose every thing, in order to display to others, and to convince himself of the plenitude of his power. France has been sacrificed to the ambition of possessing all Europe, and her armies, the source of the glory and fortune of an ungrateful commander, are now only become in his hands the sources of another kind of glory, of another kind of fortune.

To reconquer some kind of maritime influence sixty thousand men, eighty millions of livres, and Saint Domingo, were lost. To rival the commerce of England all the manufactures of

France have been ruined ; to crush the House of Bourbon in Italy, and to annihilate it in Spain six hundred thousand soldiers have been raised ; to support an inadmissible continental system fifteen years of glory are obscured ; to purchase accomplices, for an Usurper can have no subjects, the finances have been subjected to the most horrible depredations ; the gulph of the public debt has been re-opened to load them with riches, and the population has been cut off in order to have a more numerous population to dispose of.

What can have been the principle of combinations no less barbarous than wild ?—The disorder that reigns in the thoughts of a single man, the void in his heart, the absence of every enlightened sentiment. Dazzled by his false grandeur but never convinced, Bonaparte has scarcely ever been able to believe in his own elevation, because his conscience, more powerful than himself, has always told him that it was a monstrosity. He who has kept up the illusion to so many kings has never been able to keep it up to himself, he has never been able to persuade himself that his own power was fixed, and every



sovereign who is not so must necessarily abandon himself to tyranny. It was in order to reign over France that he devastated Europe ; it was to retard the return of so many sovereigns into themselves that he occupied them in repairing the losses of which he was the cause ; it was in short for want of fixing at something that he aimed at every thing, throwing himself into the vast field of chimeras, to distract his mind and veil over to himself frightful truths.

Bonaparte not daring to be King, that is to say to succeed to a title sacred to the French, raised himself to the dignity of Emperor. He overleaped as it were the former title, as we avoid an inaccessible rock, and it is because he could not in spite of treaties reckon upon a single ally that he planned that girdle of kingdoms which he bestowed upon his own family.

Such is the origin of the political system which has overturned Europe for five years before it could enlighten it. It is not from attachment to his family that he, whose heart is not open to any of those mild affections which soften the ferocity of man, placed his brothers upon thrones,

since for them he has no kindness or esteem. It was to prevent all repentance in people subjugated by treason, submissive through impotence, that he placed Joseph at Madrid, Murat at Naples, Louis in Holland, and Jerome in Westphalia. Reason, for he has known himself, he has judged himself better than he has been judged by half the cabinets of Europe, told him that subjections such as these could only be momentary, and it is fear of the moment of awakening which has made him spread terror and inflict death.

Bonaparte in following the ancient order of things, in negotiating with sovereign houses belonging to other centuries, in finding himself the last among the confederation of kings, felt himself annoyed by an inferiority which wounded his pride. He knew well that by dint of victories he might enter the lists with advantage against the ancestry of so many sovereigns; but he foresaw the immense distance with which he must one day be regarded if his victories should be converted into defeats. To prevent this danger it was necessary to throw down every

thing, to transplant every thing, to remain alone at an elevation which could not be contested, to establish a new dynasty in order to undermine all others, and it was this great work, more necessary to his preservation than may be imagined, that led him on to his fall.

But these political combinations of an Usurper have never produced any thing to France but an imaginary glory and positive losses. Her population has been destroyed for acquisitions which have never added any thing to her prosperity ; the fortune of her oppressor has alone been raised by all the sacrifices she has been induced to make. He has reigned over her neighbours, she has remained a slave to him, and it was not till the day of his shame that she was called upon to share in all the woes which he has brought upon her.

Such are the rights of Napoleon to a confidence which he has so cruelly abused. A false enthusiasm, ideas of national pride ill reflected upon, may still for some time support the idol, but the great ties of a people to a sovereign, their mutual interest, a common glory, long re-

collections, have never subsisted between this Usurper and France.

A contract existed between the republicans of France and Bonaparte; extorted by fear, surprised from indifference, obtained from disgust, it was signed on the eighteenth of Brumaire. France promised obedience, her chief promised her tranquillity and happiness. He hoped to have performed his promise, but ten years of war, of devastations, of misery, have dissolved every engagement, the partisans of the tyrant are free, his tyranny has released them from their oath.

How can he who for so many years has not taken a single step, has not conceived a single idea which was not injurious to the French have acquired any right to the generosity of sovereigns whom he has uniformly endeavoured to degrade, and under whose feet he has hollowed an abyss? Bonaparte has entered into the confederation of kings, his name has been inscribed upon this sacred list; but on what condition did he arrive at this excess of honour, and what engagements did he contract to maintain himself there?—

If war opened him the way to almost all the capitals, it was only peace which could assure him a title that a conqueror may assume, but which he never possesses till other sovereigns have granted it to him. If before the campaign of 1805 some states had been guilty of the error of acknowledging his title of Emperor without fighting, and had even been eager to bend to the yoke, yet the cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg had nobly entered the lists to dispute it. Austria, in yielding to fortune, only gave him the title at Presburgh, and Russia did not acknowledge it till two years after at the treaty of Tilsit. But in these concessions, to which the misfortunes of war attached the greater importance, the two greatest sovereigns of the continent of Europe thought they had purchased peace, and generously sacrificed their wounded dignity to the tranquillity of their people. Treaties were concluded between them and Napoleon ; the latter was recognised as Emperor, but he swore to maintain peace ; his pride was satisfied, but the sacrifice of his ambition was required, they granted on one side to obtain on the other,

and the successful soldier was treated as a brother, because they hoped that in shewing such unexampled condescension, an honour so unexpected, would appease the Usurper's thirst of blood.

The sovereigns engaged in this new system kept their promises but too religiously, but has he, as the price of so many sacrifices, adhered to any one of his? When the English government, led on by the national impulse, had the boldness, or perhaps the genius, to endeavour to prove to the nation that a peace with the man who domineered over France was nothing but a fine chimera, had this man, then first Consul of France, the decency to abstain from the invasion of Italy?—After the peace of Presburg did not his troops march directly to Naples, and did he lose a moment to blow up in Germany the flame of discord and war?—Did he adhere to the advantageous conditions which he himself dictated at the peace of Tilsit?—Prussia had there consented to enormous losses, he promised forbearance towards her; the alliance of the Emperor of Russia of which he was so ambitious was the

price of his condescension ; friendship for the first time perhaps, entered into political considerations ; the interests of Russia were in some measure immolated to the preservation of Prussia, and five years of methodical plunder were the only recompense of the most painful sacrifices. Since that, the humiliation of Denmark, the wisdom of the Swede, the submission of the Confederation of the Rhine, the tears of Italy, the resignation of Holland, the despair of Spain. — nothing has been able to stop him. He has promised peace to all; on all he has made war ; his proclamations have announced tranquillity ; his agents have spread terror. There is not a people of whose good faith he has not demanded sacrifices, not one whom he has not wronged ; there is not a sovereign whom he has not treated with indignity, not a state that he has not impoverished, not a cabinet that he has not deceived. The enemies of the day, the friends of yesterday, and those of ten years, have equally experienced his hatred ; hesitation has been a crime, devotion an artifice, submission an useless degradation. In this over-

throw of constitutions, of thrones, of kings, every thing has been overturned, raised again, destroyed with the same fury ; it was necessary to produce and reproduce disorder, chaos was the thing of which he stood in need in order to bring forth out of it that universal monarchy, the sole resource of a madman, which overstepping all bounds is no more consistent with the laws of society in its spirit, than with the rights of humanity by its feeling.

Not only are the treaties which the different cabinets of Europe have made with France annulled by the act of war, but the acknowledgment of the title of Emperor is annulled by the conduct of the man to whom it was granted. If it was wrested by victory alone, perhaps it would be more the act of passion than of justice, to say that it has been annihilated by defeats ; this manner of reasoning is too much that of Napoleon himself to set it up in opposition to him. But when an Adventurer sprung from so low an origin, is raised to such a height, Providence does not suffer such errors but at a price by which they may be retrieved. Bonaparte had



only to have made France happy to insure the people's remaining submissive to him; a great injustice would have been committed, a great right would have been infringed, but the tranquillity of thirty millions of men would have been superior to the rights of a single family. Acknowledged as the chief of a great people, he had only to have entered into the politics of Europe, modestly to have taken the place which the King of France occupied, to have encouraged political order instead of overturning it, to have maintained tranquillity, to have preserved instead of destroying, to have calmed the tempests; these things were all he had to do to have been looked to by Europe, so much was she disposed to hope every thing from him, as the bow which is seen after the storm, the pledge to man that the divine anger is appeased.

On these conditions, which could alone, if not absolve, at least excuse him, the kings might have admitted him for ever into that fraternity which constitutes them the fathers of one family; they would have ceased to blush at giving him a name of which he would have sought to

render himself worthy, and the title of sovereign instead of remaining a tribute would have become a recompense. But Napoleon never knew how to do any thing but terrify; his whole life does not offer a single moment in which his ferocity has known how to be at rest; he has broke every engagement with France, every engagement with the powers of Europe, every compact with humanity. Condescensions, recollections, treaties, are not made for one who knows neither respect nor pity. The Assassin of the Duke d'Enghien, the Conspirator of Bayonne, the Jailer of Ferdinand the Seventh, the Incendiary of Moscow, is not made to have a place on the bench of kings. Before his fall he was unworthy of it, but he trod under foot with his powerful armies the states he had devastated. Judgment was passed though the sentence could not yet be carried into execution; might overpowered conscience; but the day of justice is at length arrived, and it must have its course. The sentence of France is still suspended, though pronounced; that of Europe, to give, her an example, must first be executed.

Let peace succeed to such mighty successes, or let war increase, the cause of the French must always be separated from that of their Oppressor. Driven from the countries over which he had too soon assumed the sovereignty, for to protect is with him to subjugate, he has now delivered himself up to those whose eyes will be opened sooner or later. The punishment is begun, it remains for France, more injured herself than all the rest of Europe united, to complete it. It suffices for the sovereigns who have fought with so much glory to preserve at the same time prudence and dignity; to combine their indignation against one man, with the regards due to, we may almost say with the esteem felt for, a great people; and to guard against a magnanimity which would be as guilty towards him as it is just and necessary towards his victims.

But Europe is far from having reconquered all that she had lost: she is equally far from having renounced all that she had consented to lose by treaties. Holland, Genoa, Rome, other parts of Italy united, that is to say impudently extorted, only belonged to France by that universal silence

. which concealed a mystery that events are about rapidly to unveil. The will of so many millions of men overpowered, was converted into an apparent submission, and fifteen years of success stifled with their weight twenty nations enslaved who could no longer breathe. It is to regain these countries, sold by intriguing, or given up by selfish beings, that the present excess of glory must be first employed, that superfluity of prosperity which crowns at this moment the most extraordinary and most perfect whole that has ever arisen in the sphere of politics. Justice ought to be rendered before all other things; the conveniences of different states, the changes that time and events may have rendered even necessary will be weighed in other balances which must be just and pure as the hands by which they are poised. It is no question whether the war ought to be continued, or peace to be made; such phrases belong only to the spirit of party; the frank and noble conduct of the sovereigns answers for the continuance of a magnanimity which, in this happy moment has combined all the force of enthusiasm with the firmness

of moderation. Princes just among themselves will not be unjust towards those who are still in want of their powerful assistance. Politics are so rarely inclosed in a circle of wise and well-digested principles united with generous sentiments, that it is necessary to profit by a state of things without example, and enjoy the rewards of the fortune attached to them. Victory excites generosity, success engenders success, and combinations of every kind become more easy and more certain. When Russia, Austria, and Prussia, find their ancient branches restored; when other states rise again like the reed bent down by the storm, who shall have the right to designate such or such a people as condemned by policy to find the weight of their chains doubled? Wherever justice stops it ceases to be justice; it must be complete to preserve its noble character; when the people do not pause to make any calculations in defending the rights of sovereigns, sovereigns ought not to make any in saving the people.

Holland whom the anguish of an oppressive government, and shame at its vile administrators could alone induce to support a king; who only

endured the removal of this king because of his inutility, and only supported her slavery because it was shared with the rest of Europe,—Holland has just set a grand example. It is not the spontaneous movement of despair, it is the sentiment of the almighty national power which has produced an effect as admirable as the calm with which it has been accompanied. If she had doubted of the public opinion, hesitated as to her means, mistaken her strength, the resistance would have been terrible, for indecision would have raised up partisans to the French cause. But when a people has, by excess of indignation, arrived at excess of confidence, when it owes this confidence to that wish by which all Europe is inspired, to a coalition much more astonishing from its probity than from its power, all baseless scaffoldings of power must crumble before such means. Not only, let it be repeated, has Holland given a memorable example, but the wisdom, the dignity of her conduct, may lead to the most happy results. She has proved to Europe, she has indicated to France, the immense difference which it is important to establish between the mover of so

many crimes, and the instruments with which they have been executed. The resumption of the cherished colours, the cry of *Orange Boven* saved Holland, but the mildness exercised towards Le Brun by whom she was governed, and the troops by whom she was oppressed, will perhaps save to the Allied Princes years of war, to France many crimes, and to Europe a sad repentance.

Bonaparte has hitherto made his conquests with the pen, he has ratified them with the sword, and the congress at Prague is the first diplomatic war in which he has been beaten. Perfidy undertook every thing, force justified every thing, but the concentrated indignation of some millions of men, the silence of terror could not bind them; from the moment when Genoa, Piedmont, Tuscany, Rome, the rest of Italy shall raise their voices, they will be free. Amsterdam has shewn them the way, and it is not the generous policy which has just delivered the Germanic Empire, that will re-plunge into slavery people who are desirous of emerging from it.

In short, if it be permitted to deliver ourselves up to hopes founded on successes so unexpected,

the day will arrive when the Allies, after having rendered justice to the oppressed, may demand a strict account from their oppressors, and without recurring to the right which Europe has to chase from the social compact the man who has never acknowledged its laws, let it be permitted to examine both the dangers of war and the inconveniencies of peace.

It is certain that peace might be made with Napoleon ; for he has negociators to promise, agents to deceive, ministers to make fine-turned phrases, ambassadors to sign, and, above all, a character perfidious enough to engage his word and forfeit his faith. But who can now doubt that such a peace would be the most dangerous of truces ?—Would Europe, for this time without an excuse since she will not have yielded to the empire of necessity, find again in a century the moment she has now suffered to escape ? In acknowledging the bravery of the allied troops, and the skill of their Generals, what would reproduce a second time that enthusiasm, that ardour which has doubled the faculties of all ?—What could re-assemble, at one and the same



point, so many Sovereigns united by esteem, and become companions in arms?—What would reproduce that miraculous agreement of so many interests to which one common want, one universal hatred, have given so perfect an unity?—In order to raise again the spirit of the Russians, to exasperate again the Prussians, to exalt these nations even above their hereditary courage, must Moscow again be delivered up to the flames, must twenty provinces of Prussia become anew the prey to fifty thousand spoliators?—Excess of evils have produced incalculable effects, the remedy has arisen out of the evil, misfortunes have been useful, but like evils would never again produce like remedies. The national exaltation might be the same, but it would never resume the same paths; what is foreseen may be wise, but it is only that which was not foreseen that can be great. Peace would break the enchantment, the charm would be dissolved for the Allied Powers, as it has just been dispersed for the French. The people, suffered to return to repose, would resume their ordinary ideas, and every thing would slacken in Europe in proportion as

the thirst of vengeance would re-establish the means which so many victories have just annihilated.

If peace should be admissible, if these French, so proud of their conquests, should be forced to repass the *Furcæ Caudinæ*, like the Romans, who were not the less afterwards masters of the world, what tranquillity could reasonably be hoped for?—Napoleon was guilty of one fault which led to all the others, that of believing in the submission of humbled nations. It is not for the Allies, who have profited by this security, to imitate it. No peace will ever chain the most perfidious of men, and the more shameful it should be, the sooner would he be disengaged from it. To get rid of his enemies is at present the most complete victory he could obtain, and it can only be obtained by the pens of his negociators. To break that unity which overwhelms him; to estrange from each other those Sovereigns who now communicate freely together, who reciprocally exchange their thoughts, their wills; to make politics return into their usual labyrinth;—these are the ends

to which his wishes must be directed. What would momentary sacrifices cost him, as Berthier lately wrote to him, and as his Senate seemed to give him to understand; could he purchase too dearly the dissolution of an alliance which never could be revived?—Could he not promise every thing, in order to disperse such an assembled force?—Peace with Napoleon would be only the dissolution of the coalition without any equivalent; it would be the act of madness of a man, who, having disarmed an assassin, should, at parting, return him the dagger he had wrested from him.

There are precautions to be taken in making peace, of which the Allies cannot avail themselves in the same manner that he has done, who, under like circumstances, has set them so despotic an example. In signing it upon the banks of the Rhine, upon the exhausted soil of Germany, can they leave great armies to watch the movements of that Bonaparte, who, whatever denomination they may please to give him, whatever character he may have the air of assuming, will always be their enemy?—If it be not

the reconquered countries that are to feed such vast armies; can Russia for a long time support five hundred thousand men at five hundred leagues from her frontiers?—Can it be expected of Sweden, who has already made such great efforts in depriving herself of her Prince and of her Army?—And, if the most distant powers cannot sustain such expenses, how far would it be expedient for them to abandon such a trust to those more within reach of charging themselves with it?—Peace would plant a germ of uneasiness among the Cabinets who have shewn so much good faith towards each other during the war, and Bonaparte, in signing it, would already have gained his first victory.

The war has been hitherto carried on with the enthusiasm of the Crusades; this enthusiasm has supplied every thing; it has abridged the time, it has rendered all privations easy to be borne. Those sovereigns who were the most impoverished by the preceding wars, have been this time rich in the unbounded confidence placed in them by their generous subjects; but at the return of a like war, every one would feel

his woes, like the brave Crusaders at their return from Palestine. Great penury, the consequence of great sacrifices, would be severely felt; a part of the tributes which the universe pays to the industry of England, would no longer help to reanimate fainting Germany, and gold, so liberally spent in conquering and revenging, would itself become scarce and difficult to be obtained, when nothing would be thought of but preserving it.

Bonaparte, after the peace of Tilsit, left a part of his army to live at discretion in the Electorate of Brandenburg. At every complaint made by the Prussian government, he aggravated the evil, by increasing his demands; it was the Barbarian Brennus casting his heavy sword into the balance in which they were weighing the treasures of Rome. But notwithstanding the errors of the Princes who composed the Confederation of the Rhine, such resources could not be employed by their noble liberators. To entertain such a thought, they must be upon the soil of France, and to execute it, their bosoms must be strangers to compassion, like his who set them the cruel example.

To make peace without narrowly watching the Tyrant who had been compelled to make it, would be a want of foresight which cannot be supposed, and it is obvious how dear, and how difficult to be executed, would be the precautions necessary for insuring its duration. It is the unconquerable character of him who leads the French astray, that repels this humane idea; the first act of humanity is to preserve ourselves, and the first act of prudence is not to reproduce, by a few months of repose, an interminable war.

If the Allies, in the state into which the war and the consequences of the Continental system have plunged their finances, should find themselves no longer in a state to maintain a formidable attitude on the banks of the Rhine, it may be advanced without hesitation, that the English would no longer pay them subsidies to support a peace in which they would have no share. It is only, then, on a general peace that the ideas can be permitted to fix themselves, and since it has been proved by that of Amiens how extremely dangerous it is to give back his arms to a madman, it is very admissible to conclude, that as

long as France shall uphold the chief she has given herself, she will experience all the horrors of war.

It is very possible to make an alliance with an Usurper ; history has, alas ! familiarised us with these political monstrosities. But it is his character which must justify fortune, it is his reign when it has been one of general utility, which alone can varnish over the crime. Cromwell merits no favour from posterity, yet England and Europe, in owing their repose to him, suffered him quietly to enjoy the fruit of his misdeeds. If it was by guilt that he attained the sovereign power, he supported himself in it by talents formed to dazzle the mind. Napoleon, on the contrary, arrived at power by his talents, and has only supported himself in it by crimes.—Obliged by his personal situation to think of his power before he thought of his empire, it was impossible that his ambition should identify itself with the prosperity of the country that he governs. Founder of a dynasty he has only laboured to produce that disorder on which he might establish it. All that is not France, is the pedestal

on which he planned to raise his colossal power, but the base has fallen; the idol remains, but they have ceased to offer incense to it, and it will soon be overthrown by its admirers themselves. If the policy of such a sovereign rested upon the real strength of France, upon her trade, her population, her riches, her relations with her neighbours, she might be brought into the balance, and calculations might be made upon established truths; but it depends alone on the interest of him who created it, it swells with his pretensions, it is shaken by his reverses, and follows the unequal march of all his passions.— To treat with such a man, would be condemning ourselves to be tied down to views of which we are ignorant, to principles which do not exist; for France will have no system as long as she remains delivered up to the caprices of her Oppressor.

Any peace which does not bring with it such an equilibrium, as would dispense with the Allies observing precautions no less burdensome than the war itself, cannot be thought of. The sacrifice of a coalition without example, of an unani-



mity which has no model, of a re-union of sovereigns created by a sovereign who has in himself no personal ambition, would be such a sacrifice, that it could never be repaid except in such a general pacification as would put an entire end to a state of convulsion ; to point out the evil, is sufficient to indicate the remedy. France has only one step to take to obtain peace ; it is to recover her independence, and to make a good use of it ; Europe, as the price of twenty years of war, asks nothing of her but to insure her own happiness.

But supposing that the vapours of success should intoxicate the conquerors in their turn ; in going so far as to believe it possible that sovereigns who have been so wise in undertaking, so prudent in preserving, so generous in restoring, could feel a sentiment of vengeance, how far may it be allowable to suppose that victory would draw them on ?

For the same reason that the Russians attacked in their empire, and the Prussians treated with outrage at their own doors, shewed a force superior to every thing that could be expected even from

nations eminently brave ; is it not permitted to believe that the French driven within their own frontiers, would resume that energy of despair, so dangerous to be awakened among a great people ? Crushed by the loss of two armies of three hundred thousand men each, nothing but the invincible horror that every nation feels at the invasion of its country can excite all parties in France to unite in one rallying point. Love of the country has just saved Europe, the same sentiment may make her run the greatest dangers ; there are remedies which turn to poison, there are arms which recoil on ourselves if we do not know how to make a right use of them. A civil war in France which would have a lawful end, would be grievous undoubtedly, for justice never ought to present itself under the aspect of violence, but its short duration would diminish its horrors ; that on the contrary which would spring out of anarchy, which should not attach itself to any consoling idea, could not but be fatal. The Allies invited only by one party would have to fight all the others, without knowing exactly who were their friends and who their enemies. In-

volved quickly in national jealousies, they would learn sooner or later that a woman, a child, generals without glory, a deliberative body held in no respect, could no more succeed to a colossal reputation than replace a lawful right.

The emancipation of Germany, the admirable deliverance of Holland are obtained ; these great acts are nearly consummated. The completion of the independence of Spain, the liberation of the Low Countries, that of Italy, and the annihilation of that vast political preponderance which threw all the powers of the first rank into the second, ought to be at present the objects of the war. France must be separated from every thing that is not herself ; she must abandon those incorporations which have only increased her weight without adding to her valour. One step more would compromise the general tranquillity for years. The French nation, the eldest daughter of Europe, as her sovereign was the eldest son of the Church, can never be erased from the list of civilized nations ; her roots are struck too deep, her branches are spread too wide around, her language is too universal, her destruction

would shake a social order. For twenty years past she has been a torrent which threatened to destroy every thing ; but let her return into her bed, and her salutary waters may yet produce health and fecundity.

If the conquest of France presents great difficulties, those which are opposed to dividing her among other powers are yet more insurmountable. This the Allies know, and the French have nothing to fear. In vain does the Tyrant, in hopes of persuading them that the hatred borne to *him* is addressed to *them*, cry : *They menace you with slavery !* France must understand that nothing is menaced but to set her at liberty. • It is not a new yoke that is held out to her ; it is the offer of delivering her from that under which she is now bowed ; to reunite her to Europe, to separate her from her Oppressor ; these are the ends at which the plans of so many generous sovereigns are aimed. If the French knew what the Allied Princes suffer from a blindness which, having merited their vengeance, excites only their compassion, they would not hasten to march against them in crouds, with arms in their hands.

But they are deceived, they are led astray ; falsehoods, however, unsupported by any one single fact, cannot be long before they are unveiled.

When Bonaparte says that it is the gold of England which purchases all Europe over to its system, can these poor people, deprived of all industry, refuse to believe that it is excess of injustice which has brought back independence ? The misfortunes of the war may be concealed from them, but they do not find their children restored ; they hear of victories, but the husband, the son, the brother returns not ! Hope is in all the proclamations, Despair is in every heart. Some hired writers, some prefects paid for lying, some towns led on by intriguers, for enthusiasts exist no longer, come to the foot of the throne to offer up pompous phrases ; bachelors tender the sons of fathers of families, vagabonds the gold of persons of property, the rich the blood of the poor inhabitants of the country. They depart to serve the ambition of men in place, they talk to fill the official papers, they return to elude all that they had promised. But in the midst of this parade of patriotism, the creditor of the state

sees with dismay credit annihilated, and the peasant in the village cannot look on his last child without tears.

France is ignorant at this moment that the soil of Germany is covered with the bodies of three hundred thousand of her soldiers ; falsehood circulates rapidly over her provinces, but it is only with trembling steps and by oblique ways that truth ever penetrates into them. In spite of the emphatic language of the bulletins, and the obscurity of the intelligence they contain, victories always compel retreats. It will be recollected that after the battles of Austerlitz, of Wagram, and of Friedland, there was no demand made for three hundred thousand fresh conscripts ; and if these misfortunes are ascribed to the difficulty of making peace, it is in order to obtain it speedily that new sacrifices are wrested from them. There is no reason, then, to be alarmed at an apathy which arises from the most complete ignorance ; but France is about to be instructed, credulity is about to expire under the fury of tyranny ; the last crown is not yet spent, but the gulph of the deficit opens, and nothing

can fill it up again. Napoleon formerly, in calling for sacrifices, could remind them of his glory ; he has only at present to conceal his shame ; he could exact every thing from admiration, he has nothing to hope from contempt ; the epoch of extortions is arrived ; to support a remnant of illusion, which is dying away, no other resource remains to him but that of persuading France that the Allied Powers would interfere with the integrity of her ancient provinces. It is the part of those Powers to prove the contrary ; in occupying the territory which the fortune of their arms is about to deliver up to them, let them declare, with that frankness which has united all Germany, which has determined Holland, that it is in the name of the French to be delivered soon from an oppressive yoke, that they attack the French still in slavery. In leaving to a great nation the honour of returning from their own errors and disposing of themselves, the Allies, without laying this down as an absolute law, indicate enough, even by the conduct of the people whom they have already saved, what they believe necessary. The national pride, a sentiment which

must be respected, since it has just accomplished such great miracles, disarmed by so much magnanimity, will separate at length the cause of a single man from the happiness of all.

If the restraint which the greater Powers, in conformity with the principles they profess, think it right to put upon themselves, places an obstacle in the way of all ideas of conquest, and if France, which is not, like Germany, in the centre of Europe, not being in a situation to be entered by the Powers on her borders, ought consequently to be respected by those whose States do not touch upon her, it remains to examine how far the Princes of the Germanic Empire, roused from the terror that led them astray, ought to interest themselves in her existence. These little States can only serve as passages to arrive at France, and they will be, in the new order of things, what they were under Napoleon, mere military roads. It is their part then, still more than that of the great Powers, to abjure all idea of reprisals, to repel all thoughts of vengeance, and, above all, not to endeavour to blow up a spirit of discord; if it be noble, if it be useful in the strongest to



desire justice, it is indispensable in the weakest to excite it.

But admitting that a coalition so uniform in its march, so wise in its principles, so united in its military prowess, crowns the most brilliant of campaigns by the most noble policy, what is that regenerated France which it concerns Europe to recal into her bosom?—Is it France, such as she was at the epoch when the first convulsions broke down all equilibrium, or that which said at Rastadt, at Luneville, at Amiens, I require a fifth, in addition to my population, to indemnify me for the misfortunes of which I have been myself the cause?—If it be unworthy of a good cause to punish a nation which has been the sport of the ambitious leaders by whom she was governed, it is unjust to recompense the enterprises of those leaders. France has no right whatever to the countries she has invaded, for the generation that witnessed the invasion still exists, and protests against the violence it experienced. Time has not sanctioned such outrages, the wounds are not yet closed, they are still bleeding. Shall the prescription, which the laws grant to

individuals, be refused to nations? and do twenty years, at the utmost, present an æra sufficiently remote to legitimize an usurpation? — Let not the renunciations made by the Powers, and the indemnities received, be offered as a sanction; all was proposed by force, and accepted by necessity; the present war has annulled all treaties engendered by preceding wars; Europe can no longer bind herself but by a general peace established upon the rights of nations; victory has just overthrown all that victory had built up.

But can France, impoverished by so many misfortunes, exist without those provinces, of which the Allied Powers have a right to demand the restitution?—Yes, if it be France delivered from her oppressor and disposed to live at peace. Restored from that time to the European communion, inspiring confidence, recalling ancient ties of friendship, and strong in all the advantages which she derives from nature, in this tranquil state she will be permitted to recover in a few years what she will think she has lost. England who has no other animosity against her than what is essential to her own safety, will

find again with pleasure consumers for her articles of commerce, and a hope of rivalry will restore to her, her young marines emulous of future glory. France, exchanging her conquests for her colonies, her despotism for peaceable laws, her conscription for peace, her political preponderance for internal happiness, will learn by a fortunate experience that a country which can alone of all the countries in the universe produce a population of twenty-seven millions of men all speaking the same language, professing the same worship, having the same laws, and as it were the same character, has nothing to regret upon earth, and still less any thing to envy.

But France condemned to be happy can never suit one who to consolidate his own power must exhaust all her faculties. He must raise her to maintain himself, for stability only belongs to legitimacy of power. The present is every thing to such a man, his victories are his only rights, and as such rights are soon worn out they must be constantly renewed. Bonaparte can only reign in France as long as his system reigns on

the Continent. It is no longer by the peace of Amiens, by the peace of Luneville that he can replace himself, it is only by that of Tilsit or of Vienna; the prosperity of England makes this an imperious law to him, Bonaparte and English liberty can never exist together; this terrible axiom is the sentence of his annihilation. As long as a country exists in which Opinion shall watch over his conduct, where the Liberty of the Press shall denounce it not only to the rest of Europe but to his own people, the danger of peace will be to him incalculable. It is only by enveloping himself in mystery, by communicating with the French solely through the medium of emphatic harangues or the base adulation of his ministers, that he can keep them in their error, and it is the Patriotism of the English that he fears much more than their gold or their armies.

Let him then negotiate in order to gain time; let him give up to resume; let him yield and deceive; his moderation never can be any thing but a trick;—but if the Allies, dupes of this moderation, were to renounce saving Italy, sup-

porting Holland, and putting the finishing stroke  
 to the achievements of the immortal Wellington,  
 this would be to lose in one day the fruits of two  
 admirable campaigns.\* The great empire is  
 mouldering away, the work must be finished.  
 The great vassals, if it be permitted to employ  
 for a moment the language of their Oppressor,  
 have raised the standard of revolt. Napoleon  
 can no longer have any political connection with  
 Bavaria, with Wirtemberg, or any of the Princes  
 of the German Empire; no peace or guarantee  
 can ever shelter them from his vengeance, and  
 every treaty that shall place them under the safe-  
 guard of the distant powers, will leave them at  
 the mercy of this Tyrant, who, sooner or later,  
 will give a fatal lesson to Europe, *if they have  
 the weakness to spare him.* The Allies, in this  
 word must be included England and the powers  
 of the Continent, the Allies did not abandon the  
 cause of Spain on the banks of the Oder; they  
 finally decided her fate at the battle of Leipsic;  
 they will restore her a king on the banks of the  
 Rhine. The Pyrenees raise their proud heads  
 behind the great man who alone could level

them before him; Ferdinand the Seventh will reign over a people towards whom he can never be sufficiently prodigal of his love. The Spaniards behind the Ebro may place their dependence upon policy, but upon the Bidassoa they depend only upon themselves; this people have entered into the common cause, henceforward they may serve it and be served by it, with an equal reciprocity. The Emperor Alexander's invasion of Germany no doubt influenced the mighty progress of the conqueror of Salamanca, the bloody battles of Lützen and Bautzen facilitated the victory of Vittoria, the assault of St. Sebastian, and the taking of Pampeluna; but Wellington in his turn insured the unexpected successes at Culm, at Dennewitz, at Bischoffswerder and Leipsic. The echoes of the Pyrenees answered to the cries of joy which resounded through the plains of Saxony; the great Generals divined each other, and a fraternity of glory was established among these worthy rivals.

It is only on the terms of replacing the grandson of Philip the Fifth upon the throne of his ancestors, that we can suppose a peace signed on

the banks of the Rhine. But what agreement can ever subsist between Spain and France, while the latter remains in the hands of her Oppressor? If the Spaniards could forget the exactions of the French armies and the French the vengeance of the guerillas, with what face could the tyrant of Bayonne ever see again that of the Prince on whom he imposed the cruel alternative of abdication or death?—What alliance ever could be made between the sacrificer and his victim?—or what ambassador, other than the infamous one already charged with like messages, could charge himself with carrying to Madrid pledges of a like faith?—Not only is every compact at an end between Bonaparte and the Princes who have borne his chains, but every means is annihilated of keeping down hatred and contempt; the oppressed will long retain a remembrance of their wrongs, the Tyrant of his crimes, and his conscience will never suffer him to believe in any reconciliation.

But if it be permitted to see all the faults which it might be possible to commit, it is no longer possible to fear them. In recurring to

old errors, new actions must not be forgotten, the ancient jealousies of their cabinets must be opposed to the concord reigning personally among the sovereigns, and references must not be ungratefully made to other epochs, when it is so sweet for the honour of human nature to dwell upon the present.

The idea of a peace which should restore to Napoleon all he has lost, that is to say the power of still menacing Spain, of attacking Holland, of preserving Genoa, of lordling it over Switzerland, of occupying all Italy, being then wholly inadmissible, it is time to combat the only chimera to which the unreflecting partisans of every thing that bears the name of peace seem still to adhere. The utmost caution ought to be exercised against imitating Germany in her blindness, and abandoning to France what so many people have had the folly to call *her natural limits*. Besides the evil of giving back to the Usurper what he no longer has, an army ; besides the danger of engaging by signing a peace to send him back three hundred thousand prisoners, who would be at this moment the only soldiers on



whom he could place any dependence, would it not be an act of the highest imprudence to replace such a man at the point whence he set out? Shall Mayence, the bulwark of the Germanic Empire, be left in the hands of him, who, as long as he lives, will never consider the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine but as ungrateful wretches and rebels. And what are these pretended boundaries placed by nature to the ambition of nations?—the course of a great river, of some smaller rivers. Such ideas never enter into political calculations but when fear and not justice reign in the cabinets. The French have, for many years cried loudly to establish this system; but if the interest of the conqueror has borne away every other consideration, have not these *pretended natural limits* been overleaped?—the Rhine was then no longer found to be the true barrier, the Elbe soon became the river that the blindest ambition chose as the boundary to separate free from enslaved Europe.

To feel the danger of any peace, be it what it may with an Usurper who never could make any but a perfidious use of it, we should only recur

to the misfortunes, the successes, the events of every kind, the variety of sentiments, the extraordinary combination that assembled upon the same soil the Emperors of Russia and Austria, the King of Prussia, the Prince Royal of Sweden, and ask, if ever a hope could reasonably be entertained of a like reunion being a second time brought together ?

The Allies, arrived at a point of exaltation, which alone could produce such happy combinations, can never more risk losing, even for an appearance of good, an advantage so incalculable. It is not the extent of country which these sovereigns have reconquered, that forms at present the most brilliant part of their career ; it is the generosity, the unanimity, the justice which produced so much success ; it is these things that give them their highest title to the admiration of Europe, to the blessings of posterity. The grandest part of their conquests is that obtained over every sentiment of jealousy, over all superannuated pretensions, and this it is no longer in the power of Bonaparte to snatch from them. To tarnish their glory is his only hope ; let this

glory remain spotless, and the distance, already immense, between these great sovereigns and him, precludes for ever any of those connections which henceforward would be a scandal to the page of history.

A peace which shall reduce France within her ancient frontiers is then the only error towards which it is permitted to glance as among the number of possible ones. But such a peace it is not dangerous to combat, as it can never suit the Tyrant, he is not powerful enough to accept it. To return within the first limits of France, such as she was before an order of things, which forced her to overstep them, it would be necessary for him to have a claim to greater confidence from the world at large; he must not have offended all the sovereigns of the universe, and must be able to reckon upon the Allies that a new balance of power would attach to his policy. To govern in peace he must have finances proportionate to his projects, with fewer accomplices to purchase, and a less complicated administration to support. He must, by the uniformity of his means, the fixed nature of his

plans, the wisdom of his counsels, the moderation of his views, revive agriculture, give a new life to commerce, renounce pillage, humble himself so far as to owe nothing but to the fecundity of the soil, to the industry of the inhabitants. But in order to enter into such engagements with Europe, with his people, with himself, he must also have the virtues requisite to govern, and not be at once the worst administrator, the most unskilful financier, that ever was at the head of a great empire.

If Bonaparte, deceiving all the calculations which, from the present aspect of things, can be made upon his character, should consent to return within the boundaries of political order, he would soon learn at his own expense, that disorder is the only element of an Usurper. Uneasy as to the future, alarmed for the present, ashamed of the past, he would tremble with reason for what is called so absurdly *his* dynasty. Precipitated from the summit of his glory into a labyrinth of embarrassments, and of deficits in every way, he would recal the idea of Satan in the abyss, still revolving in his mind the pro-

ject of scaling Heaven. France, crushed under the ideas of such a man, would soon see herself punished by tyranny for her weakness; uneasiness would engender disobedience, terror would reproduce despair; this country spared by the Allies from humanity, would have no resource to avert destruction but the horrors of a civil war.

In desiring to save France, she would only be condemned to great misfortunes; the same thing would happen that almost always attends the false philanthropy of our days; the evil would be found in mistaken ideas of good. It would also be condemning the other powers to long years of disquietude, and incalculable expenses. The treaty of Luneville, so advantageous to those who adhered to it, is no longer the point to which it is allowable to return; a second peace of Westphalia can alone be looked to, and Russia has merited to take, in arranging it, the place of that France which was then respected by all Europe, because she was governed by lawful sovereigns, who had no other ambition but to secure her happiness.

If after twenty years of reverses it be per-

mitted to contract a habit of fear, to this weakness perhaps is to be ascribed, the uneasiness of those who see in the Emperor of Austria a supporter of the tyrant of the Germanic empire, and in the Crown Prince of Sweden the rival of an Usurper. Of all the proofs of respect, of admiration it may be added, which can be offered to these two princes, the boldness of investigating such a question being perhaps the least, equivocal, it shall be that which we hasten to give them.

The war of 1809 in Austria, having delivered up the capital to the enemy, and the armistice of Znaim leaving little hope, violence dictated the laws, and devotedness received them. Francis the Second considered himself more the father of his people than of his children; immolating the man to the sovereign, by the greatest of all sacrifices, he purchased, not peace, for that was made, but the hope of a tranquillity which he has never obtained. More generous than the chief of the Greeks, it was for the repose of his people, not for the sack of a town that he gave up his daughter. He did not pretend to descend

to a level with his son-in-law, he thought himself sufficiently great to raise him to his own level; and it was in the hope of appeasing his ambition by the honour which he condescended to do him, that this Prince sacrificed himself. A policy established upon sentiments so generous, cannot become the protector of such ills as some affect to fear; the attachment of the father will not betray the duties of the sovereign, since the attachment of the sovereign superseded the duties of the father. The most natural of all kinds of affection may influence the measures of individuals; a head so dear will be placed under the safeguard of the French nation; but Europe will not be deceived in her hopes.

Bonaparte has betrayed the confidence of the Emperor of Austria; he has neither acknowledged the ties of blood, nor respected those of gratitude. He has put no curb to his ambition, he has adhered to none of the engagements he contracted; the ties of policy are broken, those that subsist are merely personal, they cannot influence combinations too vast and too important

not to supersede all individual feelings. In case of those events to which the chances of war or internal dissensions may lead, it is difficult to conceive that it would be for the interest of the cabinet of Vienna to see an Archduchess sanction by her signature the will of a wretched faction. It is to save this noble victim, and not to support her, that the power of the sovereign, the dignity of the august chief, and the tenderness of the father would be exerted.

More important by the force of opinion than by military power, of less preponderance from the number of his troops than from his military reputation, the Prince Royal of Sweden by his noble and consistent conduct does not deserve to be suspected of an ambition which would do no honour to his prudence, and which never can be sanctioned by reason. Let the admiration with which he has inspired those who have been nearly connected with him; let that exalted nature which surprizes all the hearts that he has conquered, have put the idea of his entertaining such an ambition into the heads of some persons, it is an error too excusable under certain points of view



to render it necessary here to combat it But it is bringing his honour into question, to conceive that a man who lived for eighteen years upon the theatre of factions, and traversed them all with glory, who escaped by the most honourable part, should abandon the illustrious blood with which he is now identified, to plunge again into a gulph; —this cannot for a moment be supposed. The heir of a crown, the adopted son of a king, will never descend to act the part of an Usurper; he will never attempt to raise himself by a fall; he has sacred engagements to fulfil, and he will be faithful to them. He owes himself to Sweden by whom he is justly beloved, to the armies who obey and admire him, to the sovereigns who have honoured him with a fraternal friendship, and a confidence the value of which he is so capable of feeling.

But in admitting the possibility of an event which would spare France great misfortunes and Europe long years of disquietude, can any one think of stopping short, without attaining the end for which so many efforts have been made, so many advantages gained? It is an error to believe in that fatal

liberty which renders empires entirely independent the one of the other. The national will of a country has a claim to be respected in a very eminent degree, to be considered with the utmost deference, but it must be subordinate to a general principle, to the common interests of human nature. Europe is, in fact, one great christian republic, for Constantinople is only a single city in this vast circle. The trade, the manners, the customs, form too many points of contact between the different states, and the political diseases are too contagious not to require that one supreme police should watch over the general security. The government that France may adopt if she escapes from a military despotism, cannot be indifferent to the sovereigns and the people that surround her. Experience in this respect repels theory, and humanity retains her rights against the Philosophy of the day. Let the inhabitants of a country ameliorate their laws, let them consolidate their rights, let them strengthen or balance the authorities by which they are governed, let them correct instead of destroying, support instead of overturning; the wisdom of such mea-

sures, the tranquillity with which they are pursued can never be alarming to the neighbouring people. But that in the midst of Europe the nation which, of all others, has the most communication with her neighbours, should adopt, not through her own caprice, but the caprice of a few factious spirits, such a constitution as they please to give themselves, this is what, warned by experience, the sovereigns around cannot reasonably admit or support. Was it France that on the eighteenth of Brumaire gave herself to Bonaparte, or was it only the wrecks of certain factions?—Was it France that offered him the Consulate for life, that afterwards gave him the crown, or was it a senate chosen by himself?—An appeal in such cases is always, in theory, made to the people, but how far are they in fact consulted?—It is in virtue of this free choice, which is a mere chimera, that France in two and twenty years has made every discovery possible in the way of error. A monarchy without a king in 1791, she declared war against all the powers by which she was surrounded; fallen into anarchy in 1792, she menaced all the sovereigns; a democratic republic-

she passed over her frontiers and deluged Europe with a million of soldiers. Returned to a more consolidated government, in 1799 she spread disorder in all the cabinets and confusion in all political relations; at length, under a military despotism, she has compelled Europe from the fear of annihilation to know the plénitude of her power.

It is time, since victory restores justice to her empire, that she avail herself of the happy change to promote the happiness of all. France, in changing her laws and her masters, has only changed forms to disturb, means to annoy; a new essay can only lead to new dangers, it is an approved government that is required of her, and it is by the port whence she issued out to deliver herself over to so many storms, that she is counselled to return.

A local circumstance has saved the world. A chance which must now be regarded in the light, as it were, of a foresight of nature, has interposed in support of that political watchfulness which has been too much neglected by those whose office it was to guard the public

tranquillity. Had England not been an island, had the ocean ceased to surround her, Europe had been lost ; at first in the overthrow of ideas, afterwards in the overthrow of empires ; nothing could have escaped force, if weakness had not found a place of refuge. The states bordering on France, delivered over by the principles of philosophy to the verge of despotism, were ruined before they were subjected. The world was abandoned to the power of the sword if commerce had not found an asylum ; wealth, sheltered in an island, could brave military despotism, and gold and iron could dispute Europe with it because they could separate themselves from it.

In thus forming two distinct empires wise principles, ancient ideas, have been enabled to escape from violence ; the reign of injustice could only be short, but by it all might have been destroyed, if an element, more powerful than man, had not preserved all. Undoubtedly the energy of the Russian nation, the bravery of its armies, the rigour of its climate, the immensity of its territory, have been in-

vincible obstacles ; but if gold had not for ten years retarded the march of military despotism, what progress would it not have made before any thing else was in a state to check it ? If commerce has not for ten years been able to save the Continent from being rapidly impoverished, it has at least sustained it, and kept up there a necessary circulation. Gold, in serving several unfortunate coalitions, has prevented the military spirit being wholly annihilated, and the faults of the first wars have afforded useful lessons for future ones. Napoleon made some brilliant campaigns but he was intoxicated by success. Could he have suppressed the aids furnished by commerce, the subsidies of the only country which had escaped the general misfortune, with one single bound this Tamerlane of the nineteenth century might have leaped over every thing. But he has been obliged to fight step by step, as long as he found industry coming in to the support of devotedness and valour ; gold has been the means of gaining time, and to gain time was to save the world. The triumph of false ideas could not be of a

longer duration than that of violence, and violence is no more the proper state of society, than storms are the proper state of nature. In retarding from fall to fall the destruction of the Continent, the power of the Destroyer silently undermined itself. France was depopulated, a system of dilapidation was introduced, upon the principle that a government which lives by rapine can neither be a financier or an administrator. Every thing was impoverished in the midst of abundance, every thing was destroyed in the midst of an apparent prosperity, and Napoleon, blinded much more than his enemies themselves, did not shew the extent of his power till it contained within itself all the principles of its decrease. The Russian people have always been brave, devoted, and faithful, but is it very just to conclude from hence that if Europe had been sooner impoverished it would have had the same advantages? The Continent has then been saved because the means of fighting have not been wholly ravished from her, and because an island, separated from the contagion, has preserved that political health which she owes .

to the double happiness of belonging to Europe by her habits and customs, and being separated from it by the seas.

England has undoubtedly other claims to universal gratitude. It is not to the Ocean that she owes a constitution which unites much more than that of any other country the interests of individuals with those of the state, the fortunes of individuals with the public fortune. It is not the ocean which has given her patriotism with those simple and just ideas she entertains upon the laws of society, and upon public virtue, nor did it give her wise statesmen who know how to make a proper use of them. But it is her admirable situation which has saved her from the inundations of the French armies, and from the disorders which might have resulted from them. Not having to defend herself, she has been enabled to attack; not receiving laws, but giving law upon the sea, she has prepared assistance for her future Allies; for she knew that sooner or later the oppressed would be her friends. It is behind inattackable barriers that she has formed that military power



of which she scarcely dared herself conceive the idea.

But, in admiring men, who are only instruments, it is to principles that we must always finally recur. Providence who punishes, but never wholly abandons, in delivering Europe over to a conqueror, reserved to itself three great means of rescuing it again from his grasp. An Island, rich and powerful, in which to store up the treasures of industry; a Peninsula, which it was impossible to swallow up; and a great people worthy of the name of *Skłavi*,\* from whom they descend, to re-gorge, like them, upon Europe, the barbarous hordes which crushed it with their weight.

Napoleon, deceived by the facility with which he was accustomed to bear down all before him, never conceived that Nature could resist his will. The Pyrenees, the Ocean, the immensity of the Russian empire, could not intimidate him: wherever he saw men, he concluded that he could

\* The word *Skłavi* in Russia signifies glory.

conquer them; and the uniformity of his means led him not to entertain a doubt of the uniformity of his success. It was only the excess of his own presumption that could spread out a snare for him.

Tchingis Khan traversed Asia, the flat surface of which can neither arrest the course of hurricanes, or stop the progress of devastators; and if Europe has escaped experiencing a like fate, it is because Providence confided its preservation to an Empire more vast than its whole territory, to an Island richer than itself, and to a Peninsula more inflamed with the fanaticism of independence than all its other states.

Napoleon has only reigned to furnish a salutary lesson. Sovereigns, henceforwards, will keep a watchful eye over Philosophers, and the interests of human nature will be the power supreme to which nations themselves will be subordinate. Attila, *the first scourge of God*, was, if we may so say, the creator of the French monarchy. He forced the Romans to call in the Franks, the Gauls to unite themselves with the Romans, the west of Europe to become civilized,

in order to repel these new barbarians. The battle of Chalons was the last shock of the wandering nations; the battle of Leipsick will be the last effort of the universal dominator; and the restoration of France, will be owing to nearly the same causes as the principle of her monarchy. This monarchy was the first that was formed, other nations rallied round the example she had set, and civilized Europe will never forget her cradle. Respecting her territory, the nations around will engage her by their magnanimity to choose the only government, which can prove that she is desirous of peace. But, in order to obtain this peace, the sole obstacle to it must be removed, Napoleon must reign no longer. He ought no longer to sully the throne, nor ought his name any longer to sully these pages; it is time that his power should vanish, and that Europe, after twenty-three years of storms, should be shewn the bottom on which all her sovereigns ought to cast anchor, if they wish to return into port.

If the Allies had armed upon those political principles which have so often disunited them;

if this memorable war had the character of all those by which it has been preceded; if the jealousies of the different cabinets had not, by an union deserving of the utmost admiration, been converted into a disinterested zeal for the public good; if the unanimity that reigns in their operations did not prove the integrity with which they are animated; if victory, in short, had not been their just recompense, a respectful silence might still be observed. But the moment is arrived for finishing the social edifice, for laying the last stone—the key-stone of the vault, which in politics, as in architecture, insures the solidity of the whole, is not yet placed, but the magnanimity of the allied Sovereigns cannot admit of holding back any longer; where every thing is praise-worthy, to keep silence is a sort of aspersion. The present moment being above all eulogium, we ought to resign ourselves with confidence to the future, and expect from Princes who have shewn themselves so generous, that conduct alone which would be the most just towards the people, the wisest for themselves, and the most useful for all.

It is not from hesitating to acknowledge a sacred right that the question is agitated, how far it is of importance to the French that their lawful Sovereign should be restored; it is not from calling in question whether Louis the Eighteenth be really their King; on these points no doubts are raised. Seeking to prove that it is essential, for the tranquillity of Europe and the happiness of France, that this Prince should reign over her, is not combating a chimera, it is throwing down the last obstacle which can be opposed to the restoration of peace.

Why fear to attack, in direct terms, that malevolence by which the House of Bourbon is pursued? why veil in mystery the attachment that the French Royalists bear to their King?—If it were only for him, if it were only for themselves, that they wished to see him reign, then it might be said, Let them keep silence; it is the only reproach that ought to be made to misfortunes. But if it be to appease that thirst for repose by which the whole world is devoured, let them speak out. The greatest service that can be

rendered to Royalty is, to argue this question before the torch of Truth.

If the French Revolution has destroyed prejudices, customs, even abuses, which it would have been more prudent to correct by degrees, who shall dare to confound such reforms with that sacred tie which attaches a whole nation to a sovereign house that for eight centuries had watched over her prosperity? The cause of legitimate Royalty, pleaded twenty-three years ago before the tribunal of public opinion, is gained at length, through the medium even of the crimes committed by him who sought to destroy it. The inconveniences of a military despotism have pronounced the eulogium of a monarchical government; Napoleon is the most eloquent orator that ever spoke in favour of Kings, and the depopulated soil of France says more against his tyrannical government than could be urged by all the demagogues of the universe against Royalty. The only reasoning that can convince a people who have thrown aside first principles, is necessity, and in the name of necessity alone is it now permitted to speak; it is only from her that safety is

now to be expected, it is she who will bring back France to monarchy. But what must be done that in this monarchy, a wide and prudent government may be found?—Every thing must be sacrificed to that which will put an end to the greater portion of hatreds, every thing adopted which will unite together the greatest number of hearts, which will stifle past remembrances, and destroy all other pretensions to power only by giving it back with confidence to him who, not owing it to the choice of any one, will preserve the same good-will towards all.

It is not from idolatry towards the posterity of some fortunate chiefs, that almost all nations have concurred in adopting the law of primogeniture; this law, which reason wrested imperiously from ambition, is the wisest of all laws only because it is the most useful. A country is lost whenever any doubt exists as to who ought to reign over it; from that moment who will have forbearance enough not, in his turn, to aspire to this honour, and who will remain in a secondary situation, when a Crime has the air of promising him the first?

If hereditary succession be attended with some inconveniencies, they are only such as arise from nature ; they obey her laws, they are those that families experience, they do not depend on men, and are therefore the less dangerous. Yes, a man must be born to reign, in order not to feel either pride or enjoyment in commanding ; a man must be born to be a subject, in order not to feel impatience or humiliation in obeying. The country where every one has his appointed place is the only one which can hope to live in peace ; that where every one has his place to seek is condemned to all the horrors of anarchy. It is, in order to quit this anti-social state that France ought to think of the moment when she shall feel herself free ; and how arrive at it, if the most eminent place is not that to be occupied the first ?

The lawful monarch, who can consent to mount a throne from which a Tyrant has just descended, in making such a sacrifice can only be led on by the hope of bringing peace to an unfortunate people. Who can oppose such titles, such rights, such interests, against overgrown power.



against so many passions, so many opinions of every kind, as a legitimate prince? Could an adherent of any faction, could a foreigner, could another Bourbon, contend, with any prospect of success, against an Adventurer more renowned than all of them together? Men may be able to seize the authority, but to preserve it requires either a gigantic reputation or a legitimate right. In order to persuade a nation which after having changed masters twenty times, has fallen at last under the most intolerable tyranny, that it ought to give itself up to the government of a King; this King, besides his clemency and his virtues, must be the man in the whole universe in whom the most complete right to command will be recognized; he must be one with whom nobody can contest this right.

And who but the heir of thirty-five kings, the lineal descendant of Saint Louis, of Henry the Fourth, combines in his person such a train of recollections, as can rescue France from a yoke which her Oppressor renders every day more and more odious? Who will dare, after so many scourges, present himself as one scourge more?

Perhaps the love of power, the thirst of reigning which intoxicated Robespierre and which have turned the mind of his successor, may still lurk in the hearts of some factious partisans, who, when they think of the end, cannot any longer measure the distance; but they that can pretend to interpose between an Usurper, who ravages Europe, and the legal heir of an august house, are little to be feared. • Why place, or maintain upon the throne weak and feeble beings? — Why protect tottering powers? — Nothing but a glory without reproach, a birth *uncontested*, can, with any face, pretend to the honour of governing France. The glory is vanished, the rights remain; let Bonaparte fall, and Louis the Eighteenth can no longer have a rival. France may return into the bosom of anarchy, may belong to all the world, to end at last in belonging to nobody, but no other can reign over her, save he who has a right to reign. Europe ought not to suffer any new experiments to be made in a country, whose experiments have already cost her so dear. If it be humane to desire tranquillity, it is necessary to exact it. Is it for the

good of the man alone, or for the interests of all, that Sovereigns and Laws exist?—Is it for Louis the Eighteenth that it is necessary the people of France should have a King, or is it for this people that it is necessary Louis the Eighteenth should reign over them?

If the happiness of the French were to be immolated to the fortune of one man alone, then might it, indeed, be said, let the royalists be silent, away with a purpose so culpable!—But if, on the contrary, it is the tranquillity of one that is to be sacrificed to the happiness of all, let them speak, and not wait till millions of men cry to them from the bottom of the tomb, “spare the generation that remains! save that which is to be born! do not imitate those who have sacrificed us!”

The prevailing religion of France requires a lawful King, and not an Usurper obliged to persecute it. It is too much connected with the ancient monarchy, not to have been obnoxious to him. It was to make it subservient to his projects, that he admitted it, as if a religion which can be rendered subservient, did not lose its

rights to the respect of mankind. The Imperial catechism, which makes the worship of the sovereign the primary object, and that of God only an accessory,—this catechism, as well as the Concordat, have endeavoured in vain to give a turn to men's consciences; they cry louder than the Oppressor, and the long martyrdom that the head of the Church has experienced with a piety so affecting, has expiated all his weaknesses.

France, like all civilised States, being composed of husbandmen attached to the soil, of proprietors of the public funds, of persons receiving salaries from government, of people living on their industry, of vagabonds, lastly, living by rapine; the conscription, the forced loans, the diminution of indirect taxes, the annihilation of commerce, and the war in the interior cannot have attached any body to the fortunes of the Tyrant. In vain has he placed between these classes and himself a triple barrier of courtiers, of men in place, of warriors, among whom he has distributed his plunder, the majorities which constituted their riches have disappeared. Italy furnished the duchies, Poland the

counties the important fiefs, Westphalia and Germany the pensions to the Legion of Honour, Accomplices without remorse, warriors without modesty, favourites without merit, all pounced equally upon the prey which the Vulture had let fall from his bloody claws, and these countries, like the stag who, exhausted, has nothing left but his tears to oppose to the hunters, saw their wealth dilapidated by the hungry pack that devoured them.

But in losing their conquests these disappointed courtiers, these vanquished warriors, these unskilful administrators have lost the fruits of their devotion, and nothing remains to this nobility but the meanness and the crimes which have supplied to them the place of ancestors. Deprived of their rewards, but expected to make the same sacrifices, it is far from unreasonable to doubt the attachment of four or five thousand persons, who have only sold their consciences to receive the stipulated price. Impoverished, in fact, reduced to honours which will become ridiculous, to a contested distinction, to a glory changed into shame, it may well be supposed that the colossus will shrink away in their eyes.

and that this same barrier raised between the Tyrant and his disenchanted people, will soon be overthrown with ease. Disorder may hitherto have been convenient to many ; Europe was the prize of the conqueror, France was not the prey of the vanquished ; but an order of things which carries away from the lands the lands by which they were cultivated, which deprives the manufacturers of all hope of a market for their goods, the man of no situation of all hope of plunder, cannot long subsist. The receipts of the exterior supported the finances, the war, the armies, and licences were of some assistance to commerce ; these resources are exhausted ; the abyss is opened, and all France is perhaps about to be precipitated into it ; while a single man alone would fill it up.

If the generation which has just risen up in France, those who fight, those who prepare themselves to occupy places, know nothing of the Bourbons, for they are in fact to them imaginary beings, those who govern, those who occupy important posts lived under the last reign. The youth, led astray by the unwearied assiduity with

which the different factions have calumniated their ancient Princes, must have received false impressions upon the subject. But when they shall discover that the pretended organs of the public opinion have deceived them, that the victories talked of have been only defeats, the conquered countries only vast tombs, the national prosperity only an immense deficit, the glory of the country a chimera, and its depopulation a sad truth,; when they shall be convinced of these things, then, perhaps, it will not be difficult to persuade them that their prejudices against a mild, modest, and sagacious race of princes, have not been more just than their predilection for the Usurper. The attachment of the armies to the Tyrant is no longer to be feared; they loved nothing but his glory, by which they were dazzled; his reverses have opened their eyes. The national pride may still maintain a struggle, but if address be used in separating this sentiment, noble in itself, from the ungrateful wretch who has compromised it so egregiously; no fear need be entertained of talking to the soldiers of their ancient masters, to the youth of the descendants of their

kings;—the calumnies of a Tyrant, once become odious, will soon be converted into titles to esteem.

If this tumultuous youth is less to be feared than has been hitherto conceived, how ridiculous would it be to fear maturer age, when the passions are deadened and the heart begins to sigh only for repose. With the exception of a very small number of individuals, which the royal clemency would excuse, because the happiness of a people must supercede the justice of a king, what reasonable man is there in all France who would not feel the necessity of expiating the murder of Louis the Sixteenth, and effacing the remembrance of the wrongs inflicted upon his family? Who would not see with transport, the sacred dove, who alone has the right to announce the reconciliation of heaven with the earth, return into the ark? A great crime has been committed, nothing but a great expiation can wash away the shame of it. After several years of blindness, the English found that no one but the heir of Charles the First could console them for the loss of his father. At every mark of respect shewn



him, at every token of repentance with which they overwhelmed him, they felt the burden of that guilt, which for eleven years had weighed heavy on their hearts, alleviated and lightened.

But what is at last the picture of that Europe whose thoughts are all employed upon one single man,—upon a man who keeps all her springs stretched to the utmost, who alone suspends her tranquillity? Before Europe can think of influencing the fate of France, the question may be asked, can she dispose of her? Who governs her? Who animates her? What hath she done with her old errors? What will she do with her new virtues? To so many questions, with regard to the future, the past might answer, if Europe at the present moment were such as she was formerly. But her sovereigns, her intimidated people are no longer what they were; two years have changed her means, and alone have repaired fifteen years of misfortunes.

It is the people at large who have now conquered, it was only portions of the people that were vanquished. The armies had been beaten in one campaign, in another the cabinets had been

deceived; sovereigns, generals, ministers, had been tricked, the people brought nothing into the quarrel but fear and curiosity. In these contests esteem was for the enemy, distrust for themselves, and opinion was fortune. But from the moment when a great people substituting themselves for the army, placed their entire will in the room of the instrument only of that will, the face of Europe must necessarily be changed.

The Tyrant of the French only made such a progress over Europe by means of his auxiliary aids. If he fought her armies, policy seconded him; if he menaced thrones, his menaces flattered the people; if he plundered these same people he revenged the sovereigns whom he had abandoned. Disorder and falsehood marched before him, one half of his enemies served him to weaken the other half; disunion delivered the world up to him, it is union which has just reconquered it. The Oppressor of Europe governed the half of her territory; he had deceived France by holding out the hope of rendering her happy; Italy by the hope of seeing the whole country united together; the Confederation of the Rhine,

by inspiring them with fear of Prussia and Austria ; Spain by treason ; Holland by perfidy ; Austria by his negotiations ; Prussia by his intrigues ; Saxony by his hypocrisy ; Poland by false hopes ; Russia by the promise of restoring her to tranquillity. So much power raised upon such a scaffolding of falsehood, must one day moulder away, and this Tower of Babel must be abandoned by its workmen, Kings and Princes, who in serving the ambition of one man all on a sudden ceased to understand each other.

The Revolution, a contagious malady, for twenty years has resisted every kind of remedy ; it was necessary that the atmosphere should recover its salubrity ; it was necessary, as with the plague, that the evil in extending itself should lose its force, and exhaust itself in the blood of its victims. The sovereigns, the governments, the armies, these important parts of society are not so culpable as they may be thought ; it is the people led astray at all points that have done the mischief, and it is the people alone that can repair it.

This revolution which carried its ideas to complete independence, met, at the end of its course, a people the most dependent and the most happy upon the earth; it struck against Russia, and it bruised its feet. Strong from the impulsive force it received in the west of Europe, it yielded to the resistance of a great nation placed at the other extremity. Theories, abstract ideas, had led the people on; experience, simple ideas, have led them back. The love of liberty, instead of establishing republics, has annihilated those that existed, and the fruit of an age of sophisms, and twenty-five years of misfortunes, is the wish of Holland for a king.

To obviate all uneasiness respecting the present coalition, let it only be asked, where is the power that can destroy Opinion? Suppose the Oppressor of France to levy *eleven hundred thousand soldiers*, he cannot conquer twenty nations who have constituted themselves the *dépôts* for their armies. What can be the result even if he obtain victories? Can they compel ideas to make one retrograde step? For twenty years, the sovereigns had been ascending the stream of opinion, at pre-

sent they redescend it, carrying with them the wishes of all the people upon the shores.

While the sovereigns fought against the French nation, the struggle was painful, and they could not fail of being overpowered; but since it is the nations that fight against a Corsican, opinion has changed its place, it has passed into the camp of the conquerors. And if all the principles, all the sentiments that bind men closely together are on the side of the Allies, a rapid glance will soon shew that all the resources are equally with them.

Prussia has been laid waste, but her inhabitants have been converted into invincible soldiers; necessity and despair have done more than the economy of Frederic William the First, and the genius of his son. Her armies are more numerous; devotion to the cause has supplied materials to support it; discipline has arisen from the necessity of its being re-established. Useful men have presented themselves from all parts, the clouds which concealed the skilful Generals are dispersed; Blucher has saved his country, and Prussia at this day, has no reason to envy Prussia, under the Great Frederic.

Instructed by experience, the Confederation of the Rhine no longer seeks a support in tyranny; she will no longer endeavour to escape from the laws she had made to herself to run into a system of which she is still ignorant; she will only see in France a barrier against the ambition of the powers by whom she is surrounded, and in these same powers a curb to the ambition of France.

Austria, who includes within herself, all that constitutes the true force of a state, a monarchy, as Talleyrand himself acknowledged, whose roots penetrate quite to the centre of the earth, — Austria will have learnt that egoism in politics is the most fatal of all combinations.

Too much disposed perhaps to take the agitations of factions for the safety of the state, Sweden already feels the entire value of her brilliant situation. She sees in the great man, who between Lutzen and Leipsic, recalls the memory of the illustrious Gustavus, one who will repair the evils that Charles the Twelfth brought upon her, and thanks Heaven for having drawn from the bosom of disorder the hero, who will restore her

to tranquillity and lay the foundation for her future prosperity.

Denmark, corrected by experience, will learn perhaps that to share the misfortunes of the brave, is preferable to participating in the fortune of the wicked: and threatened with being taught a severe lesson, will hasten to 'merit the esteem' of the dispensers of European justice.

Holland, whose good faith is true power, in reviving commerce in her towns, in renewing her industry upon the element by which she is surrounded, will not forget that to the wisdom of acquiring must be united energy to preserve, and the vessel of the State, battered by republican tempests, will drop the true anchor which alone can insure her tranquillity.

Italy, more impatient of the yoke than any other country, but more strictly watched, waits, but probably conspires. It is no longer for her that we tremble, it is for the unfortunate French, innocent, as it were, of the crimes that they commit. The Sicilian vespers cannot be called to mind without shuddering, and memory recurring with grief to the pages of history, sees those fine

countries once more become the tombs of their conquerors.

Such is the view of the powers which have received a great example from England from Spain, and from Russia. If to the force of that opinion which has raised Europe again from her fallen state, generous and clear-sighted England shall continue to join her riches, the Peninsula its energy, and Russia her admirable disinterestedness, she is sure of reconquering her tranquillity.

The Revolution made twenty-five years ago profited by the faults of all the Kings, let the present Revolution profit by their talents and their virtues. The Allies cannot be ignorant of the resources they possess; recent events have taught them to understand them fully. But what are those resources which Heaven had concealed, as it were for a time, to develop them again at the epoch when it should cease to punish?

Spain was nearly conquered; a throne, an altar had fled; the country of Portugal was scarcely any longer a country; but Wellington was reserved by Providence, and two brave nations have been saved.



France, after five and twenty years of convulsion, has need of repose ; Europe has equal need, that she should be placed in a situation in which she is no longer to be feared ; the world at large has need, that she should be restored to its esteem, and that same Providence has preserved to her a monarch just and without ambition, a family without resentments, generous Princes who still tremble lest they should be confounded with her Tyrant.

The Allies, to avoid the exactions which would render them odious, have occasion for subsidies, and Providence concentrates all the riches of the world among the people of the world the most worthy to make so noble an use of them.

In leading the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine astray for a while, in overlooking for a long time the faults of Prussia, the errors of Austria, Providence has maintained upon those thrones, sovereigns full of honour and worthy of hearing the truth.

Not being able to restore at once to Sweden the preponderance she had enjoyed in former ages, it has united her glory with that of a Chief

which it has given to her soldiers and who prepares to her a glorious futurity.

. . . Lastly, to crown so many blessings, to unite so many different elements, to overthrow so many obstacles, to stifle so much ambition, to smooth over so many jealousies, to cement so vast an edifice, Providence has consigned its great work to the safeguard of probity, of honour, of all the most heroic sentiments, and has placed these virtues in the heart of the Emperor Alexander.

*London, December 14th, 1813.*

FINIS.



